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GOD AND REASON

SOME THESES FROM NATURAL THEOLOGY

BY

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

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INTRODUCTION

Modern philosophy has emphatically turned its face away from reason as a guide to man in any of the weightier interests of life. It boasts of its deliverance from the teachings of the "naïve and pre-scientific believers of the primitive Christian Gospel." It will have nothing to do with a reason-proved, personal, infinite God, the Creator and Ruler of the physical and moral world. Make God anything else you please, even a symbol with a changing ideal value for your changing subjective moods, and modern philosophy will tolerate you. He who runs may read the message. It is written in no uncertain terms, as the following typical quotations, and others to be given later, will show.

Hocking (Professor at Yale University when the work from which we cite was written, now at Harvard University), *The Meaning of God in Human Experience,* rejects a reason-proved God and tells us "that the original source of the knowledge of God is an experience of *not being alone in knowing the world,* and especially the world of nature . . . . God is known as that of which I am primarily certain; and being certain, am certain of self and of my world of men and men's objects." Pp. 236, 296. Professor Hocking appears to be an Ontologist. He has been said to be, and probably is, a Pantheist. Not only does he reject a reason-proved God, but, as we shall see later, he is in hearty agreement with the general tendency in modern philosophy to judge "of uncertain worth . . . . . the labors of reason in behalf of any of our weightier human interests." Not reasoned knowledge, then, but "faith-knowledge" makes God naturally known to us. What an unreasonable, unstable, subjective thing this experience-born faith-knowledge is Professor Hocking himself ingenuously tells us.

"For it is not simply the case that these attributes which religion ascribes to reality (divinity, beneficence, soul-preserving or value-conserving properties) are invisible, spiritual, inaccessible to observation: it is the case that these ideas, so far as reasons go, are in apparent equilibrium—neither provable nor disprovable. The world would be consistent without God; it would also be consistent with God: whichever hypothesis a man adopts will fit experience equally well; neither one, so far as accounting for visible facts is concerned, works better than the other. I have often wondered whether in these supermundane matters the universe may not be so nicely adjusted (and withal so justly) that each man finds true the things he believes in and wills for; why should not man find his religion true, in so far as he has indeed set his heart upon it and makes sacrifices for it? However this may be, the religious objects (the predicates given by religion to reality) stand at a pass of intellectual equipoise: it may well seem that some other faculty must enter in to give determination to reason at the point where reason halts, without deciding voice of its own. The birth of the idea of God in the mind—the judgment 'Reality is living, divine, a God exists'—is so subtle, like the faintest breath of the spirit upon the face of the waters, that no look within can tell whether God is here revealing Himself to man, or man creating God.

"It is because of this position of subtle equilibrium that the religious consciousness is *evanescent; faith is unstable* as empirical knowledge is not. Though at any time I find my world sacred, it only needs a touch of passivity on my part and it will again become secular: I cannot recover nor understand its former worth. My faith in God is subject to fluctuation as my faith in other objects is not, even though these other objects are equally inaccessible (as my faith in China or in the conservation of energy). And noteworthy about this fluctuation is that it passes from extreme to extreme . . .the existence of God is to me either wholly certain or wholly absurd.

"Likewise of immortality: it seems to me at times that a man is a fool to believe it, at other times that a man is a fool not to believe it. . . . But alternations like these belong rather to the will or disposition of the spirit than to the estimating mind. And further, the one thing which is most sure to dispel faith and substitute the secular world-picture is precisely intellectual scrutiny. Faith is not only difficult for reason; it is distinctly diffident towards reason. Its origin, then, and its firmness must be due to some other power, presumably to will . . . the thought of God comes and goes; it is often lost and often recovered, both in racial and in individual experience . . . " Pp. 143—145.

James (Harvard University), *The Varieties of Religious Experience,*

"Rationalism insists that all our beliefs ought ultimately to find for themselves articulate grounds. . . .Vague impressions of something indefinable have no place in the rationalistic system, . . .

nevertheless, if we look on man's whole mental life as it exists, on the life of men that lies in them apart from their learning and science, and that they inwardly and privately follow [James is speaking here principally of man's religious life], we have to confess that the part of it of which rationalism can give an account is relatively superficial. It is the part that has the *prestige* undoubtedly, for it has the loquacity, it can challenge you for proofs, and chop logic, and put you down with words. But it will fail to convince or convert you all the same, if your dumb intuitions [?] are opposed to its conclusions. If you have intuitions at all, they come from a deeper level of your nature than the loquacious level which rationalism inhabits . . .

"This inferiority of the rationalistic level in founding belief is just as manifest when rationalism argues for religion as when it argues against it. That vast literature of proofs for God's existence drawn from the order of nature, which a century ago seemed so overwhelmingly convincing, to-day does little more than gather dust in our libraries, for the simple reason that our generation has ceased to believe in the kind of God it argued for. Whatever sort of a being God may be, we *know* to-day that he is nevermore that mere external inventor of 'contrivances' intended to make manifest his 'glory' in which our great-grandfathers took such satisfaction, though just how we know this we cannot possibly make clear by words either to others or to ourselves. . . .

"Can philosophy stamp a warrant of veracity upon the religious man's sense of the divine? . . . Religion, you expect to hear me conclude, is nothing but an affair of faith, based either on vague sentiment, or on that vivid sense of the reality of things unseen . . . In short, you suspect that I am planning to defend feeling, at the expense of reason . . . To a certain extent I have to admit you guess rightly. I do believe that feeling is the deeper source of religion . . . " Pp. 73, 74, 430, 431.

In *A Pluralistic Universe*, he adds,

"God in the religious life of ordinary men *is the name only of the ideal tendency in things*, believed in as a super-human person . . . The theological machinery that spoke so livingly to our ancestors, with its finite age of the world, its creation out of nothing, its juridical morality and eschatology, its relish for rewards and punishments, its treatment of God as an external contriver, an 'intelligent and moral governor,' sounds as odd to most of us as if it were some outlandish savage religion. The vaster vistas which scientific evolutionism has opened, and the rising tide of social democratic ideals, have changed the type of our imagination, and the older monarchical theism is obsolete or obsolescent . . . An external creator and his institutions may still be verbally confessed at church in formulas that linger by their mere inertia, but the life is out of them, we avoid dwelling on them, the sincere heart of us is elsewhere." Pp. 124, 29.

Blind sentiment, then, leads James to reject the reasoned God our philosophy offers; we shall see farther on that for James it puts in His stead a god that may be anything you please, and gives birth to a faith that is a mere hypothesis, and to a creed that he who professes it may always doubt.

Drake (Professor at Vassar College), *Seekers after God*, **Harvard Theological Review**, January, 1919, writing in full sympathy with the religious chaos to which modern philosophy has given birth, and of which this article is a sad object-lesson, tells us,

"Ambiguous the word 'God' hopelessly is . . . However this may be, any conception which has had such a checkered history, might well suffer, one would suppose, a few more changes." Pp. 80, 81.

"It seems now rather needless to be an atheist. There are so many conceptions of God afloat that anyone at all widely read can scarcely fail to find one suited to his mental outlook and convictions . . . One feels that the rejection of the orthodox conception leaves clear room for the preaching of the naturalistic God of contemporary thought." P. 69.

"For certain types of mind pantheism will doubtless always be alluring . . . God seems [by others to be] relegated to the realm of the ideal . . . No one, except the uncritical adherents of traditional dogma [and among these Professor Drake would most certainly include Catholics] believes to-day in such a God as the ancient Jews worshipped; and it is doubtful if many *really* believe in the grim potter-God of Saint Paul. Mature thought . . . must put away childish things. It is impossible that the great truths which science has revealed in the past nineteen centuries should not have profoundly altered our views of the ultimate realities from that of the naive and pre-scientific believers of the primitive Christian gospel . . . Perhaps our modern God-ideas have really more of the spirit of the Master's teaching than the Hellenic subtleties of the Nicene creed—or even of the Fourth Gospel." Pp. 71, 76, 81.

"What matters, however, in the last analysis, is not how close our conception may approach, or how far it may veer from the thought of earlier days; or even whether we are to use the term 'God' or not; what is vital is that we should retain the sense of the worth and meaning of life which the sacred word connotes. Of the men of the future Mr. Lowes Dickinson writes, 'It may be a personal God they conceive, it may be a tendency in the universe; it may be something which they prefer to call the 'Earth' or 'Nature'; it may be an Absolute; but in any case, it is something not themselves and greater than themselves, something which . . .

concentrates and satisfies in itself those ideal impulses that otherwise would be tortured and broken about an imperfect self." P. 82.

"Are we going to abandon religion in the ardor of our new tasks? Are we to turn with renewed zeal to religion, but free it more and more from theolatry [i.e. God-worship]? Or are we perhaps at the verge of a great new vision of God, which shall lead us into ways that it hath not entered into our hearts to conceive?" P. 83.

An affirmative answer to either of the first two questions means no religion at all or a religion in which the worship of God is to be reduced to a vanishing-point. Either way spells Atheism. And "the new vision of God" looked for in the third question is certainly not one of "the God of orthodox dogma, with His omniscience, omnipotence, aseity [i.e., self-existence], and what not", for Professor Drake insists that "the vast theological library", which furnishes "supposed proofs" for the existence of such a God,

"Is, for progressive thinkers, simply shelved. The question has become, not, can we believe in this cut-and dried conception of mediaeval and modern orthodoxy, but rather, is there any conception of God that we can accept? In other words, the God-idea has become fluid again, the God of the future is in the making" to be moulded "into a form more consonant with man's maturer experience and more servicable for his spiritual life." Pp. 67, 68.

It would appear that for these philosophers the eternal, changeless God has not the reality and stability even of a mortal, changeable man, but is a plaything for them, to be conceived and moulded in whatever fashion happens to suit their varying individual whims or fancies.

Leuba (Professor at Bryn Mawr College), *The Belief in God and Immortality,* writes even more destructively, if that be possible, of religion and morality:

"It hardly need be said here that the abandonment of the belief in a personal God and in personal immortality, though it involved the disappearance of the existing religions, need not bring to an end religious life. Religion is not to be identified with its present forms . . . The sources of the religious life, its fundamental realities, lie deeper than the conceptional forms [one of which is the concept of a personal God] in which they find expression." Pp. X, XI.

"It is, therefore, of the greatest practical importance that those who have become convinced of the absence of sufficient ground for these two beliefs [namely, in a personal God and personal

immortality] and of their apparent unavoidable disappearance if humanity continues in its present course, realize that morality is essentially independent of them. They must know with the clearness that brings persuasion that moral ideals and moral energy have their source in social life . . . " Pp. 321, 322.

"We are now, fortunately, almost done with the absurd tradition that formal religion is the essential means of moral education . . . Belief in transcendental objects [God is one of them], bearers of perfection, is of no greater value in artistic education than in ethical culture, it is . . . in the presence of noble characters and fine conduct that we learn to know and love the good. Those who exaggerate the usefulness of the beliefs in immortality, and in God conceived as the perfect embodiment of all the values discovered on earth, fail to realize the inherent disadvantages of these beliefs. The evils they breed may be called by the general name of 'otherworldliness.' It *would be difficult to evaluate the harm done to humanity in the past by the conviction that the real destination of man is the world to come* . . . I know religious life too favorably to insinuate that those who preach the Kingdom of Heaven are enemies of mankind, but I think that on the whole they would serve it better if they were able to forget not only hell but also heaven. There is always some discrepancy between that which is best for the God of the Christian worship and life in heaven, and that which is best for the individual and society on earth: *one cannot serve perfectly man and the traditional God.*" Pp. 327, 328, 329.

"The conviction that *we must know* whence we come and whither we are going, and that *we must possess* the assurance of a complete realization of our ideals on earth or elsewhere in order to lead a contented and worthy existence, is childish and mischievous." P. 330.

"Of the sense of a real, immediate dependence upon a personal divinity, there remain in Christian states but a few pitiable remnants. In the United States the most conspicuous one is the yearly proclamation of a day of thanksgiving, by which the members of the nation are called upon to return thanks to God for the good that has fallen to their lot and that of the country during the year. From an expression of genuine belief, this custom has become an objectionable tradition, which the sooner it is abandoned, the better for those who keep it up and for those to whom it is addressed." P. 324.

A further insight into Leuba's destructive views on religion is given us in the following passage from **James**, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, which contains an abridged quotation from an article published by **Leuba**, viz., *The Contents of Religious Consciousness*, in **The Monist**, July, 1901. James writes,

"Taking creeds and faith-state together, as forming 'religions,' and treating these as purely subjective phenomena, without regard to the question of their 'truth,' we are obliged, on account of their extraordinary influence on action and endurance, to class them amongst the most important biological functions of mankind. Their stimulant and anaesthetic effect is so great that Professor Leuba in a recent article [mentioned above], goes so far as to say that as long as men can *use* their God, they care very little who he is, or even whether he is at all. 'The truth of the matter can be put,' says Leuba, 'in this way: *God is not known, he is not understood*, he is used—sometimes as a meat-purveyor, sometimes as a moral support, sometimes as a friend, sometimes as an object of love. If he proves himself useful, the religious consciousness asks for no more than that. Does he exist? How does he exist? What is he? are so many irrelevant questions. Not God, but life, more life, a larger, richer, more satisfying life is, in the last analysis, the end of religion.'" Pp. 506, 507.

Could anything be conceived more subversive of true religion and morality than the views expressed by these men? Nevertheless, this is the philosophy which is being taught to-day in non-Catholic colleges and universities, at home and abroad. It monopolizes the current non-Catholic philosophic magazines, it is reflected in our literature, our press, and the lives of the people. Its evil effect cannot be exaggerated. One would be led to surmise that the very chaos, intellectual, religious and moral, into which it has plunged its followers, would be reason enough for its rejection by them. But it is not; and for the simple fact, that having rejected reason as a guide, they have ceased to be reasonable, and have, as a consequence, no appreciation of the state of utter confusion in which they live.

To help to counteract in some measure the deadly influence, especially on religion and morality, of this fundamentally false philosophy, the present work was planned. Its aim is to establish the existence of the reason-proved, personal God, who has been rejected with mockery by modern philosophy.

This is accomplished, in the first place, negatively, that is, by refuting the principal erroneous opinions advanced by various philosophic systems to explain how our first knowledge of God is acquired. It is to be noted, however, that as these

opinions, in as far as they touch our present subject-matter, namely, God, are, for the most part, but particular applications of general theories of knowledge, the falsity of which is supposed to have been fully exposed and demonstrated in previous parts of philosophy, our explanation and refutation of them will be brief.

In the positive treatment of our subject, which follows, theses affirming the existence of God, as the first and unproduced, absolutely self-sufficient, necessarily existing cause of all other existing beings, together with the necessary oneness of His nature, His intelligence and His personality, are quite fully explained, proved, and defended against the objections of adversaries.

As an aid to greater clearness the matter has been developed in thesis-form. For the same reason the syllogism has been generally employed in the proofs of theses and in the presentation of difficulties; terms requiring definition have been formally and strictly defined; and in the solution of difficulties logical form has been everywhere employed. In this last case, however, where a surer grasp of the point at issue appeared to demand it, to these formal solutions informal explanations have been added. This severely Scholastic method of treatment was adopted not only because it seemed to make for greater clearness and more accurate thinking, but also because it was judged best suited to a book intended rather for classroom work or private study than for mere cursory reading.

A not at all unimportant part of our work are the many quotations from more modern philosophical writers, furnishing as they do a fairly good idea of the attitude of present-day philosophy towards God, and so giving a proper setting to our theses, and point to the difficulties urged against them. These quotations will be found to have been taken from articles and books offering brief and striking passages suitable for our purpose, and principally from those published in this country and of non-Catholic authorship. The reason for this choice was, that quotations from these writers, whilst making clear

how far contemporary philosophy has wandered from God, seemed, in addition, best fitted to bring home to us in this country the vital need we have of a thorough acquaintance with a sane, reason-proved Theodicy, and at the same time to give a guarantee that the picture we present of the deplorable state into which modern philosophy has sunk, in its estimation of God and His attributes, has not been overdrawn.

It is scarcely necessary to add, in this matter of quotations, that, unless the contrary is clearly stated or clearly implied, neither approval nor disapproval of any author is to be considered as applying in general to the doctrine taught by him, or in particular to any part of such doctrines other than that at the time referred to.

It may be well, finally, to note just how far our defense of God takes us. The theses we present for development and demonstration are but the initial theses of Natural Theology. Many others, and very important ones, have been left practically untouched; to be treated, perhaps, some future day. Notwithstanding this, however, by proving, as we do, the existence of God as the one, and only possible one, intelligent, personal, unproduced, and hence self-existing and necessarily existing, first cause of all other existing things, the ruler of the world and of man, we have excluded, as absolutely false, all kinds of Atheism, Polytheism and Pantheism.

The exclusion of Pantheism is both explicit and implicit. Attention is called to the implicit exclusion. This is contained, and with immediate clearness, in the proved conclusion that God is an unproduced, necessarily existing being, for as such He can in no way be identified with the produced, contingent world.

Deism also, with its exclusion of God from the world of His creation, is refuted by our theses, not explicitly though, but implicitly. This implication also is contained in the proved conclusion that God is the unproduced, necessarily existing cause of the world, seeing that without the continued and intimate

presence and action in the world of its necessary cause, God, and without the direction of His all-wise providence, neither the ordered world could exist, nor could any single creature in it continue in existence or perform action of any kind.

What is more, by proving that God exists by His very essence and with absolute necessity, we have established the fundamental or root perfection from which Natural Theology derives, either immediately or mediately, all the other great perfections of God which human reason left to itself is capable of knowing. Not a few of these will be found enumerated in the description which will be given later of the more fully developed scientific concept of God. It seems scarcely necessary to add that when this concept has been fully proved and defended, the falsity of Atheism, Polytheism, Pantheism, Deism and other erroneous opinions concerning God will be more clearly and completely evident.

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GOD AND REASON

SOME THESES FROM NATURAL THEOLOGY

I. NATURAL THEOLOGY—DEFINITION.

Natural Theology (*Theos,* God; *logos,* reasonable account) is a scientific, i.e., ordered, certain, reasoned, knowledge of God, acquired by unaided (and so differing from Dogmatic Theology) human reason

It is called also Theodicy (*Theos,* God; *dikē,* right; *dikaioō,* I set right, I justify), i.e., a justification, for believers and against the attacks of unbelievers, of the existence, attributes and works of God. This name was first used by Leibnitz in the title "Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu" etc., under which he published a treatise in answer to Bayle and others, who impugned God's existence because of the presence in the world of moral evil. It should be noted that Leibnitz held the erroneous opinion that the present world is absolutely the best world that could be made, even by God.

II. IMPORTANCE.

1. It is the highest of the naturally acquired sciences. It treats of God.
2. It is the complement of other parts of Philosophy. Without it
   a. Cosmology cannot give a complete explanation of the origin and final cause of the world, the necessity of nature's laws, miracles;
   b. Psychology finds it impossible to adequately explain the origin and immortality of the human soul, the freedom of the human will;
   c. Ethics is without foundation.
3. It supplies the truths necessary as a basis for a reasonable supernatural faith.

III. RELATION TO DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.

It is subordinate to Dogmatic Theology and subject to its negative direction, and this, because the word of God is an extrinsic norm to Natural Theology, and is absolutely infallible, whilst reason, which is its intrinsic norm, may fall into error. Hence, as reason may err, it is held to the truth by Revelation; negatively, however, not positively. It is told that it must not attempt to teach anything which goes counter to the word of God, or the teaching of His infallible Church.

The great value of this negative direction of Dogmatic Theology will become apparent when we view the countless errors concerning religion and morality to which misguided reason, unchecked by Divine Revelation, has given birth. Scarcely a page of the history of philosophy, ancient and especially modern, is free from them.

IV. DIVISION.

1. The existence of God, one and personal. This part only is treated in the present volume.
2. The essence and attributes of God.
3. The action of God in the world.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD, ONE AND PERSONAL

GENERAL PRENOTES

I. THE NAME OF GOD.

Anglo-Saxon, *God;* **German** and **Swiss,** *Gott;* **Dutch,** *Godt;* **Flemish,** *Goed;* **Danish** and **Swedish,** *Gude;* the one invoked, the one to whom sacrifice is offered. From the Gothic root, *gheu,* to invoke, to sacrifice to. Akin to **Hindu,** *Khooda,* and **Persian,** *Khoda.*

Latin, *Deus;* **Sanskrit,** *Dyaus* (gen. *Divas*); **Indo-Iranian,** *Deva;* **Gallic,** *Diu;* **French,** *Dieu;* **Spanish,** *Dios;* **Portuguese,** *Deos;* **Italian,** *Dio;* **Irish** and **Gaelic,** *Dia;* **Greek,** *Zeus* (gen. *Dios*) and *Theos;* **Old Teutonic,** *Tiu* (Tuesday). Probably from Indo-Germanic roots, *div,* to shine, to give light; and *thes,* in *thessasthai,* to implore.

Hebrew, *El;* **Babylonian,** *Ilu;* **Arabic,** *Ilah* (*Al-Ilah, Allah*); the strong or mighty one. By the **Hebrews** God was also called *Jahveh* (the unutterable name), He who is; *Adonai,* Lord; *Elohim,* probably, the Almighty.

II. THE CONCEPT OF GOD.

Popular. This concept represents God, at least, as a supreme being, superior to the world and on whom the world depends; its ruler and the ruler of man, and the object of man's prayer and veneration. It may, and does in many instances, represent additional perfections of God; at times, also, it is partially erroneous in representing His nature, as, for instance, when it represents His nature as existing in many beings.

This concept, which, morally speaking, all who have the use of their reason tenaciously possess, is derived, almost spontaneously and through an informal reasoning

process, from a consideration of ourselves and things round about us.

Speaking of this concept of God, **Fr. Kleutgen, S. J.,** *Philosophie Scholastique,* nn. 226 ff. (quoted by **William George Ward,** *The Philosophy of Theism,* Vol. 2, pp. 133 ff.), says,

"In many places Scripture declares, in the most express manner, that even for those to whom God has not manifested Himself by His Prophets or by His Son, there exists a revelation of God in His works, and even within the mind of men, whereby they can without any difficulty cognize God, their Creator and Maker, as well as His sovereign law.

"It is not necessary to point out that Scripture does not in this speak of any (supposable) first cause, but of the living and true God, who has created heaven and earth, and inscribed His law in the heart of man; and that, consequently, it speaks also of the moral order.

"Now, it says in the same passages that men who do not thus cognize their God are without excuse; that they are insensate; that they deserve God's wrath and all His chastisements. It necessarily follows, then, that this manifestation of God by His works is such, that man cannot fail by this means to cognize God with certitude, unless he commit a grave fault.

"Assuredly this does not mean that it is philosophical researches, continued laboriously through obstacles and doubts, which can alone lead to knowledge of God. Very few men, in fact, are capable of these laborious researches; whereas Scripture speaks of all the heathens in general; and in the Book of Wisdom it is said expressly (13:1), 'All men are vanity who do not possess the knowledge of God.' . . .

"It necessarily follows, therefore, that there is a knowledge of God different from philosophical knowledge; a knowledge so easy to acquire and so certain, that ignorance and doubt on that head cannot be explained, except either by culpable carelessness or proud obstinacy. Such is also . . . the common doctrine of the holy Fathers: they distinguish that knowledge, of God which is obtained by philosopical research, from that which springs up spontaneously in every man at the very sight of creation. This latter kind of knowledge is called by them . . 'an endowment of nature' . . . a knowledge which springs up in some sense of itself, in proportion as reason is developed. . . . And when the Fathers of the Church declare unanimously on this head that this knowledge is really found and established in all men, the importance of their testimony is better understood by remembering that they lived in the midst of heathen populations. . . . Since that moral and religious life for which man was created is founded on a knowledge of the truths whereof we speak, God watches over man, in order that reason,

as it is developed, may come to know them with facility and certainty. Observe the question here is not of supernatural grace, but is of the natural order."

Scientific. This concept represents God as the unproduced first cause of the world, existing of Himself and with absolute necessity, one and, of necessity, only one, intelligent, and consequently a personal being.

When more fully developed, it further shows God to be absolutely infinite, i. e., actually possessing all possible perfections limitlessly, absolutely simple, intrinsically immutable, immense, eternal, with an infinitely perfect knowledge from all eternity of absolutely everything knowable, even the free future acts of man, all holy, all merciful, all just, all mighty, the creator of the world, on whom all creatures absolutely depend for their coming into existence, and in every action they perform, whose wise providence continually governs all things and is in no way to be impugned because of the evils in the world, be they physical or moral.

This concept is the fruit of careful analysis and formal, scientific demonstration.

Other Concepts of God. Besides these two concepts of God which unaided reason derives through *a posteriori* demonstration from a consideration of the visible universe, man knows God in two other ways; in this life, through Revelation; in the life to come, seeing God face to face in the Beatific Vision. These two concepts, however, being supernatural, are outside the province of Natural Theology.

III. VARIOUS OPINIONS CONCERNING GOD.

1. **Atheist.** One who, having the use of reason, does not admit the existence of God.

   Practical, One who lives as if there were no God, and so practically rejects Him.

Theoretical, One who intellectually does not admit God's existence.

Negative, When this non-admission is due to a want of all knowledge of God.

Positive, When it is an explicit act.

Agnostic, One who asserts that to man's unaided reason, God, the ultimate source of reality, must ever remain unknown. He is frequently called merely an Agnostic.

Sceptic, One who positively doubts of God's existence.

Dogmatic, One who positively denies God's existence.

As a genuine concept of God must at least represent Him as a supreme being, superior to the world and on whom it depends, a being to be supplicated and venerated, we class as Atheists not only those just mentioned but also those who place God on a level with the world, or with any part of it.

"No Theist" says **Ward, J.,** *Pluralism and Theism,* p. 243, "can pretend that the world is co-ordinate with God; the divine transcendence is essential to the whole theistic position."

Hence Pantheists, as will appear below, are Atheists, and also many present day non-Catholic philosophers, who would resent the name of Atheist, but who admit at least that they have no knowledge of the actual existence of the being called God, and some of whom make Him to be not a real being at all, but a shadowy something, an ideal, an inspiration, "a symbol of our highest human values," the "Common Will" of men, and the like. In this, they follow the lead of the father of modern philosophy, Kant, who, no matter what he called himself, was really an Atheist. From the viewpoint of his "pure reason," he was an Agnostic, and the god he

postulated, through his "practical reason," was really man himself.

In a brief summary of his doctrine concerning God, to be given shortly, Kant's Atheism will be clearly shown. Some idea of the atheistic trend of the philosophy of to-day, which even a casual reading will discover, may be gathered from two articles, and a lately published (1922) book, to which we refer: *Seekers after God,* by **Durant Drake,** Professor of Philosophy and Education, Vassar College, **The Harvard Theological Review,** January, 1919; *The Theological Trend of Pragmatism,* by **A. Eustace Haydon,** Chicago University, **The American Journal of Theology** (Chicago University), October, 1919; and *The Idea of God,* by **Clarence A. Beckwith,** Illinois Professor of Christian Theology, Chicago Theological Seminary. These three writers seem to have minds elastic enough to tolerate any concept of God, except that offered by Scholastic Philosophy. And modern philosophy is almost at one with them in this tolerance. Some passages from Professor Drake's article have already been cited in our introduction; other passages to be cited later will further emphasize present-day philosophy's rejection of God.

2. **Polytheist.** One who admits the existence of many gods.

3. **Pantheist.** One who either partially or wholly identifies God with the world. A Pantheist is really an Atheist. Not a few philosophers of the present day profess Pantheism of the idealistic type.

4. **Deist.** One who admits the existence of God but denies His providence over the world, either totally, or only His special providence, i.e., miracles and supernatural revelation.

Christlieb, *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief*, gives a brief but clear picture of the Deist and incidentally also of the Pantheist.

"This [Deism] is in many respects the antithesis of Pantheism. According to Pantheism, God exists only *in* the world as its soul; according to Deism, He exists only *above* the world as a personal spirit, who, after creating the world by His will, now acts towards it like an artificer with a finished machine, which mechanically pursues its natural course according to the laws laid down for it, and no longer requires the immediate assistance or interference of its maker. . . .

"The being, personality and supramundane nature of the Deity, and the creation of the world by Him, are thus acknowledged; while, on the other hand, any *continuous active presence of God in the world, and any living interposition in its affairs are denied.* The world has outgrown its leading-strings, and emancipated from divine control is now left to itself. There is no special providence; miracles are an impossibility. Everything takes place in harmony with natural laws, which are implanted in the universe and suffer no alteration whatsoever. This is the chief character of the deistical theory.

"For the Pantheist, God is too near to seem to be above him; for the Deist, too far off to be recognized as exercising any direct rule over the world which He has made. Relegating God, as it were, to the uttermost confines of being, he seeks to keep Him off as far as possible, in order to follow the light of natural reason, unmolested by the cross lights of a higher revelation.

"The first and immediate consequence of this is, that every special manifestation of God, no matter what, must be denied, all supernatural elements in the Christian belief, even those involved in the person and work of Christ, must be excluded, and anything in Scripture, bearing on these points must be explained away by a reference to natural causes. In all essentials, then, Deism coincides entirely with that which was formerly denominated Naturalism, for it pronounces the laws of nature to be adequate to the continuous existence of the world, and natural religion to be the only essential form of belief, even in connection with Christianity. It likewise agrees in principle with Rationalism, the essence of which consists in the position that reason is not merely the formal but also the material principle of religion, and supreme arbiter over the whole substance of the Christian faith." P. 101.

5. **Monotheist (Theist).** One who admits the existence of only one God, the creator and ruler of the world, over

which He exercises both general and special providence. The numerous erroneous views briefly stated above will be rejected later, either explicitly or implicitly.

IV. VARIOUS ERRONEOUS OPINIONS AS TO HOW MAN KNOWS GOD.

1. **Erring by Excess:** holding that God's existence is immediately evident to us.

a. The Defenders of the Argument 'A Simultaneo' (though called also the Ontological argument, it is not the argument of the Ontologists), who hold that the proposition,—God, a being whose existence is absolutely necessary, exists,—is immediately evident to us, i. e., by analysis and comparison of its subject and predicate we come to a knowledge of God's real and actual existence.

St. Anselm and St. Bonaventure, Descartes and Leibnitz, the two last holding the idea of God to be innate, used this argument.

Some think, however, and with reason, that St. Anselm and St. Bonaventure presupposing God's existence proved, and hence the idea of God a true one, used the argument, not as a means of gaining a primary knowledge of God, but rather to show that one who conceives God through a concept known to be valid, must by that very fact know Him to exist.

b. The Ontologists, who hold that the first knowledge man has, is a direct, immediate, though obscure, knowledge of God, and that in Him so known is known everything else that man knows. This vision of God is had through an immediate objective union with Him, and its initial obscurity is due to distractions arising in the imagination, and to the shackling of the soul to the body. It cannot be evolved or perfected independently of the concurrent action of the imagination, and intercommunication through speech with other intellects.

Hence this vision differs from that of the Blessed in heaven.

There are four varieties of Ontologism: Pantheistic, Rationalistic, Malebranchian, Giobertian. Pantheistic Ontologism identifies our intellect with God; Rationalistic, claims that we have an immediate vision of the essence of God. Both of these forms of Ontologism explicitly go counter to our faith. What is more, each of the other two forms contains implicitly the same two errors. Both of them hold that we have a direct vision of God through some attribute; but God's essence and attributes are identical in reality and also in concept; therefore he who has a vision of an attribute has a vision of the essence of God. Moreover, both of these opinions are pantheistic, inasmuch as they make the reality represented in our universal concepts a thing divine. But this reality is identified with creatures.

Malebranche, Gioberti, Rosmini, and, at one time, Brownson were Ontologists. Ontologism was condemned by a decree of the Congregation of the Holy Office, September 18, 1861. Cf. **Denzinger,** *Enchiridion Symbolorum, etc.,* Ed. 1913, n. 1659. Rosmini's opinions were condemned by the same Congregation, Dec. 14, 1887. Cf. *Ibid.*, nn. 1891 ff., 1927. For more modern Ontologism, cf. **Driscoll,** *God,* p. 56.

Some of the arguments for Ontologism will be answered at the end of Thesis I.

c. The Defenders of Innate or Divinely Infused Ideas.

Chief among these are Descartes, Leibnitz, both of whom advocate the argument *a simultaneo,* and Rosmini, whose innate idea is an *intuition of God.*

Descartes admitted three kinds of ideas: 1. Those formed by outside objects acting through the senses (*adventitiae,* adventitious); 2. Those fashioned by the intellect either arbitrarily or as the result of reasoning

(*factitiae,* made); 3. Innate ideas, which are created with the intellectual faculty. These are either actual cognitions which lie dormant or shine clear as attention is not, or is given; or an innate capacity of the mind for eliciting certain cognitions distinct from and causally independent of adventitious and factitious knowledge. Among other things, God is known in this way.

Leibnitz held that at the creation of the soul, God gave it ideas of all things knowable in the world. These ideas, however, when given, are confused and involved, and become distinct and are evolved according to a divinely pre-established harmony between the changes in the body and those in the soul, its dominant monad.

Rosmini asserted that in the intellect of man is an innate idea of being, at first indeterminate, through the application of which to objects perceived by the senses, generic and specific ideas of things are gradually formed. Gradually Rosmini drifted into Ontologism implicitly pantheistic, for in a work published after his death, he held that this innate idea represented intuitively something of being, necessary, eternal, and the creative cause of things.

2. **Erring by Defect:** holding that man's intellect of itself is incapable of any evidential knowledge of God, either immediate, or mediate i. e., acquired by demonstration.

a. **The Traditionalists (Fideists),** who say, in part, that man to know God, even obscurely, or, according to a milder form of the doctrine, to know God clearly and distinctly, has an absolute need of Revelation. Given in the beginning, this Revelation has been perpetuated by tradition. The intellect, therefore, if not taught from without, cannot come to a knowledge of God, or at least to a clear knowledge of Him.

Inventors of different forms of this error were De Bonald, Bonnety, Ventura. Traditionalism is condemned by the Church.

b. **A Host of Modern Philosophers,** more or less Kantian, and in the true sense of the word Agnostics, who teach, in part, that God's existence in the actual world cannot be demonstrated, but that, through a natural though blind instinct, an existence of some kind is to be accorded to Him. And this by:

i. **The Practical Reason.** Kant is the father of the system which attributes, to what in that system is called the *Practical Reason,* whatever belief or faith man has in the existence of God, the freedom of the human will, and the immortality of the human soul. We say *whatever belief man has,* for according to Kant, man neither has, nor can have *any knowledge* of these matters. Whatever else, then, may be said later on of Kant's Practical Reason, this may be said now, that it is in no sense a cognitive faculty, but the *Will* of man, which acts independently of reason, and with absolutely no reasonable foundation. It is a blind guide, born of a system that is destructive of all truth, morality and religion. What follows will make this only too evident.

It is not our intention, however, to give here a full explanation and refutation of Kant's system. That is done elsewhere in philosophy. It will be sufficient for our present purpose to view it briefly in its bearing on God, morality and religion, noting in the meanwhile, a point well worthy of note, namely, that, though abounding in glaring inconsistencies,—"*glorious* inconsistencies" one of his admirers calls them—the influence of Kant's system on modern thought is almost beyond estimation. Modern philosophy has all but rejected reason universally as a guide to God, or in any of the weightier interests of life, and to Kant as to an infallible teacher

it appeals for justification in this rejection. This is the destructive heritage that Kant has left to modern philosophy.

Man's knowledge according to Kant, is confined solely to phenomena, i.e., to his own subjective sense experiences. He knows, and can know nothing outside of them, nothing outside of himself. The Natural Sciences and Mathematics which have to do with phenomena, either actual or possible, are real sciences. Metaphysics, on the contrary, as a science claiming to deal with extra-phenomenal reality, i.e., with *things-in-themselves,* is useless. Cosmology, Psychology, Natural Theology, can know nothing of a world, a soul, a God, for these objects transcending man's experience are altogether outside of his knowledge. True, the speculative reason, urged on by an uncontrollable impulse to seek for the *unconditioned condition of all things conditioned,* reaches out to the Being of beings, an infinite God; nevertheless, its labor is barren, for since it knows nothing, and can know nothing of a *real* God, it develops and can develop only an *idea* of God, to which corresponds no known or knowable reality. Kant's speculative reason, then, as we noted before, brings man to agnostic Atheism.

Kant's system, however, does not stop here. The prime motive he had in destroying reason's power to reach God, he tells us, was not to bring about Atheism, on the contrary, it was to protect God, religion and morality from the many enemies who were making use of reason to destroy them.

"I am not allowed, therefore," Kant says in the preface to the second edition of his *Critique of Pure Reason,* "even to *assume* for the sake of the necessary practical employment of reason, *God, freedom and immortality, if I cannot deprive speculative reason of its pretensions to transcendent insights,* because reason, in order to arrive at these, must use principles which are intended originally for objects of possible experience only, and which, if in spite of this, they are applied to what

cannot be an object of experience, really change this into a phenomenon, thus rendering all *practical extension* of pure reason impossible. *I had therefore to remove knowledge to make room for belief.* For the dogmatism of metaphysic, that is, the presumption that it is possible to achieve anything in metaphysic without a previous criticism of pure reason, is the source of all that unbelief, which is always very dogmatical, and wars against all morality . . . "

"The greatest benefit, however, [of the Critique of Pure Reason] will be, that such a work will enable us to put an end forever to all objections to morality and religion, according to the Socratic method, namely, by the clearest proof of the *ignorance* of our opponents. Some kind of metaphysic has always existed, and will always exist, and with a dialectic of pure reason, as being natural to it. *It is therefore the first and most important task of philosophy to deprive metaphysic, once for all, of its pernicious influence, by closing up the sources of its errors.*" (Max Müller's Translation, 2nd edition, pp. 700, 701.)

By removing, then, the fundamental truths of religion and morality from the reach of reason, Kant wished to protect them, little seeing that such removal would necessarily destroy them. Heine saw with clear vision the result of Kant's philosophy,—"I can hear the bell. Kneel down. They are bringing the Sacraments to a dying God."

Having deprived *speculative reason* of the power to attack God, Kant now turns to his Practical Reason to bring God back again, to restore Him to His proper place in man's life. How this is done, and what kind of god Kant has brought back, we shall now see.

Man cannot know God, nevertheless man is a moral being, and the Practical Reason through the voice of conscience proclaiming the *Categoric Imperative*,—"This must be done; this must be left undone,"—demands insistently man's obedience. This obedience, however, cannot be justified, in other words, morality cannot be justified, unless the Practical Reason *postulates* the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the freedom of the will, i. e.,—restricting our attention now merely to the *postulate* of God's existence,—unless the

Practical Reason commands man to act on the *hypothesis* (Kant denies that it is an hypothesis) that there is a God, *to act as if there were a God,* the while his cognitive or speculative reason tells him that it knows nothing of a God, and can discover no reasonable grounds for asserting the existence of one. **Donat** in *The Freedom of Science,* p. 45, justly remarks,

> "This dualism of 'faith' and 'knowledge' is as untenable as it is common. It is a psychological impossibility as well as a sad degradation of religion. How can I seriously believe and seriously hold for true, a view of the world which I do not know to be really true, when the intellect unceasingly whispers in my ear: it is all imagination. As long as faith is a conviction so long must it be an activity of the intellect. With my feeling and will I may indeed wish that something be true; but to wish simply that there be a God is not to be convinced that there actually is a God. By merely longing and desiring, I can be as little convinced, as I can make progress in virtue by walking, or repent of sins by a toothache."

Man, then, according to Kant, postulates the existence of a god, capable of satisfying a need which man judges himself to have. As the nature of this postulated being is not determined by anything that man *knows to be objectively true,* then every individual man being the judge of his own needs may postulate a god to suit himself. Whether the god so postulated exists or not makes little or no difference. That this is the practical outcome of Kant's philosophy we shall show presently.

Before doing so, however, let us see what kind of god Kant postulated to explain the moral law. Time and again he insists that God is not the source of morality, that there is no eternal, divine law that man is bound to obey, that man is a law unto himself, and is bound to obey not God but himself. Man is morally autonomous, just as in Kant's system he is intellecually autonomous. God's existence, then, is postulated by Kant not because without Him, as man's *moral superior* and the *supreme lawgiver,* the moral order could not be explained, but because

without Him, as *ruler of physical nature,* all-powerful to harmonize it with man's moral endeavors, man could not hope to reach that happiness which he merits by obeying not God, but his own nature. Man, therefore, in the moral order, and in the religious order also,—for, according to Kant, religion and morality are one and the same thing—is not merely independent of God, but is His superior, for *God is only an agent of man,* postulated to give to man the happiness which man has deserved independently of Him. (*Cf. Kant's Theory of Ethics,* Abbott's translation, 6 Ed., pp. 16, 17, 18, 51, 179 ff., 206, 221 ff., 231, 240 ff.)

Johnston Estep Walter in an article on *Kant's Moral Theology,* Harvard Theological Review, July, 1917, writes very clearly and forcibly on this point:

"The moral law [according to Kant] commands us to make the *summum bonum* the ultimate object of our endeavors. The *summum bonum* consists of two elements, morality or virtue and happiness. Virtue is the 'first and principal element' ('it is the worth of the person, and his worthiness to be happy'); happiness is the inferior element, it is conditioned by virtue . . . It should be attentively observed that Kant assumes the existence of God, not as necessary to the possibility of the whole of the *summum bonum,* but of only one of its elements, and that, the inferior element, namely, happiness. Kant never postulates a God as necessary to the 'first and principal element' of the *summum bonum,* virtue or morality.

"More fully it should be noted, that he does not treat God as the author of the community of moral agents in the world, or as the supreme object of their moral reverence, or as the producer of moral law, or the inspirer of moral life, or as Himself having ordained that virtue shall be accompanied by proportionate happiness, or as having made it a duty to promote the *summum bonum:* that is to say, he does not postulate a God as necessary for any of the greater objects and concerns of morality, but only, or primarily, as the agent of the rather subordinate office of securing for the virtuous the happiness which they think they ought to have.

"Kant regards man as morally autonomous, as giving moral law to himself and obeying it himself, as the sole author of his own virtue. To assume that men are dependent on God for the moral law and for virtue would be posulating a species of heteronomy to which Kant is always decidedly

opposed. He will not accept the moral law even from God; he firmly claims autonomy. The supreme moral object for men is the moral law, which they produce of themselves and impose upon themselves. In his moral theory the finite rational agent is greater than God."

Briefly, Kant's Practical Reason,—which is not reason at all, but the Will demanding and commanding obedience to moral laws,—blindly postulates a god of a kind to render service to man such, that man may find it possible to obey laws which emanate from himself. It is an act of the will, then, setting up a god with a man-fashioned nature to serve a man-created desire. The intellect, therefore, no longer discovers a God existing outside of man, whose existence and attributes are His by divine right, eternally and absolutely, on whom man utterly depends, whose supreme will man is bound to obey, who is to be reverenced, worshipped and adored; but the will of man conjures up a god, whose existence is not known and cannot be known, and who cannot consequently be treated as a real being, and whose nature and attributes are fashioned by man to suit man's self-made needs.

Kant's speculative reason makes of man an Agnostic, his practical reason goes further. When its work is done, man no longer merely confesses ignorance of God, but to his ignorance he has added the insult of setting up in place of the true God, a *postulated* or supposititious god, man-made and man's inferior. It will not surprise us, then, if, as the subjoined excerpts will show, we find religion a sham for Kant, and for the many present-day philosophers who, following his lead, reject a reason-proved God, and substitute a god of their own making, or choose one from the many man-made gods already fashioned.

Of Kant's religion, Donat, *The Freedom of Science,* writes, citing in places Kant's own words:

"Kant himself the father of agnostic mysticism, has made it clear that his postulates of faith concerning the

existence of God and the immortality of the soul, have never taken in him the place of earnest conviction. Thus, in the first place, Kant holds that there are no duties towards God, since He is merely a creature of our mind. 'Since this idea [of God] proceeds entirely from ourselves, and is a product of ours, we have here before us a postulated being towards whom we can have no obligation; for its reality would first have to be proved by experience, . . . to have religion is a duty man owes to himself.' 'Prayer, as an internal form of cult, and therefore, considered as a means of grace, is a superstitious delusion . . . *A disposition* present in all our actions to perform them *as if* in the service of God, is *a spirit of prayer* that can and ought to be our perpetual guide . . . *By this . . . spirit of prayer man seeks to influence only himself; by prayer*, since man expresses himself in words, hence outwardly, *he seeks to influence God.* In the former sense a prayer can be made with all sincerity, though man does not pretend to assert the existence of God fully established; in the latter form, as an address, he assumes the highest Being is personally present, or at least *pretends* that he is convinced of his presence, in the belief, that even should he not be, it can do him no harm, on the contrary it may win him favor; hence in the latter form of actual prayer we shall not find the sincerity as perfect as in the former.'" P. 46.

Kant's followers are more outspoken and some even blasphemous in their rejection of God. It will be sufficient to cite a few.

Kleinpeter, *Kantstudien, VIII,* p. 314,

"It is important to hold fast to the idea that a self-existent, divine truth, independent of the subject, objectively binding, enthroned, so to say, above men and gods, is meaningless, . . . Such a Truth is nonsense." (Cited by Donat, l.c., p. 35).

Niebergall, *Christliche Welt,* 1909, p. 43,

"The fundamental idea of religion can neither be created nor destroyed by teaching; it has its seat in sentiment, like —excuse the term—an insane idea." (Cited by Donat, l.c., p. 45).

E. Von Hartmann,

"From the viewpoint of authority, autonomy does not mean anything else but that in ethical matters I am for myself the highest court of appeal . . . The God, who in the beginning spoke to his children from a fiery cloud . . . has descended into our bosom, and, transformed into our being, speaks out of us as a moral autonomy." (Cited by Donat, l.c, p. 250).

"We cannot help attributing a religious character, as far as the animal is concerned, to the relation between the in-

telligent domestic animals and their master." (Cited by Donat, l.c., p. 290).

Plate,

"The universe is the expression of a uniform, original principle, which may be termed God, Nature, primitive force, or anything else, . . . These fundamental ideas of monism are by no means atheistic." (Cited by Donat, l.c., p. 287).

Jodl,

"As the realm of science is the real, and the realm of art the possible, so the realm of religion is the impossible." (Cited by Donat, l.c., p. 290).

Leuba,

"The truth of the matter can be put in this way: God is not known, he is not understood; he is used—sometimes as a meat-purveyor, sometimes as a moral support, sometimes as a friend, sometimes as an object of love. If he proves himself useful the religious consciousness asks for no more than that. Does God really exist? What is he? are so many irrelevant questions." (Cited by James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 506. What James thought of God we have seen in our Introduction, and shall further see below, in the section entitled Pragmatism).

W. Bender,

"Not the question about God, and not the inquiry into the origin and purpose of the world is religion, but the question about man. All religious views of life are anthropocentric." (Cited by James, l.c., p. 507).

Durant Drake, *Seekers After God,* **Harvard Theological Review,** January, 1919, has already witnessed to the hopeless confusion concerning God into which modern philosophy has been led by its Kantian rejection of reason as a guide in man's search for Him. A few more confirmatory passages from the same article will close our present inquiry.

"It now seems rather needless to be an atheist. There are so many conceptions of God afloat that anyone at all widely read can scarcely fail to find someone suited to his mental outlook and convictions." P. 69.

"For certain types of mind pantheism will always be alluring. . . . The veteran and beloved **John Burroughs** equates the terms 'God' and 'Nature.' 'We must get rid of the great moral governor and head director. He is a fiction of our own brains. We must recognize only Nature, the All: call it God if we will . . .'

"Similarly **ex-President Elliot,** in his famous address on *The Religion of the Future* (Delivered at the Harvard

Summer School of Theology, 1909), declares that 'the *new thought* of God will be its most characteristic element.' 'The Infinite Spirit pervades the universe, just as the spirit of man pervades his body, and acts consciously or unconsciously in every atom of it.' It is 'one, omnipotent, eternal Energy, informing and inspiring the whole creation at every instant of time and throughout the infinite spaces.'" P. 71.

"In his last great work (*The Problem of Christianity*) Royce. . defined God, more in accord with the new dominant tendency, as ' the spirit of the beloved community.'" P. 72.

"At last Mr. Wells. . has succeeded in forming his conception of God, . . . 'He is the undying human memory, the increasing human will' This is reminiscent of earlier expressions by a scholarly American writer (H. A. Overstreet, *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. XI, p. 394; Vol. XIII, p. 155), who defined 'God' as 'our own ideal of life,' 'the finer life that lives potentially in ourselves,' 'the deeper, more comprehensive self in all men that is urging to realization.' . . . Is that the conception, so eloquently presented by F. H. Green (*The Witness of God*), of God, as 'our unrealized ideal of a best'? . . . 'The word God is a symbol to designate the universe in its ideal-achieving capacity.' (So Forster, *The Function of Religion in Man's Struggle for Existence*.") Pp. 74, 75, 76.

"Mr. Bernard Shaw, who, in that delightful play, *Androcles and the Lion*, showed his ability to appreciate the Christian spirit, tells us in its preface that 'Jesus declared that the reality behind the popular belief in God was a creative spirit in ourselves called by Him the Heavenly Father and by us Evolution, Élan Vital, Life Force, and other names.'" P. 79.

ii. **Sentiment,** i.e., by a blind irresistible feeling of a faculty superior to the intellect. This faculty is called the divine sense, the religious sense. Jacobi, Schleiermacher, Gratry and many present-day philosophers hold this opinion.

iii. **A Blind Instinct of the Intellect,** called the common sense, the faculty of inspiration, of intuition. So think Reid, Oswald, Dugald Stewart and others.

iv. **The Principle of Vital Immanence.** This principle is proposed by the Modernists as the source of man's knowledge of God, and of religious truths in general. The system they have built up in support of it, philosophically, bristles with error; theologically, it has been rightly styled

in the Encyclical of Pius X, *Pascendi Dominici gregis,* Sept. 8, 1907, (**Denzinger,** op. c., nn. 2071 ff.) condemning it, "a synthesis of all heresies." Many of its errors, therefore, are in direct opposition to the revealed word of God, and have been condemned by not a few Councils of the Church. The above-mentioned Encyclical gives a very full exposition of its erroneous doctrines and its methods of propagandism, and points out the means to be taken to nullify its baneful influence. One of these means is a solid grounding in Scholastic Philosophy.

The following are some of the principal errors of Modernism:

a. Man by the natural light of human reason cannot come to a knowledge of God. Hence all proofs for God's existence advanced in Natural Theology are worthless. Neither can the word of man, nor the teaching of man reveal God to us. God is the object of faith-knowledge, and as such is known only by a direct revelation made by God to each individual man.

b. As God is not known previous to, or outside of the act of faith-knowledge, there can be no question of a revelation accepted on the word of an all-knowing, all-truthful God, hence this revelation of Himself which God makes to each individual man is not an *objective* or *external* revelation, i. e., one made transiently or from without, as, for example, when one man reveals something to another, but a subjective revelation made by God immanent in the heart, i. e., the desires or affections of man, by which man has an actual vital experience of God working within him. This vital experience then, is not an intellectual vision of God as a being external to man, but a sense or emotional feeling which is produced in the heart, i.e., the affective faculty, without any previous advertence of the mind, and possesses within itself, as its *own object* and as its *intrinsic* cause, the *reality of*

the divine. In other words, man is emotionally conscious of God's presence within him, God being the *intrinsic* cause of this emotion, the intrinsic Revealer, and also the object revealed in it.

Now as man can be conscious only of *his own vital acts,* and *of himself* as the cause concretely revealed in them, it follows that if man is conscious of an emotion intrinsically caused by God, and revealing God, man's vital act and God's vital act are one and the same act; God and man are identified. This is pure Pantheism.

In justification of these statements we cite a few passages from *The Programme of Modernism* (Translated by Tyrrell) and from Tyrrell, *Through Scylla and Charybdis,* at the same time calling attention to the pantheistic implications involved in the supreme eminence in religious matters given by the Modernists to the individual and collective religious consciousness because of the immanence of God in that consciousness.

The Programme of Modernism:

"Religious knowledge is our actual experience of the divine which works in ourselves and in the whole world." P. 96.

"Religion is shown to be the spontaneous result of irrepressible needs of man's spirit which finds satisfaction in the inward and emotional experience of the presence of God within us." P. 100.

"Long years . . . have . . . driven us [Modernists] to adopt a new theory as to the development of dogma from the teaching of Christ, preferring to see everywhere the continual and secret workings of a divine indwelling spirit rather than contradict plain facts by admitting an abrupt and complete revelation which never took place." P. 17.

"That this revelation [i.e., revelation as explained by the Modernists] can only be *transmitted* by external signs is beyond question. But this does not alter the fact that our adhesion to these supernatural realities, which are the theme and argument of the said revelation is a result of *internal* experience." P. 109.

"It cannot be denied that our [the Modernists'] postulates are inspired by the principles of immanentism, for they all assume that the subject is not purely passive in its pro-

cesses of knowledge and in its religious experiences, but brings forth from its own spiritual nature both the witness to a higher reality intuitively perceived and the abstract formulation of the same." P. 99.

"Modernists . . . examine them [the Scriptures] with two faculties: the scientific faculty . . . and the faculty of faith, or religious intuition, which strives by assimilation and self-adaptation to re-experience within itself that religious experience of which the Bible is the written record." P. 125.

"According to this principle [the immanental], nothing can enter into and get hold of man's spirit that does not spring from it and in some way correspond to its need of self-expansion. For there is no fixed truth, no unalterable principle, that is not in some way self-imposed and innate." P. 92.

Through Scylla and Charybdis:

"Revelation is not so much a representation of something experienced, as one of the elements of a complex spiritual experience—an experience made up of feelings and impulses and imaginings; which reverberates in every corner of the soul and leaves its impress everywhere; in the mind no less than in the heart and will . . . It would be a mistake to regard these latter as the exclusive substance and reality of the experience, or as the 'content' or signification of that so-called 'representation.' It is as much a part of the experience as they are, . . . it is, together with them, the subject matter of a subsequent act of reflection which strives to understand the whole complex experience in the interests of theology and philosophy." P. 283.

"Revelation is not statement but experience . . . When, therefore, God reveals Himself to the spirit in an extraordinary way and degree, it is in the total experience that we are to look for the revelation and not merely in the mental element. In this total experience He is revealed, not as a fact is revealed in a statement, but as a cause is revealed in its effect . . . Revelation is not a statement, but a 'showing.' God speaks by deeds, not by words." Pp. 285, 287.

"On the ears of the hearer, prophetic utterances must fall dead, unless there be within him a capacity to be evoked and directed by the Divine Word, a spirit to answer the Spirit . . . In other words, the teaching from outside must evoke a revelation in us. It is to this evoked revelation that we answer by the act of Faith, recognizing it as God's word in us from outside, it can be occasioned, but it cannot be caused, by instruction." Pp. 304, 305, 306.

"For us once freed from our imaginative representation of an external God, who works upon humanity from outside;

for us who recognize that the Divine Spirit is to be sought in the human spirit, where alone it speaks to us and reveals itself, the question as to whether authority (civil or religious) is from heaven or of men assumes a new complexion, and needs a new formulation. . . .

"If then the community to be governed is a higher organ, a fuller manifestation of the immanent Deity than any of the laws, council or rulers, by which it is governed; if God is never to be found by man so truly outside as inside humanity—in conscience, both individual and collective—there is no such thing as an authority for whose use or abuse its bearer is accountable solely to an absentee external God and to an indefinitely distant assize. He is accountable, in a sense, to God alone, but it is to God immanent in the collective mind and conscience of the community." P. 370.

"The priest is not only *for* the people but *from* the people; his baptism is indeed from Heaven, but it is also from men. That it is *from* the Spirit, *through* the community is inevitably implied in the practice of ceremonial ordination. That it is from the Spirit *in* the community is only the rational interpretation of the symbolic and pictorial account which religion gives us. It is from Him Who dwells not in temples made with human hands, but in that human temple which His own hands have made. The priest stands above the layman solely as the representative of the whole organism of the Church of which he and the layman alike are constituent members. From that organism, as from God, all his spiritual powers are derived, and to it, as to God, he is responsible for their use or abuse." P. 371.

"The vital question is,—Where is that God to whom alone both Pope and Council claim to be responsible? Is He immanent in the whole Church where we can ultimately learn His mind and will, or is He away beyond the stars where we can know nothing of either . . . ? By what vehicle does He speak and communicate with us? By voices from the clouds or by the gradual evolution of His Mind and Will in the collective spirit of mankind?" P. 380.

"It is said reforms must come from below. Let us rather say they must come from above, from God immanent in the entire community which stands above priesthood and in laity." P. 385.

What interpretation is to be put on these statements the Encyclical mentioned above tells us:

"Concerning immanence it is not easy to determine what Modernists precisely mean by it, for their own opinions on the subject vary. Some understand it . . ., others, finally, explain it in a way which savors of Pantheism, and this, in truth, is the sense which best fits in with the rest of their doctrines . . . And to Pantheism pure and simple that other doctrine of the divine immanence leads directly. For this

is the question we ask: Does or does not this *immanence* leave God distinct from man? If it does, in what does it differ from the Catholic doctrine of external revelation? If it does not, it is Pantheism. Now the doctrine of immanence in the Modernist acceptation holds and professes that every phenomenon of conscience proceeds from man as man. The rigorous conclusion of this is the identity of man with God, which means Pantheism."

Furthermore, as this sentimental feeling of the divine is, and can be, preceded in man by no natural knowledge of God, and as it is the sole source of the only knowledge man can have of God, i.e., faith-knowledge,—which really is not *intellectual* knowledge, since God, according to the Modernists, cannot be reached by man's intellect,—it must be, as far as man is concerned, a blind emotional feeling for an intellectually unknown and unknowable object.

The Encyclical continues:

"The object of science they [the Modernists] say, is the reality of the knowable; the object of faith, on the contrary, is the reality of the unknowable. Now, what makes the unknowable unknowable is its disproportion with the intelligible, a disproportion which nothing whatever, even in the doctrine of the Modernists, can suppress. Hence the unknowable remains and will eternally remain unknowable to the believer as well as to the philosopher. Therefore, if any religion at all is possible, it can only be the religion of an unknown reality."

c. This vital experience or sense of the divine reality, this subjective revelation of Himself is produced by the immanent God in the heart of man in answer to a longing, a desire for God initially hidden in man's subconsciousness. And how does this longing emerge into consciousness, satisfied by the vital experience of God's presence, and how does that experience grow and develop? The *occasion* for all this, not in any sense the cause,—God vitally immanent in man is the cause,—is some event in man's life, a sickness, maybe, or a reverse of fortune, or something he has read, or something he has heard, say, from a friend or in a sermon. What is more, man's daily experience may also furnish him with

objects on which faith-knowledge works, in which case, however, those objects are disfigured and transfigured by faith into something higher, and so removed into the realm of faith-knowledge. A notable example of this is had in the person of Christ. As an historic personage Christ was a mere man, and not God. As such He was an object falling within the experience of His fellow-men. Faith, however, disfiguring and transfiguring the man Christ, sees in Him God. What the Modernist means, when he professes a belief in the divinity of Christ, we shall see shortly.

d. The work of the intellect and reason in the origin and growth of man's faith-knowledge, is neither to discover God nor argumentatively to increase man's knowledge of God, but merely to examine and analyze the initial revelation, the emotional sense of the divine, in which God discovers Himself to man; to represent intellectually and clearly God discovered there, and thereafter systematically to arrange and express in intellectual formulas or categories the growing experiences of the divine which as time goes on are produced in man by the action of God vitally immanent in him.

e. What the Modernist considers truth and knowledge in general to be, and what, in general, the work of the intellect and reason in man, will be best stated in their own words. Their views will be found to be subversive, utterly destructive of all knowledge.

We quote from *The Programme of Modernism*:

"First of all we distinguish different orders of knowledge, —phenomenal, scientific, philosophic, religious. Phenomenal embraces all sense-objects in their particularity; scientific knowledge applies its calculations to the various groupings of perceived phenomena, and gives expression to the constant laws of their changes; philosophical knowledge is the interpretation of the universe according to certain inborn catagories of the human mind, and having regard to the deep-seated, unchanging demands of life and action; religious

knowledge, in fine, is our actual experience of the divine which works in ourselves and in the whole world.

"Naturally this does away with the old definitions, inherited by scholasticism, . . . by which science was conceived as 'the knowledge of an object according to its causes —efficient, final, material, formal,' and philosophy as 'the knowledge of things human and divine in their ultimate causes.' But it is not our fault . . . if psychological analysis . . . has shown the subjective and personal elements which contribute to the formation of abstract knowledge. So that to-day it is no longer possible to speak of a cognitive faculty which functions in complete independence of our subjective needs and interests and arrives at a certainty and a truth which is 'an equation of thought to thing' (*adaequatio rei et intellectus.*)

"To-day speculation is recognized to be a sort of *action*, in the more general sense of the term, and to be subservient to action. The act of knowledge is the result of a laborious effort of the spirit to dominate reality and turn it to its own service by aid of certain mental *schemata*, or plans, in which it represents the useful relations and connections of objects.

"Such a conception is liberating in the broadest sense. Considering the cognitive faculty as a function of man's whole inward life; always remembering the relation of strict solidarity between abstract thought and action; breaking down the fictitious barriers raised between thought and will by scholastic philosophy, we contrive to give an enormous expansion to the region of the knowable, and to show that man is able, although by forms of knowledge hitherto little appreciated, to attain to those higher realities, the intimate apprehension of which augments the value of life and enriches it with new possibilities." Pp. 96, 97, 98.

"For us it matters little to attain to God through the demonstrations of mediaeval metaphysics or through arguments from miracles and prophecies which offend rather than impress the modern mind, and evade the control of experience. . . . .

"The arguments for the existence of God, drawn by scholastic metaphysic from change and movement, from the finite and contingent nature of things, from the degrees of perfection, and from the design and purpose of the world have lost all value nowadays." Pp. 98, 100.

"It is impossible for us of to-day to conceive a purely intellectual and speculative faculty, immune from all influences of the will and the emotions. To the latest psychology reason seems more and more to be a sort of instrument of formulation and definition which human nature has instinctively fashioned for itself, and which it uses unconsciously in order to arrange, express, and control the experiences of the more elementary faculties of will and feeling

and external sensation . . . For us reason does not exist as something abstract and apart. It exists only as a function of the instinctive faculties whose wants and successes it registers and classifies for future use." Pp. 107, 108.

f. According to the Modernists, then, an act of knowledge, a judgment, may be true when the object whose actual existence is affirmed *does not exist at all,* for, as we have seen, they insist that truth does not consist in a correspondence or equation between the intellect judging and the object of its judgment. What, then, is the truth-value of such a judgment? In reality it has no such value, for the Modernists have destroyed the notion of truth. They call it a true judgment, however, even though it in no way corresponds to reality, if it is useful or helpful to man intellectually, morally, religiously, etc.

If you ask the Modernist, then: "Does God exist?" he will answer, speaking as a believer with the knowledge of faith: "Yes;" speaking from the knowledge that he has gathered from his reading even of the Scriptures, or from what other men have told him, or from his reasoning on the world round about him, he will answer: "I do not know. Neither science, nor philosophy, nor the word of man, nor his teaching can give me any certainty on that point." If you ask him, further: "Is your faith-judgment, 'God exists,' a true judgment?" he should answer: "It *is* true, even though there be no person called God; it is true with a symbolic value, because it voices in a concrete way a sentiment, a thought, an inspiration, which is useful, which satisfies my religious yearnings and urges me on to action." If you ask him further: "Is the judgment, 'Christ is God' a true judgment?" he will answer as a believer: "Yes;" as a reader of history he will answer: "No, the person Christ who lived many years ago in the flesh, was a mere man, and not God." And so, in the same way, to the

questions: "Did Christ perform miracles?" "Yes" and "No," "Was Christ born of a virgin Mother?" "Yes and "No," "Did Christ rise from the dead?" "Yes" and "No," etc. It may be well, however, to let the Modernists tell us all this in their own words.

The Programme of Modernism:

"It is certain, however, that faith-truth is not always historical truth, but often only historical fiction." P. 64.

"As the supernatural life of Christ in the faithful and in the church has been clothed in an historical form which has given birth to what we might somewhat loosely call the *Christ of legend*, so the same life has been submitted to a doctrinal elaboration which has given birth to the *Christ of theology or dogma*." P. 70.

"By means of history we see in him [Christ] a *man* who has taught us by word and example: by means of faith we *experience* in Him the Saviour whose death and resurrection have given us a new life." P. 73.

"It matters little to faith *whether* or no criticism can prove the virgin-birth of Christ, His more striking miracles, or even His resurrection; *whether* or no it sanctions the attribution to Christ of certain dogmas, or of the direct institution of the Church. As ultra-phenomenal, these *former* facts evade the grasp of experimental and historical criticism, while of the *latter* it finds, as a fact, no proof. But both these and those possess a reality for faith superior to that of physical and historical facts. Without them, without such an expression of ultimate moral values, Christian experience would have lacked one of its most solid supports." P. 112.

"This way [the pragmatic] of conceiving the legitimacy of the development of Christianity is rebuked by the Encyclical as subjectivism and symbolism. But subjectivism and symbolism can no longer be reproaches. The latest criticism of the various knowledge-theories points to everything in the realm of knowledge—the laws of science and the theories of metaphysics—as being subjective and symbolic. But this does not hinder every such creation of the human spirit in the various departments of its activity from having an absolute value. Also the world constructed by faith has its life-giving value, and is therefore something absolute in its own kind. As for symbolism, a symbol no longer means a fictitious, and perhaps fraudulent, substitution connected with ignorant or erroneous beliefs. It too is a reality of its own peculiar kind whereon faith confers an inestimable value by which it becomes the real vehicle and beneficent occasion of an uplifting of the spirit and of a deeper religious insight. And since our own life is—for each one of us—something absolute, nay, the only absolute of our direct

experience, all that proceeds from it and returns to it, all that feeds it and expands it more fruitfully, has, in like manner, the value of something absolute." P. 114.

v. Pragmatism. Pragmatism rejects the definition of logical or intellectual truth as an equation, a correspondence, between the thinking intellect and the object of its thought, and calls that true which is useful, helpful, upbuilding. Logical truth, then, for the Pragmatist has no objective, absolute, permanent value, independent of the thinker, but a subjective, relative value; relative to the varying conditions of the thinker, and hence, which changes as they change. This system, therefore, in reality does away with the notion of truth altogether, and substitutes for it that of utility. Now, whilst truth may be very useful and have a practical value, nevertheless truth is not utility.

Many who are, strictly speaking, not Pragmatists, adopt this pragmatic norm of truth. The Modernists, for example, have done so, and with what results we have seen. Its use must lead to intellectual chaos, and countless other evils. For no matter how much its defenders may try to limit its application, it logically gives every individual the right to hold as true whatever he considers helpful, and to act accordingly. What is true for me, then, may be false for you; what is true for me to-day may be false to-morrow; what is true for me *according to faith-knowledge* to-day, may, at the same time, be absolutely false, so the Modernists insist, *as an historical fact*. A man, then, who would use the pragmatic norm of truth, might assert the judgment, "God exists," to be a true judgment, giving it any meaning he pleased, even insisting that he had no knowledge of the objective existence of any being called God, provided he found such a judgment helpful to him. In fact, James has told us in *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 124, that "God in the religious life of ordinary men is the name

. . . only of the ideal tendency of things, believed in as a super-human person."

All this, of course, is but making a mockery of truth and knowledge. A few examples will show this.

The Pragmatic writer of the unsigned article on *Polytheism* in the *Encyclopedia Americana* gives this definition of Deity: "What one ought to mean by the truth or falsehood of the doctrine of Deity is not the reality or otherwise of any events which are associated with its rise; but on the contrary, the adequacy of the idea to inspire just such feelings and to constrain to just such religious behavior as will give expression to a believer's conscious relation to the ultimate grounds of existence, the abiding, in the measure that he knows them." It may be well to note in passing that this whole article is very vague, and not free from errors which, from a Catholic viewpoint, make it dangerous.

Kant, though not a Pragmatist, used, however, the pragmatic norm in the postulates of his Practical Reason—the existence of God, etc. And what kind of god did Kant fashion for himself? Kant tells us: "The righteous man may say: 'I will that there be a god'." Kant himself, therefore, said: "*I* will that there be a god," and, as we saw above, this is the god he willed: "Since this idea [of god] proceeds entirely from ourselves, and is a product of ours, we have here before us a postulated being towards whom we cannot have an obligation, . . . to have religion is a duty man owes himself . . . Prayer as an internal form of cult, and, therefore, considered as a means of grace, is a superstitious delusion." Cf. **Donat,** *Freedom of Science,* p. 46.

James tells us that

". . . anyone who insists that there is a designer [of the world] and who is sure [?] he is a divine one, gets a

certain pragmatic benefit from the term—the same, in fact, which we saw that the terms God, Spirit, or the Absolute yield. 'Design,' worthless though it be, as a mere rationistic principle, set above or behind things for our admiration, becomes, if our *faith* concretes it into something theistic, a term of promise . . . Other than this practical significance, the words, God, free-will, design, etc., have none. Yet, dark though they be in themselves, or intellectualistically taken, when we bear them into life's thicket with us, the darkness there grows light about us." *Pragmatism*, pp. 114, 121.

"Faith is synonomous with working hypothesis . . . now in such questions as *God, immortality, absolute morality* and *free will*, no non-papal believer at the present day pretends his faith to be of an essentially different complexion; he can always doubt his creed." *The Will to Believe*, P. 95.

"Meanwhile the practical needs and experiences of religion seem to be sufficiently met by the belief that beyond each man and in a fashion continuous with him there exists a higher power which is friendly to him and to his ideals . . . anything larger will do, if it be only large enough to trust for the next step. It need not be infinite, it need not be solitary. It might even be a more Godlike self, of which the present self would then be but the mutilated expression, and the universe might conceivably be a collection of such selves . . . with no absolute unity realized in it at all. Thus would a sort of polytheism return upon us—a polytheism which I do not on this occasion defend, for my only aim at present is to keep the testimony of religious experience within its proper bounds." *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 525, 526.

In all these passages James, a thorough-going Pragmatist, speaks true to form. He realized that for a Pragmatist the name God may mean anything and everything. in other words, every man has a right to make a god to suit himself. And that every man has a right to make his own god, or to choose one from the many already made, Drake in the article previously cited, affirms in so many words,—

"It now seems rather needless to be an atheist. There are so many conceptions of God afloat that anyone at all widely read can scarcely fail to find one suited to his mental outlook and convictions." P. 69.

Clarence A. Beckwith, Illinois Professor of Christian Theology, Chicago Theological Seminary, is a Sentimentalist, a Pragmatist, and, though he calls him-

self an "ethical monotheist", the doctrine he advances in *The Idea of God,* published in 1922, would seem to justify one who would class him among the Pantheists.

His initial idea of God he discovers in feeling and sentiment. The fuller meaning of that idea he strives to determine by endeavoring to find out not what God is, but what it pleases man to make Him to be. Truth, for Professor Beckwith, has no permanent worth; it is measured not by the object it should represent, but by what it suits man to think of that object, by man's individual experiences, views, theories, value-judgments, fancies, etc., which, under varying conditions, are ever shifting and changing, and are different for different men at the same time, and for the same men at different times.

With this working principle of Pragmatism, Professor Beckwith judges that the God of the Nicene Creed does not suit the modern man at all. Hence he rejects Him absolutely and utterly, and if obliged to choose between Him and Atheism, he would take Atheism. He denies the Divinity of Christ, and rejects the doctrine of creation and miracles, as "antiquated and indefensible" and not "found either in the Old or New Testament". He gives, however, a sympathetic hearing to the host of fanciful, false, and for the most part, crude concepts of God which modern philosophy has brought forth. The god, finally, who suits Professor Beckwith's individual views of the universe, is one who is immanent in the world and yet transcends it. As immanent, he is not a changeless, eternal, substantial being, but ever-changing Energy, the Purposive Will or Creative Good Will, energizing the world from within; as transcendent, he is not real at all, but an ideal, a goal, towards which the Purposive Will, which at no time is fully realized in the world, is ever pushing onward and upward. We give a

few brief, typical quotations from *The Idea of God* in confirmation.

"We have never stopped to define what the idea [of God] means to us, but we have taken it for granted, as we take the air, friendship, education and democracy. We have shrunk from exact definition, since we preferred to leave it in the region of feeling; in its very vagueness lies much of its power to quicken reverence and awe and to appeal to simple trust: . . . Moreover there is the feeling that to drag this sentiment out from its reticent retreat and turn on it the cold light of reason, force it to give an account of itself and to justify its existence on pain of rejecting it, is nothing less than the unpardonable sin" P. V.

"This work aims at such a presentation of the idea of God as will enable it to function anew in the life of to-day." P. VI.

"Since the idea of God is functional and conditions have arisen far different from those in the early centuries, we must expect a corresponding change in this idea . . . . Meantime we must remind ourselves that an attempt so to define the idea of God as to keep it aloof from the modern view of the world is to place it in extreme jeopardy. All the sciences have been born since the fourth century, and have changed the meaning of the universe for all thoughtful men. The social order has undergone profound modification. The simple fact is that the Nicene idea of God does not interpret the world to the modern man; between that idea and the world of to-day is an impassable gulf. If the alternative is either that idea of God unmodified or none, then the conclusion must be—no God. Such an idea cast in irreformable dogma is the greatest possible encouragement to atheism." P. 3.

"The [modern] scientific spirit is marked by certain characteristic tendencies and habits . . . It relies upon inductive verification. All questions which involve human beliefs, customs and ideals are subjected to historical inquiry . . . The presumption is thus created that a doctrine such as the idea of God, which originated in modes of thought alien to the modern scientific spirit and world-view, requires restatement to become acceptable to the scientific temper and intelligence of to-day." P. 6.

"The naïve notion of him [God] revealed in the beautiful story of the garden of Eden is unworkable and out of place in relation to conditions of civic and industrial communities." P. 6.

"Religious education is in exigent need of a restatement of the idea of God. . . . What is required is some conception of God which shall make him real, attractive and helpful . . . The historic creeds do not answer here. . . . We want no Deity who can be snugly imprisoned in cast-iron formulas and imposed by any body of men. Nor for religious education can we tolerate an idea of God [i.e. the Nicene] which is

belied by the highest intelligence of the age, inconsistent with every or even any science, from which in later years, if one will think in terms of modern thought, one frees himself only by a violent wrench." P. 32.

"An idea of God which suffices for one people cannot answer for another people at the same time or at another age of the world, nor indeed for the same people at a further age in its own history. . . . . Since all ideas are functional and no idea of God meets all the varied needs of all Christian peoples at a given time, there must be many variations of it to embody the requirements of the different groups. A cross-section of present-day religious thinking discloses a rather bewildering diversity of ideas of God, as these appear in Calvinism, Arminianism, Socinianism, monism, panlogism, voluntarism, vitalism, pluralistic pragmatism, and the New Realism,—each an attempt to solve the problem of existence from a particular point of view and in answer to a particular set of needs. Nor are we at the end of these endeavors, which should be welcomed by all who are in search of truth whose only function is to serve the well-being of man." P. 17.

"If we are to assign any meaning to [divine] transcendence we must avoid the assumption that God is independent of the universe, that his life would be complete without it and that he is in any degree separated from it. Apart from the universe, God is inconceivable: no content can be attributed to his being. . . . Moreover, we believe that there is no 'beyond,' no Epicurean heaven removed from the world, as a dwelling place." P. 266.

"God is immanent [in the universe] so far as he is the pervasive principle or energy by which the creative process is carried forward: he is transcendent so far as there are infinite possibilities in the creative process which may be realized under temporal, spatial and conscious forms. The immanent God is 'The God of things as they are'; the transcendent God is the God of things as they are to become. Since, however, being is ever passing into becoming, God as immanent is not static but dynamic; and because becoming rises out of and fulfils being, God as transcendent is not detached from the actual. If he is the changing, he is also the permanent, real One." P. 269.

"The being of God is not other than his will, and his will does not exist outside of a world of space and time and conscious beings. Nowhere is God more real and never will he be more active than in the immediate circle of our conscious life. . . . With a world which transcends experience, and a conception of God which alleges something in him which is other than what is manifest in our world we can have no concern." P. 314.

"The One exists only in and through the many." P. 331.

All these views are a simple declaration of mental bankruptcy, and, in principle at least, of moral and religious bank-

ruptcy also. And all systems of philosophy that desert reason in their search for God, and in its place install some blind guide, must necessarily make this same declaration. How widespread to-day is that desertion may be gathered from the following passages taken from **Hocking**, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*. Professor Hocking is in full sympathy with the movement against reason. He writes:

"The services of thought to religion have been subject to a justified distrust. Of uncertain worth, especially of uncertain recoil, are the labors of reason in behalf of any of our weightier human interests. By right instinct has religion from the beginning looked elsewhere for the brunt of support—say to revelation, to faith, to feeling. A bad defense is a betrayal, and what human philosophy of religion can be better than a bad defense? Present-day philosophy seems notably inclined to take this view of itself.

"Our current science of religion may now assume without too much discussion that the grounds of religion are supra-rational; and we find philosophy undertaking to define what those other-than-rational grounds are,—grounds moral, perhaps or psychological or social or historical: grounds pragmatic or even mystic.

"Various and variously combined as are these several Philosophic trends they agree in accepting the judgment that religion lies close to the primitive moving force of life: deeper, then, than reason, or any work of reason. But a vague territory, still, is this Beyond-Reason or Deeper-than-Reason. Once singly named Faith, now it has many names,—instinct, the subconscious, the co-conscious, feeling, will, value judgment, social sense, intuition, mystic reason, perhaps *'l'élan vital.'*" P. V.

All the erroneous opinions above mentioned, excluding, however, that advancing the argument *a simultaneo*, are fully explained and refuted in previous parts of Philosophy, viz., in Criteriology and Rational Psychology. Still, as their rejection is necessary for a full treatment of our matter, they are given a passing mention here, and will be again refuted, but briefly. In the difficulties at the end of Thesis I, some of their main arguments will be answered. The argument *a simultaneo*, or Ontological argument, will be refuted in a separate thesis.

THESIS I.

The source of our knowledge of God is neither an ontological intuition of Him, nor an innate or divinely infused idea, nor any of the subjective mediums invented by Kantians, Reidians, Sentimentalists, Modernists or Pragmatists, nor is it necessarily revelation and a consequent tradition.

PRENOTES TO THE THESIS.

A sufficient knowledge of the sense of the thesis and its adversaries may be gathered from the exposition given above of the opinions rejected in the thesis.

As the false Theories of Knowledge advancing these opinions are fully and specifically refuted elsewhere in Philosophy, the proofs of our thesis, whilst amply sufficient, are brief, and general rather than specific.

PROOF OF THE THESIS.

Parts I and II. Ontological intuition, and innate or divinely infused idea of God rejected.

1. If God were so known, we should be conscious of the fact, especially on reflection, and we are not.
2. If God were so known, our concepts of God should express perfections (notes) derived directly from Him, and not, as is the case, directly from creatures, to be afterwards applied to Him, *mutatis mutandis*, i.e., so changed as to imply no imperfection.
3. If God were so known, it is impossible to understand why a scientific knowledge of God is got with difficulty.
4. The law of parsimony prohibits recourse to an extraordinary medium of knowledge when, as in the present case, we have an ordinary one, i.e., our reason.

Part III. The opinions of the Kantians, Reidians, Sentimentalists, Modernists rejected.

1. They all deny to reason the power to prove God's existence, and falsely, as we shall show by proving His existence by *a posteriori* arguments. The substitutes they offer in reason's stead can give no intellectual certainty, for we know, that unless the assent of the intellect rest in some way on evidence, it must be doubtful.

2. Again, the conscious contact with God, of whatever kind it may be, which is supposed to be made through these mediums, should be immediate, nevertheless, even after most careful reflection, it is impossible to discover any consciousness of such contact with an actually existing being who is God.

Part IV. The opinion of the Pragmatists rejected.

The Pragmatists have rejected all objective knowledge. The measure of truth they offer is not an object to which the intellect must conform, but subjective utility. But what I judge useful to me, my neighbor may judge harmful to him. So the same judgment may be true for him, false for me, and there is no possibility of an absolute norm. What is true today, may be false tomorrow. Nay, even for the same person and at the same time, the same judgment may be true and false. The Modernists, who, in this regard follow the Pragmatists, tell us how. The belief, for example, that *Christ is God,* that *Christ worked miracles,* is true, in the world of faith, but in the world of fact, of history, in the actual order, these assertions are absolutetly false.

It is quite evident that on pragmatic grounds Atheism, Pantheism, Deism, Polytheism, and a Monotheism that makes of God any kind of being we please,—"anything larger will do if it be only large enough to trust for the next step—a larger and more God-like self," as **James** says, *Varieties of Religious Experience,* p. 525,—may

all be justified. In other words there is no such thing as truth.

Part V. The opinion of the Traditionalists rejected.

Independently of revelation and tradition, we can acquire, by *a posteriori* demonstration, a certain, clear knowledge of God. Therefore, revelation and tradition are not necessarily the source of such knowledge.

It is to be noted, however, that revelation is *morally* necessary that man, generally speaking, may acquire a fuller knowledge of God *expeditiously, without error* and *surely*. In other words, the difficulties to be overcome in acquiring expeditiously a sure, and accurate fuller knowledge of God are such that, though man has the physical power to surmount them, and though some men would actually and successfully use that power, still the general run of men would not do so. To give man, therefore, a knowledge of God which he could acquire, but which, for one reason or other, in by far the greater number of instances he would not acquire, revelation is necessary.

How true it is, that human reason, as we find it, when not held in check by the absolutely infallible guide of revelation would fall into many and grievous errors concerning God, is only too convincingly shown in the religious beliefs and philosophical systems of those who have rejected the revealed word of God explicitly, or implicitly, that is, by rejecting its living infallible guardian, and interpreter, the Catholic Church.

DIFFICULTIES

1. We have an idea of the infinite. This cannot be derived by reason from things finite. Therefore its origin may be possibly either an intuition of God, or an innate idea of Him.

D. Maj.[1] We have an idea of the infinite, wholly positive and derived through an intuition or an innate idea of God, *N.;* not wholly negative, i.e. not representing God as a limitless blank, nor wholly positive, as it should be if we knew God immediately, but negativo-positive, e.g., representing God as a non-finite being, i.e., a being possessing reality without limit, which idea is derived from finite things indirectly, *C.* *Cd. Min.*

2. True knowledge is the agreement of mind with the object known. Therefore as God is first in the order of reality, if my knowledge is to be true, He must be known first. Therefore Ontologism is to be admitted.

D. Ant. The agreement required by truth is that, as far as the act of knowledge goes, it must represent things as they are, *C.;* it also requires that the genesis of my acts of knowledge follow the order of the genesis of things, *N.* *N. Con.*

I may truly know an effect before I know its causes; I may derive a knowledge of the existence of the cause from the effect.

3. God is a being more intelligible than any other being, and closer to my intellect than any other being. Therefore He should be known first and intuitively. Hence Ontologism is true.

D. Ant. God is in Himself and to Himself most intelligible; He is also in the physical order closer to me than any other being, and that, in virtue of His immensity, and His activity in creating and continuing in existence myself and all my faculties, and in concurring with me in all my actions, *C.;* God is more intelligible to me, i.e., closer to me in the intellectual order, than any other being, *N.* *N. Con.*

My intellectual knowledge is derived directly through sense knowledge, rising above it, first, in those universal

1. See Appendix, p. 219.

concepts which represent the essences of things sensible, and thereafter, by demonstration, coming to know things spiritual and even God Himself.

4. Our universal concepts, formed prior to reasoning, represent something which is necessary, immutable, eternal, infinite. Such a thing, however, is divine and, as it is known prior to reasoning, these concepts must result from a direct knowledge or vision of God. Therefore Ontologism is to be admitted.

D. Maj. My universal concept represents something which, considered as it exists in the actual order, is an absolutely necessary and immutable being, who is in the strict sense eternal and possesses all perfections, who is God, *N.;* it represents something which, considered only as it exists objectively in the intellect, is not singular but universal, which, *as such,* cannot exist actually, and which may be said to be necessary, immutable, eternal, infinite, but not at all in the sense God is said to be, *C.* *Cd. Min.*

My universal concept represents no singular, actual being with such perfections. It is derived by an act of spontaneous or natural abstraction from a sensible object, representing only the nature which that object has in common with others, neglecting that which is proper to it as an individual. That which it represents may be looked at in two ways: as it exists in the object, and, as such, it is found in the actual order, singular, contingent, changeable, temporal, finite; or as it exists shorn of its individuating perfections, and, as such, it exists as a universal, not in the actual order but only objectively in the intellect, in which state only it may be said to be, in a very restricted sense, and in no way as God is said to be, necessary, immutable, eternal, infinite. For example, the essence which is represented in the universal concept *man,* is *necessary* and *immutable* in the sense that every individual who is a man must of

necessity have and *without any change* the notes that constitute that essence, viz., animality and rationality; it is *eternal* and *infinite* in the sense that it is intrinsically possible for it to exist *at any point of time* and in *any number of individuals.*

5. The admission of the existence of God, conceived at least as a being ruling the world and on whom man physically and morally depends, is so universal among races, nations, tribes and individuals, that it must be said to be natural to man. It can be explained only on the supposition that man has an innate knowledge of God. What is more, some of the Fathers of the Church admit such a knowledge.

We grant the truth of the assertion, but deny its explanation, if it contends that man is born with an actual knowledge of God, or with a capacity for knowing Him directly and immediately. We deny also that any of the Fathers of the Church have so spoken. In fact, those who touch this question, substantially agree with the explanation we subjoin.

Man is made for God. The natural and final end of his endeavors in this life is to give God reverence and service, and this presupposes a knowledge of Him. Until this knowledge is acquired, man is uneasy. He is conscious that what he as yet knows, does not satisfy, and by his nature he is impelled to seek for further enlightenment.

An immediate evidence of God's existence is not granted him, but an intellect has been given him, so fashioned that, if mediate evidence of that existence be granted, it will discover it with ease and tenaciously cling to it; and this, because the discovery of that truth satisfies a vital need of man's nature.

And this mediate evidence is bounteously given. For just as the ultimate and chiefest end of man in this life

is to know God, in order that he may reverence and serve Him, so the ultimate end of all visible nature is to make God known to man. The heavens, the earth, and all things in them show forth the glory of God. Hence, that universal, constant knowledge of God in all races, nations, tribes and individuals; not scientifically and laboriously worked out, but drawn from God's visible creation by a process of spontaneous reasoning, in many instances hard to analyze, in many instances erring as to the nature of God, but ever acknowledging His supremacy over the world, and the world's physical and moral dependence on Him. (Cf. **Kleutgen,** cited above, under *Popular Concept of God.*)

6. Man naturally seeks for the greatest good. But the greatest good is God. Therefore man naturally seeks God. Hence he has a natural, an innate knowledge of God.

D. Maj. Man's whole nature, by the very fact that it is made for God, tends towards the greatest good, which tendency therefore is independent of, and prior to all knowledge, *C.;* man in his actions naturally seeks the greatest good, *Subd.,* as the aspect, under which the will seeks its object in all its actions, is that of goodness with no admixture of badness, so man may be said in all his actions naturally to tend towards the greatest good in the abstract, *C.;* man in his actions naturally tends towards that being in whom concretely is found all good, i.e., towards God, *Subd.,* man in *all* his actions tends toward God, *N.;* in those actions in which he seeks his last end either immediately or mediately, and which actions in no way presuppose an innate knowledge of God, *C.* *Cd. Min.* *D. Con.*

THESIS II.

That God exists is a truth which is immediately evident in itself though not immediately evident to us. It can be proved neither a simultaneo nor a priori.

PRENOTES TO THE THESIS.

A truth immediately evident in itself is one contained in an analytical proposition, the necessary nexus between the subject and predicate of which is objectively or in itself immediate. In itself, therefore, this nexus is knowable immediately; hence an intellect sufficiently perfect could so know it.

A truth immediately evident to us is one contained in an analytical proposition, the necessary nexus between the subject and predicate of which is not only objectively or in itself immediate, but also immediately knowable to the human intellect. The human intellect, therefore, by a mere analysis and comparison of the subject and predicate of such a proposition, and hence without recourse to any middle term, could clearly see the necessary nexus between them.

The argument a simultaneo essays to derive merely from the concept we have of God, e.g., as a being who is conceived as necessarily existing, the knowledge on our part of His actual existence.

A priori proof draws its conclusion from a truth which *in the real order*, i.e., in the nature of things, is prior to that contained in the conclusion. We so argue when we derive from the existence and nature of a cause the existence and nature of its effects.

A posteriori proof draws its conclusion from a truth which in the real order is posterior, i.e., subsequent, to

that contained in the conclusion. In this way, as will be seen below, we argue from the existence and nature of things in the world to the existence of a first, unproduced, self-existing cause of them—God.

ADVERSARIES.

Atheists reject the first part of the thesis. As those who defend the argument *a simultaneo* really hold that the existence of God is a truth immediately evident to us they may be classed as adversaries to the second and third parts of the thesis.

PROOF OF THE THESIS.

Part I. That God exists is a truth which is immediately evident in itself.

In the proposition, *God is existing,* the predicate, as will appear below, is of the very essence of the subject, i.e., objectively the nexus between them is immediate. Therefore one who would fully understand the nature of the subject would also immediately see this necessary nexus.

Part II. That God exists is not a truth which is immediately evident to us.

1. Our consciousness testifies that by merely conceiving a being whose existence is essential to it, and actual existence, and comparing the two conceived objects, we are not forced to affirm that being's actual existence.
2. If our intellects were thus forced to affirm that being's existence, no one, after merely forming a concept of a being whose existence is essential to it, could doubt of that being's actual existence. As a fact, however, there are many who after forming such a concept either doubt of God's existence or embrace Agnosticism.

3. It is a law of logic that those perfections which are found after analysis to belong to any subject, can rightly be predicated of that subject only in the order in which it is found. But in the present instance the subject, as far as our knowledge yet goes, exists only objectively in concept, therefore the only judgment I can make with regard to its existence is this: a being, conceived as existing by its essence, must *necessarily be conceived* as actually existing.

If, however, it be objected that, at least in the case of a subject whose essence is to exist, we may pass from the ideal to the actual order, for if that being did not exist, a concept of him would be impossible, and yet we have a concept of him,—*we answer* (and this answer shows the fallacy in the argument *a simultaneo*), that since the proofs we have given above are valid, and hence since the mere concept of a necessarily existing being does not give us a knowledge of his actual existence, that concept, as far as our knowledge goes, may, or may not, be a self contradictory one. In other words, the concept we have of a necessarily existing being, prior to, or prescinding from, *a posteriori* proof of that being's actual existence, represents that being as one whom *we merely do not see* to be impossible and *not* as one whom *we see* not to be impossible, i.e., whom *we see* to be possible.

Part III. The argument a simultaneo is invalid.

If the concept we have of God prior to an *a posteriori* proof of His existence, may or may not, as far as our knowledge goes, represent an impossible being, the argument *a simultaneo* is invalid.
But the condition is true.
Therefore, etc.

Maj. If, as far as our knowledge goes, the concept may or may not represent an impossible being, we certainly cannot get from it certain knowledge that he is a possible being, and hence that he exists. In that hypothesis, therefore, the argument *a simultaneo* is invalid.

Min. That the concept we have of a necessarily existing being, independent of all proof of that being's existence, may, as far as our knowledge goes, represent an impossible being, has been shown in the proofs of Part II.

Part IV. The existence of God cannot be proved a priori.

There is nothing in the real order prior to God, He, as will be proved later, being the self existing first cause of all things.

And even when in concept we distinguish, for our better understanding of Him, perfections in God, His existence is necessarily conceived as fundamental. Hence there is nothing in concept prior to it from which it may be derived.

Therefore the existence of God cannot be proved *a priori*.

Scholion. The argument *a simultaneo* is presented under several forms. We give the three best known with their solutions. As was stated above, it is not certain that St. Anselm or St. Bonaventure used it strictly.

1. **St. Anselm.** If a being who is conceived as the greatest being thinkable does not exist, he is not the greatest being thinkable.

But the being who is conceived as the greatest being thinkable, is the greatest being thinkable. Therefore he exists.

D. Maj. And the concept we have of such a being, independent of *a posteriori* proof of his existence, represents him as one who, as far as our knowledge goes, may or may not be impossible, *C.;* it shows him as a being known to us to be possible, hence actually existing, *N.*

Cd. Min. And the concept I have of him independent of *a posteriori* proof of his existence represents him to me as a being who is known to me to exist, *N.;* who as far as my knowledge goes, may or may not be existing, *C.*

2. **Descartes.** Whatever is contained in a clear and distinct idea of any object must be affirmed of that object.

But existence is contained in a clear and distinct idea of an absolutely perfect being.

Therefore existence must be affirmed of him.

D. Maj. If the idea is known to represent a possible being, *C.;* if it may or may not, as far as our knowledge goes, represent an impossible being, *N.*

Cd. Min. Which idea, as far as our knowledge goes, may or may not represent an impossible being, *C.;* is known to represent a possible and hence an existing being, *Subd.,* after *a posteriori* proof, *C.;* before, *N. D. Con.* After *a posteriori* proof, *C.;* before, *N.*

3. **Leibnitz.** If God is possible, He exists.

But He is possible.

Therefore He exists.

D. Maj. If God is known to me to be a possible being I must affirm His existence, *C.;* if He is known to me as a being who may or may not be possible, I must affirm, etc., *N.*

Cd. Min. God is known to me as a being who may or may not be possible, *C.;* He is known to me as a

being who is possible, *Subd.*, after *a posteriori* proof of His existence, *C.;* before, *N.*

D. Con. I must affirm His existence after *a posteriori* proof of it, *C.;* before, *N.*

THESIS III.

The existence of God, as the unproduced cause of all things existing in the world, is proved from the fact that all existing beings cannot be produced beings.

GENERAL PRENOTES TO THE PROOFS FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE.

1. All our proofs of God's existence are *a posteriori*. From a consideration, under different aspects, of the creatures that God has made, we demonstrate His existence under different aspects.
2. These proofs are grouped under three general heads; *Metaphysical, Physical, Moral.*

Metaphysical proofs draw their conclusion from the consideration of objective reasons which are derived from this sensible (physical) world, but which in themselves, and as used, are not restricted to, i.e., prescind from, its sensible or physical aspect, and so are universally applicable to any being in the world. Hence they are called metaphysical. For example, though our knowledge of produced being is acquired through a knowledge of the sensible, i.e., physical world about us, from the fact that even one such being exists, whether that being be sensible or not, the metaphysical argument proves the existence of a first unproduced cause.

Physical proofs draw their conclusion from the consideration of some sensible (physical) aspect of the visible world. For example, from the order we see in the universe.

Moral proofs draw their conclusion from some common, habitual, customary (*mores*, customs) way or man-

ner of thinking or acting among men, i.e., from those judgments or actions of men which, from their universality and constancy, which true knowledge has ever increased, may be said to spring from human nature itself, so that one who would go counter to them would be judged not-natural, i.e., unnatural, abnormal. Such an argument is that derived from the universal belief of mankind in the existence of a being or beings superior to the world, and on whom the world depends not only physically but morally and religiously.

3. Of these proofs by far the most important are the metaphysical, for through them we derive the knowledge of the existence of God as an unproduced first cause, who exists of Himself and with absolute necessity. This concept having been established, through it we deduce His infinity and all those other perfections which are found in the fully developed, scientific concept of God, mentioned above. These arguments give us the seed-thought from which is developed the science of Natural Theology. The other arguments, however, are not by any means useless. That derived from the order of the universe, for example, proves emphatically the great intelligence of the First Cause, while the moral arguments present the testimony of the whole human race to the fact that a supreme being exists.

4. We shall select one argument from each of these divisions for full development; the more important of those which remain will be explained briefly later on.

PRENOTES TO THE THESIS.

1. The argument developed in the present thesis is called the *Cosmological* (*cosmos,* the world; *logos,* a rational explanation) argument. It gives the final answer to the question: Whence come those countless produced beings, substantial and accidental, through whose springing into

existence, the world is continually renewed and perpetuated?

2. We take for granted, therefore, and from internal and external experience it is self-evident, that in this world things are being continually produced: new combinations, both substantial and accidental, of the elements, new plants, new animals, new men, new thoughts, new desires, and all the wonderful effects of man's endeavors.

It is well to note, however, that if we knew of the existence of only one produced being, we could demonstate the existence of an unproduced first cause.

3. Our proof draws all its force from the principles of causality and sufficient reason.

The principle of causality is an analytical principle; one, namely, expressed in a judgment, between the subject and the predicate of which exists an absolutely necessary nexus.

It may be enunciated as follows: Whatever does not exist of absolute necessity, cannot exist without a proportionate physical efficient cause. Another form, which shows clearly that the principle of causality is but the principle of sufficient reason restricted to contingent beings, is: The only sufficient reason for the existence of a being whose existence is not absolutely necessary is a proportionate physical efficient cause. Since God, as will be shown, is an absolute necessary being, the principle of causality cannot be applied to Him.

The truth and analytical character of the principle of causality may be briefly shown as follows: A being whose existence is not absolutely necessary,— and all changeable beings are such,—has the sufficient reason for its existence in itself, or in some other being. It cannot however, have such reason in itself. If it had, it would be either, *a.* because existence is essential to it, which is impossible, seeing that its existence is not absolutely

necessary to it, or *b.* because it caused its own existence, which is also impossible, for to cause its own existence, it would have to exist before it existed. Therefore the reason for its existence must be found in some other being. That being is its efficient cause.

The principle of sufficient reason, also analytical, is absolutely universal in its application, not excluding even God. It states: Whatever is, must have a sufficient reason for being what it is.

4. **The sufficient reason** assigned for the existence of a produced, i.e., a contingent being, which is found in an efficient cause, may be adequate or inadequate.
An adequately sufficient reason is one that fully satisfies, and, beyond which no other reason can be given.
An inadequately or partially sufficient reason is one which partially satisfies, and hence beyond which, or outside of which, some other must be given.

In our thesis we contend, that although a partially sufficient reason for the existence of a produced being may be found in another produced being which is its proximate efficient cause, still a full and adequate reason for its existence can never be found, unless we admit the existence of an ultimate unproduced first cause.

5. In our proof we prescind from the question of the impossibility of an infinite series of actual, successively produced beings. Hence even though its possibility were admitted, our proof would still be valid. Our aim in so doing is to make our proof, as far as possible, independent of the discussion of a question, which even some Catholic philosophers consider debatable.

As a matter of fact, we hold that an infinite series, which is actual, of successively produced and producing beings is impossible. Indeed St. Thomas' argument for the existence of an unproduced first cause of things produced is drawn from this impossibility.

6. **The scope of the thesis.** It is true that the existence of an unproduced being having once been demonstrated, we can derive from the knowledge thus gained, His self-sufficiency, absolutely necessary existence, unicity, etc., still these conclusions are outside the scope of the present thesis. They will be proved later. Now we only wish to establish *the existence* of an unproduced being.

ADVERSARIES.

Atheists, Pantheists, Materialists, and an innumerable multitude of others who admit God's existence, but who deny that it can be demonstrated.

In this denial, and in particular in their attacks on this argument, many of our present day adversaries follow the lead of Kant, and most of them blindly. The mere fact that Kant has spoken is enough for them. Among these may be mentioned, the **Modernists, Weber** (Prof. of Phil., U. of Strasburg), **James** (Harvard U.) **Bergson, Corrance, Loisy, Calkins** (Wellesley C.), **Conybeare** (Oxford U.), **Höffding** (Copenhagen U.), **James Ward** (Cambridge U.), **Hocking** (Harvard U.), **Stewart** (Prof. Phil., Dalhousie U., Halifax, N.S.), **Miller** (Prof. Biblical Instruction, Princeton U.), **Troeltch** (Heidelberg U.), **Youtz** (Auburn Theol. Seminary), **Royce** (Harvard U.), **Knight** (Prof. Moral Phil., U. of St. Andrew), **Mallock, Drake** (Prof. Phil. and Education, Vassar C.), **Johnson** (Lincoln U.), **Overstreet** (N. Y. City C.), **Paulsen** (U. of Berlin), **Schiller** (Oxford U.), **Herbert, Sabatier.**

The difficulties which Kant and others urge against our argument will be answered below.

PROOF OF THE THESIS.

There exist in this visible world produced beings.
But the existence of even one produced being necessarily implies the existence of an unproduced first cause.
Therefore such a cause exists.

Maj. The Major is evident from internal and external experience.

Min. The cause of the being in question is either unproduced or produced.

If *unproduced, our conclusion stands.*

If produced, then the question recurs: Whence its producer? And the question, if further continued will finally stop at a *first unproduced cause,* and again *our conclusion stands,* or—

We must admit an infinite series of successively produced causes which is dependent for its existence on an unproduced cause, or which exists without such cause.

If it depends for its existence on *an unproduced cause,* again *our conclusion stands.*

If, however, it is asserted that such a series can exist without an unproduced cause, to *finally* establish our conclusion, we must prove this assertion false. We must prove, then, that—

An infinite series of successively produced causes without an unproduced cause of it is absolutely impossible.

It is impossible if nowhere in it can be found an *adequately sufficient* reason for the existence of any one member of it. But nowhere in it can such a reason be found.

It cannot be found in the being itself, which for the sake of clearness we shall call *A,* for if left to itself *A,* being a produced being, would never have existed.

Nor can it be found in any prior cause. For if the *adequately sufficient* reason for *A*'s existence could be found in such cause, I might consider, for the purposes of my investigation, all the causes in the series prior to this cause as non-existing, as I should

have an adequate reason for *A*'s existence without them.

But if I consider any cause in the series as non-existing, I am forced to consider all that follow it in the series as non-existing, and hence *A* as non-existing.

Hence the hypothesis, that any cause in the series can give me an adequately sufficient reason for *A*'s existence, results in the absurd conclusion that *A* cannot be existing.

An example will make this last part, the vital part, of our argument clear. I see a chain hanging in the air. Whence it comes I know not as its uppermost links are lost to vision in the distant sky. If you ask me why the lowest link hangs in the air, evidently I give a reason if I answer, that it is supported by the link above. And just as evidently my reason is not adequately sufficient, for till I know what supports the link above I do not fully know what supports the lowest one. And so mounting higher and higher I shall never get an adequately sufficient answer till I reach something which has not the fatal essential weakness of the links of the chain, i. e., till I reach something supporting but not supported. As such a thing can never be found in the chain, I may imagine the chain any length I please, even infinite, if such be possible, and I shall never find in it an adequate reason for the suspension in the air of the lowest, or of any link.

Or this way may be clearer,—The lowest link of the chain is not self-supporting; no link of the chain is self-supporting. If, then, no link is self-supporting, no link in itself explains how it supports those hanging from it. Therefore, nowhere

in the chain can I find an adequately sufficient reason for the suspension of any one of its links.

Or this way,—If in any link of the chain I could find an adequate reason for the support of the links below it, the links above could be done away with, and it and the links below it should still remain hanging.

But this is manifestly ridiculous.

DIFFICULTIES

1. a. The Cosmological argument extends invalidly the principle of causality beyond the phenomenal order.

b. As it is of the essence of a cause that it be a produced being, the argument draws an impossible conclusion, viz., the existence of an unproduced cause.

c. The Cosmological argument either leaves us with the knowledge of a "blank essence" which certainly is not a knowledge of God, or, if it attempts to fill out the concept of "unproduced being," and prove that being to be a person, infinitely intelligent, infinitely perfect, it necessarily makes use of the Ontological (*a simultaneo*) argument, which is invalid.

Therefore the Cosmological argument fails to prove the existence of an unproduced cause of the universe, who is God.

These are Kant's arguments against our proof. They are repeated today, more or less blindly, by a host of Kantians, many of whom consider the very fact that Kant has spoken reason enough to satisfy anyone. It may be well to hear a few words from Kant and some of his followers.

Kant, *Pure Reason,* (Max Müller, 2nd Ed., Macmillan, 1907).

"The whole conclusive strength of the so-called cosmological proof rests therefore in reality on the ontological proof from mere concepts, while the appeal to experience is quite superfluous, and, though it may lead us on to the concept of absolute necessity, it cannot demonstrate it with any definite object." P. 489.

"The principle of causality has no meaning and no criterion of its use except in the world of sense [i.e., the world of subjective experience], while here [in the cosmological proof] we extend the principle beyond experience." P. 491.

Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx,*

"Now, says Kant, both the cosmological and the physico-theological [teleological] proofs depend ultimately on the ontological, and the ontological simply begs the question . . . With regard to the cosmological it must be pointed out that until it has been connected with the ontological proofs, it does not specify what the 'absolutely necessary being' is, nor exclude the possibility of its being the world as a whole, or a Spencerian 'Unknowable' instead of a God." P. 40.

Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy,*

"The absolute self simply does not cause the world. The very idea of causation belongs to things of finite experience." P. 348.

James, *Varieties of Religious Experience,*

"The bare fact that all idealists since Kant have felt entitled to scout or neglect them [i.e., all our proofs for God's existence] shows that they are not solid enough to serve as religion's all-sufficient foundation. . . . Causation indeed is too obscure a principle to bear the weight of the whole structure of theology." P. 437.

"The fact is that these arguments prove nothing rigorously." P. 439.

Ward, James, *Pluralism and Theism,*

"Can we then prove the existence of God? Attempts innumerable to prove this have been made . . . all of them reducible to one or other of the three forms called, respectively, the ontological, the cosmological and the teleological argument. The fatal defects of all these have, it is almost universally conceded, been clearly exposed once for all by Kant. The ontological argument, as has been shown, involves the common metaphysical fallacy of hypostatizing an idea; the teleological argument does not carry us beyond pluralism; and the cosmological only does so by implicitly assuming the ontological." P. 230.

Our answers to Kant's assertions will be brief.

a. *N. Ant.* The extension of the principle of

causality beyond the phenomenal order,—which for Kant meant the order of subjective experiences,—is valid, when not to so extend it would be a violation of the principle of contradiction. In our argument we showed that the principle of contradiction would be violated, if, in virtue of the principle of casuality, we did not assert the existence of an unproduced first cause. Moreover, Kant himself with glaring (Calkins calls it "glorious") inconsistency denies his own principle when he speaks of objects causing our external sensations, and even proves (Suppl. 21, l. c., p. 778) that we can know objects to exist outside of ourselves.

b. *N. Ant.* Because all the causes of which we have experience are themselves the effects of other causes, it does not follow that it is of the essence of a cause to be an effect.

c. *N, Ant.* It is true that, having proved the existence of an unproduced first cause, and thus having made certain for ourselves that the concept of such a cause represents a real being, we can, and shall hereafter from such concept by analytical reasoning, prove that cause to be all-sufficient, necessary, one and only one, intelligent, infinite. In so doing, however, we in no way commit the fallacy found in the Ontological argument. That argument attempted, without prior proof of the existence of a necessary being, to draw from the concept of such being, which, prior to proof, could not be known to be a valid concept, certain knowledge of that being's existence.

2. The Cosmological argument derives the existence of an infinite being from finite beings.
But the existence of the infinite cannot be got from the finite. Therefore, etc.

Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx,*

"No evidence can prove an infinite cause of the world, for no evidence can prove anything but a cause adequate to the production of the world, but not infinite. To infer the infinite from the finite is a fallacy like inferring the unknowable from the known, and all arguments in favor of an infinite God must commit it. We argue with finite minds, from finite data, and our conclusions must be of a like nature." P. 304.

D. Maj. It derives the existence of a being who *de facto* is infinite, saying nothing, however, of his infinity, *C.;* it derives the existence of a being not merely who *de facto* is infinite, but explicitly *as* infinite, *Subd.*, directly, *N.;* indirectly, *C. Cd. Min.*

As everything produced is necessarily finite and as a finite cause is capable of producing a finite effect, we do not deduce the infinity of the first unproduced cause directly from the effects produced by him. After having proved, however, directly, that such a cause exists, an analytical deductive inquiry into his nature reveals to us his infinity.

3. To derive the infinite in any way from the finite supposes a proportion to exist between the two. But no proportion exists. Therefore, etc.

D. Maj. It supposes that there should be a perfect likeness, in essence and attributes between the two, i. e., that all the perfections of the infinite should be in finite beings, or that those which are, should be in them in the same way in which they are in the infinite, *N.;* it supposes that all the perfections which are in the finite should be found in the infinite, in an infinite degree, and without any of their imperfections, and, moreover, that the existence of the finite being given, there exists a necessary relation, between it and the infinite, of effect to its cause, *C. Cd. Min.*

Only after the infinity of God has been explained and established will it be possible to fully understand the solution just given and others, which presuppose a knowledge of the infinite and of its relation to the finite.

4. If we could prove the existence of an unproduced being we should be able to form a valid concept of—

a. A self-existent being,

b. A being who has already existed through an infinite stretch of time,

c. A being who is the creator of space.

But all these concepts are impossible. Therefore, etc.

Corrance, *Hibbert Journal*, 1914:

"The nature of the ultimate must ever transcend our categories." P. 388.

Spencer, *First Principles*:

"Self-existence is rigorously inconceivable; and this holds true whatever be the nature of the object of which it is predicated. . . . [for] our conception of its self-existence can be formed only by joining with it the notion of unlimited duration through past time . . . unlimited duration is inconceivable." Pp. 35, 36.

If all beings that are, were made by an unproduced being, then "space was made in the same way that matter was made: [but this is impossible] for if space was created it must have been previously non-existent. The non-existence of space cannot, however, by any mental effort be imagined." P. 34.

a. *D. Maj.* We should be able to form a concept of a self-existing being expressing notes or perfection of that being, gathered through an intuitional, i. e., a direct and immediate, knowledge of him, *N.;* expressing perfections not derived from him, but derived from finite beings, and applied to him analogically (not in exactly the same sense), i. e., all imperfection and limit being removed, *C. Cd. Min.*

Finite beings contain perfections found in the infinite, their cause. These perfections, however, are found in him without imperfection and in an infinite degree. Knowing that the infinite must so contain those perfections, and all our knowledge being expressed through concepts derived directly from sensible things, we must necessarily have an analogical knowledge of the infinite.

b. *D. Maj.* We should be able to form a concept of a being who has already existed through an infinite stretch of time, i. e., our concept of the infinite must necessarily explicitly represent his eternal duration, *N.;* our concept which does represent his eternal duration must represent an existence through an infinite stretch of time, *Subd.,* conceiving that time to be intrinsic to God, *N.;* extrinsic, *Subd.,* and actual, *N.;* and possible. *C. Cd. Min.*

Time is continuous successive duration considered according to that which *was,* which *is,* which *will be.* It is said to be *intrinsic* to an object, when the continuous, successive duration is that of the object itself; *extrinsic,* when the duration of the object is measured by a continuous, successive duration which is extrinsic to it. As there is no motion or change of any kind in the infinite, time is not intrinsic to him. His duration is eternal in the strict sense, excluding as absolutely impossible any beginning or end, any before or after. However we may conceive the eternity of the infinite in terms of time which is extrinsic to it, just as we measure our own duration by the motion of the earth on its axis and around the sun. In this way we may say that the infinite has existed through an infinite time, with one other restriction, however, namely,

that that infinite time be not conceived as actual but as possible. That is, as no moment in the past can be assigned as the first when time was possible, so possible time may be conceived as stretching back indefinitely, i. e., in a broad sense, infinitely. It has no limit in its possibility; the infinite's duration has actually no limit. So the latter may be conceived in terms of the former.

c. *N. Maj.* We deny that a concept of the infinite should be able to represent him as the creator of space. And this, for the simple reason that space, as such, is not a real thing. It is a thing fashioned by our own intellect, not arbitrarily, however, but with a foundation in reality, i. e., in the real order, for so doing. It has an objective existence in the intellect as a thing thought, but outside of the intellect it neither exists nor can it exist.

The foundation in the real order of our concept of space are the extended objects we see about us with their length, breadth and depth. Our concept of a part of space is formed by supposing that such an extended object has dropped out of existence and that nothing has taken its place, and conceiving the void it leaves,—which has the exact dimensions of the body,—as a receptacle, i. e., the space, into which the body may be conceived to have been put. This space is called real space by reason of the reality of the surfaces of the body or bodies conceived as enclosing it.

If we consider, further, that no matter how many extended objects exist, no matter how large any one of them may be, it is still possible that others and larger ones may be made, and that without end, we have a concept of the limitless vastness in length, breadth and depth of possible extension.

If now we conceive a void with these limitless dimensions as a receptacle into which extended objects may be put we have a concept of absolute or imaginary space; that space, namely, into which we may conceive the visible world to have been put when it was made.

This is the space which Spencer tells us the infinite would have to be conceived as creating. The difficulty is an absurdity to one who knows what space is.

We have dwelt at some length on these notions of space and time, as an utterly false explanation of the way in which we form them lies at the very door of Kant's destructive *Critique of Pure Reason.* He claims the notions of time and space are formed independently of experience, i. e., through *a priori* forms of them. We have shown how we derive them from experience, at the same time giving answer to our present adversary's difficulties.

5. If matter and the forces of matter existing from eternity, and in motion from eternity, and acting according to the immutable laws of nature, can by a gradual evolution form at first less perfect substances, then more perfect ones, and finally man, there is no need of postulating the existence of an unproduced first cause of the world,—an intelligent, infinitely perfect being.
But this hypothesis is true. Therefore, etc.
This is the explanation of the world given by Büchner and other gross materialistic Atheists. Haeckel, who has been called "the high-priest of Monism," though he claims that he is not a Materialist (Cf. *Riddle of the Universe,* p. 16, Translated by McCabe; Watts & Co., London, 1913), really is

one, and holds practically the doctrine advanced in the difficulty.

He says, l. c.,

"Monism recognizes one sole substance in the universe, which is at once 'God and Nature'; body and spirit (or matter and energy) it holds to be inseparable. The extramundane God of dualism leads necessarily to Theism; the intra-mundane God of the monist leads to Pantheism."

He calls himself a Pantheist, but he is honest enough farther on (l. c., p. 238) to admit that this Pantheism is Atheism. He quotes, approvingly, the following from Schopenhauer:

"Pantheism is only a polite form of Atheism. The truth of Pantheism lies in its destruction of the dualistic antithesis of God and the world, in its recognition that the world exists in virtue of its own inherent forces. The maxim of the Pantheist, 'God and the world are one' is merely a polite way of giving the Lord God his *congé*."

Of Haeckel's doctrine, **Calkins**, *Persistent Problems of Philosophy*, p. 402, writes:

"If Haeckel were consistent in his teaching, it would be, indeed, unfair, to reckon him as a materialist. But the truth is as has been shown, that he actually defines the 'one substance' in terms of the material—as the sum of atoms, or of chemical and physical processes, and as phychoplasma. Similarly Herbert applied to what he calls the Unknown Reality specific attributes of the physical universe."

In answer then to our difficulty—

N. Min. The explanation offered bristles with absurdities.

The following reasons will suffice for its rejection. More could be given.

1. The fundamental substance it postulates has all the attributes of a produced being, and yet it is said to be unproduced.

2. The motion it postulates from eternity is impossible. It necessarily implies that an infinite duration of time has been passed in reaching the

present moment in the world's history. This implication is impossible.

3. Matter and material energy and motion cannot explain the lower forms of life, much less can they explain intellectual life, the origin of the soul, free-will, etc.

6. What is outside of man's experience cannot be demonstrated by man.

But the existence of an unproduced cause is outside of man's experience. Therefore, etc.

John Stuart Mill and others who belittle man's reasoning power so argue.

D. Maj. What is outside of man's experience and not necessarily connected with what he experiences cannot be demonstrated, *C.;* what man does not experience, but what is necessarily connected with the objects of that experience, he cannot demonstrate, *N. Cd. Min.*

7. As far as we know the elementary constituents of the world may have always existed.

Therefore the existence of a first cause extrinsic to them cannot be demonstrated. Thus argues Mill.

R. 1. *Tr. Ant. N. Con.* Even though the world had no beginning, still, as a mutable and contingent being, it is a produced thing. Hence it necessarily depends on the first unproduced cause of all things produced.

2. *D. Ant.* As far as we know, naturally and apart from the conclusions of reason, *C.;* including reason's conclusions, *N.*

THESIS IV.

An unproduced cause exists of itself and with absolute necessity.

PRENOTES TO THE THESIS.

Having demonstrated the existence of an unproduced first cause of the beings daily produced in the world, in the present thesis we derive from a consideration of the nature of that being two other attributes very closely allied to that of its being unproduced, viz., its self existence and its absolutely necessary existence. In fact, the connection is so close that the present thesis may be said to be but a corollary of the preceding one.

A Self-Existing Being is one whose existence is *from itself*. Not in the sense, however, that it produces itself,—which is manifestly impossible,—but in the sense, that its existence is of its very essence or nature. Because it is what it is, it exists.

An Absolutely Necessary Being is one which on no hypothesis can be, or can be conceived to be, non-existing. For brevity's sake this being is most frequently called simply a *necessary being*.

An Hypothetically Necessary Being is one which on the hypothesis that it be existing, cannot be non-existing. It might, however, have not existed, and it is absolutely possible for it to lose the existence it now has. It can, then, be fully conceived apart from existence. For example, I can have a perfect concept of a man, in a state of non-existence; I can never conceive a being whose existence is absolutely necessary in such a state.

An hypothetically necessary being is commonly and briefly called a *contingent being.*

ADVERSARIES.

Kant and his followers, who claim that any logical deduction from the conclusion of the Cosmological argument, i. e., from the concept of an unproduced being, whose existence has been proved, necessarily involves the invalid Ontological argument. We have already shown this claim to be false.

PROOF OF THE THESIS.

Part I. An unproduced cause is self-existing.

An unproduced cause is either self-existing or derives its existence from another.

But it does not derive its existence from another. Therefore, etc.

Maj. The truth of the Major follows immediately from the principle of causality.

Min. If it derived its existence from another, it would not be unproduced.

Part II. An unproduced cause exists with absolute necessity.

An unproduced cause, whose existence is not absolutely necessary to it, could not exist.

But an unproduced cause can exist. Therefore, etc.

Maj. It could not exist, for there could be no sufficient reason for its existence.

The reason could not be found in the being itself, for it would be a contingent being.

It could not be found in any other being, for that being would be its cause; and it has no cause.

Min. It not only can exist but must have existed, as we proved in the preceding thesis.

Corollary I. A necessary being absolutely excludes the possibility of a beginning or an end to its existence. It always

has existed, it now exists, it will exist forever. If it could ever be non-existing, it would not be a necessary being.

Corollary II. From the study of the nature of a necessary being, we shall demonstrate the wonderful perfections of that nature; its unicity, intelligence, personality, simplicity, immutability, infinity both in itself and in its attributes, etc.

In none of these proofs drawn from the concept of necessary being, we insist in answer to the contrary assertions of Kant and his many present-day followers, is there any implication of the invalid Ontological argument.

The Ontological argument attempts, prior to the establishment of the validity of the concept of a necessary being, and hence prior to an *a posteriori proof* of that being's existence, to derive from that concept a knowledge of the actual existence of that being. In doing this it commits the fallacy of drawing a certain conclusion from a concept which is not known to be a valid concept, and attempting, in so doing, to pass illegitimately from the ideal to the real and actual order.

In the demonstrations mentioned above, no such fallacy is committed. We have proved the existence of an unproduced being, and, hence, have established the validity of the concept of that being. We have a perfect right now by deductive argumentation to draw whatever conclusions may legitimately be drawn from that concept. Exercising that right we have proved that an unproduced being is a self-existing and necessarily existing being, and continuing the same kind of argumentation we shall derive all the conclusions mentioned in these corallaries, and many more.

THESIS V.

There exists, and can exist, only one absolutely necessary being; only one God.

PRENOTES TO THE THESIS.

Our adversaries have told us that the Cosmological argument, even if it could prove the existence of an unproduced first cause, is barren of results, inasmuch as any attempt to further develop it, and show that an unproduced first cause is not the eternally existing matter of the materialistic Atheists, nor the world-including god of the Pantheists, nor the finite god of many Pluralists, nor the multiplied god of the Polytheists, necessarily introduces the Ontological argument, the invalidity of which we have admitted. (Cf. **Knight,** *Aspects of Theism,* pp. 53 ff.)

Though this difficulty has just been answered, it may be well to answer it again, as our adversaries, since the time of Kant, never grow weary of urging it.

Our method of argumentation is this. Having derived from the existence of things produced the existence of an unproduced cause of them, whether one or many as yet we have not proved, we deduce, step by step, through a reasoned analysis of the nature of that cause, a concept of God, viz., our fully developed scientific concept, which distinguishes Him absolutely from any being which a Materialist, Atheist, or Pantheist, or illogical Pluralist or Polytheist may wish to put in His place.

Nor in so doing are we guilty of the fallacy of the Ontological argument. Our deductions are drawn from a concept, the validity of which we have already established. Such, however, is not the method of those who advance the Ontological argument. They wish to pass from the ideal order to

the real and actual order, and that through a concept which, as they use it, can not be known to be valid. What is more as a concept of a necessarily existing being cannot certainly be known by us to be valid without a knowledge of the existence of that being, any attempt to demonstrate the existence of such a being, even from a concept known to be valid is necessarily a *petitio principii.*

In this thesis, then, in pursuance of our plan, we advance a step and show that the nature of a necessary being is such that it cannot be multiplied, hence there is, and can be, only one necessary being. Our thesis excludes Ditheism, Tritheism and all other forms of Polytheism.

In a thesis to be explained and proved later on, we shall show that the oneness of God, which excludes the possibility of other gods, is a oneness of absolute simplicity, i. e., a oneness which excludes composition of all kinds from God.

Only One—That is said to be only one, which has no one to share that perfection of which it is said to be sole possessor.

Only One, of Necessity—That is said to be necessarily only one, which has no one to share the said perfection, because any such one is impossible. It is this kind of *unicity, only-oneness,* we predicate of God's nature in our thesis.

Only One, In Fact—That is said to be only one *in fact,* i. e., *merely in fact,* which actually is without any one to share the said perfection, though such ones are possible.

When we say a necessary being is of necessity one and only one, we affirm that a plurality of necessary beings is impossible, i. e., we affirm that a necessary being is in such wise one determined individual that there cannot be another individual of the same nature. Hence the very nature which makes a necessary being, *considered merely as such,* to be a *necessary being,* makes him also to be *this* necessary being

In other words, we assert that there is a great difference between, for example, human nature, looked at *merely as such,* and the nature of a necessary being, looked at *in the same way.* Human nature, looked at *merely as such,* is not in its concept restricted to one individual man, it may be found in countless men; the nature of a necessary being, on the contrary, looked at *merely as such,* in its concept is restricted to one definite, individual, necessary being. Therefore only one necessary being, one God, is possible. This oneness or unity of the divine nature is a oneness of singularity.

ADVERSARIES.

Ditheists (Theistic Dualists), Tritheists, and Polytheists, both ancient and modern. **William James,** as far as words go, is polytheistically inclined; in reality he appears to be an Atheist. (Cf. *A Pluralistic Universe,* p. 124.)

Ditheism. Philosophy has a problem to solve which is commonly called the problem of evil. It is a hard problem; an age-old problem. **James Ward** calls it "the crux of theism," and **F. C. Schiller** tells us that it is "a stumbling block to all practical religion" and "is as insoluble a mystery to the theologians now as it was at the beginning."

It may be stated thus: There are in the world evils in abundance, both physical and moral. Can their presence there be squared with the claim that there is one and only one ruler of the world, who is a God, infinitely good and infinitely powerful, or is some other solution to be sought for?

It is not our intention to solve this problem here. We make mention of it merely to give the ground for the rise of Ditheism which sprang from a futile effort to solve it.

This system explains the world and its evils as the result of the action of two eternally opposed principles; one essentially good and the author of all good in the world; the other, essentially bad, and the author of all the world's evils. This error was prevalent in the East for several centuries before

Christ, especially in Persia where Zoroaster gave it birth. In the third century after Christ, substantially the same error was taught by the Manicheans; named from their founder Mani.

The problem is still with us, acutely so, in the face of the terrible sufferings and crimes that accompanied and have followed the world war. Ditheism failed to answer it. Ditheism is dead. And the principle of decay and death is in every answer that present-day non-Catholic philosophy has to offer; and they are many.

The Atheist *solves* (?) the problem by removing God; the Christian Scientist, if he may be called a philosopher, by removing evil; the non-Catholic Pluralist, with very few exceptions, by limiting God's power and making Him finite; the Pantheist, in different ways; some, by ignoring evil; others, in evolutionary fashion, by saying that all will be well in the end, when the world will have evolved into a perfect state, and all evil will have vanished from it.

All these so-called solutions of the problem of evil we reject. It is a hard problem to solve, but whatever its solution may be, it cannot be found in Atheism or so-called Christian Science, or in a denial either of the unicity of God, or of His infinite power or infinite goodness. Christian philosophy can tolerate no such solution.

And yet more than one of our adversaries will tell us unblushingly, as **Durant Drake** does, in *Seekers After God,* **Harvard Theological Review,** Jan., 1919: "The conception of Satan, taken over from the Persian religion, has prevented Christianity from becoming a clear-cut Monotheism, as Mohammedanism has been; many Christian writings depict their God, as a striving God, not unlike the Ahura-Mazda of Zoroaster, or the finite God of William James, whose success is dependent in part on our faithfulness." P. 74.

Tritheism. This peculiar form of Polytheism arose from an incorrect interpretation of the mystery of the most Blessed

Trinity. It taught that the divine nature is multiplied in the three divine Persons, and consequently that there are three Gods.

Polytheism. Polytheism admits the existence of many, and, in some instances, of countless gods. Indian writers have boasted of thirty-three millions. It made its appearance some time after the Deluge, and gradually became so universal, that before long the Jews were practically the only nation which professed pure Monotheism.

With the coming of Christ, our Saviour, and the founding of His church, began a warfare between that church and the religions of the false gods so fierce that the history of the early church may be said to be written in blood. This warfare has gone on and is still going on. Countless souls have been brought to a knowledge of the one true God, but still countless souls remain to be won. Of all the inhabitants of the world at the present day fully sixty per cent. are still Polytheists. The picture is a dark one yet there are many reasons for not taking an altogether pessimistic view of it. For:

1. Though Polytheism be the belief of more than half the human race, it is an error neither as vicious nor as hard to eradicate as Atheism or Pantheism.

   It is not as vicious: for whilst the existence of a Supreme Being on whom he depends, to whom he owes reverence, and by whom good and evil are given their deserts, is formally denied by the dogmatic Atheist, formally doubted by the Sceptic, formally ignored by the Agnostic, and virtually repudiated by the Pantheist, who by placing himself on the level with God, makes of Him no God,—the Polytheist, whatever his life may be, recognizes that there is a Being above him, on whom he depends, whom he must reverence, and to whom he owes an accounting for the deeds of his life.

   In a word, the Atheist, Agnostic and Pantheist, having put aside God, have also put aside, theoretically at

least, the law of God, and for that matter, the law of man also, seeing that all authority comes from God; the Polytheist, not so.

Nor is the error of the Polytheist as hard to eradicate as those of the Atheist, dogmatic, sceptic and agnostic, or Pantheist. The error of the Polytheist, is the error of the over-credulous, the simple, the ignorant; the error of the Atheist, whatever his complexion may be, and Pantheist, is the error of the self-sufficient, over-wise philosopher, who, by a misuse of reason, has entrenched himself in his false position.

History justifies this analysis, for while Atheism and Pantheism have their philosophic systems and champions, Polytheism has not; or, to cite a concrete example, while the philosophic school of the Brahmanists is pantheistic, and that of the Buddhists, atheistic, the millions of the common, ignorant followers of Brahma and Buddha are frankly polytheistic.

2. A careful study of the religions, both ancient and modern, of the non-christian world, based upon information furnished by historical records of the past, and reliable data gathered painstakingly in these later days by missioners, explorers and followers of the new science of Comparative Religion, shows clearly enough that, as far as our knowledge goes, no such thing as a *pure* Polytheism has ever existed. For among the many gods of the Polytheists, even of those Polytheists at the lowest level of culture and intellectual development, *one* God is always found who is acknowledged to be supreme, the lord of the lower gods and of men. In the sense, therefore, of recognizing one God as supreme ruler, although many inferior ones were also venerated, Polytheism may be said to be monotheistic.

Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience,* tells us "Man has never been in doubt that the qualities

of God are such as can belong to one,—a polytheism that is not in some sense a henotheism [*heis, henos,* one; *theos,* God, i. e., a belief in *one* God, and not in only one God], is yet to be discovered." P. 325.

3. Nor can Polytheism be considered a stage in the upward development, or evolution, of man in religion and morals from a zero of no God, and no conscience, as is urged by many non-Catholic philosophers who nowadays wish to apply their evolutionary theory to religion, to morals, and even to God Himself. On the contrary, we have the indubitable testimony of competent witnesses, some of them non-Catholics, men deeply versed in the study of the religions of mankind, and especially of the primitive religions, to the fact, that a pure Monotheism was the primitive faith of the human race, and hence that Polytheism is a degeneration from a purer form of worship.

Fr. John T. Driscoll, S. T. L., *God*, after discussing this point says,

"We may with perfect safety consider these conclusions as well established:

"a. That the farther back we go in the history of any religion the purer become the religious concepts, hence the fact of primitive purity, for which we have the testimony of Renouf, de Rouge, Müller, Rawlinson, Tiele.

"b. That everywhere evident traces are found of the corruption of primitive belief, hence the fact of degeneracy, for which we appeal to the labors of Dr. Robertson Smith, Müller, Kellog, Ebrard, Phillips, etc.

"c. That all nations point in tradition to the time when heaven was closer to earth, hence the traces of primitive revelation, e. g., Müller, Phillips.

"d. That the ascertained results of historic criticism show the earliest known belief of the Persians, the Hindus, the Egyptians, the Chinese, to be of a pure and spiritual monotheism, for which fact we have the researches of d'Harlez, Darmesteter, Tiele, Legge, de Rouge, Renouf." P. 42.

Tisdall, *Comparative Religion*, in his concluding chapter writes:

"Ethnic religions have been compared to a stream into which flow two rivulets, one pure and the other foul. In the bed of the river these mingle their waters, though sometimes there may be detected a part of the current which has par-

tially escaped pollution. Lactantius and other Christian writers of antiquity appeal to the fact that on certain occasions even polytheists confess the unity of God and show some knowledge of Him. 'When they swear, and when they express a hope, and when they render thanks they name—not Jove, nor many dieties, but—'God'; to such an extent does truth of itself naturally find expression even from unwilling hearts.' Lactantius points out that in prosperity this occurs much less frequently than in adversity. . . . 'They never remember God except when they are in trouble. After fear has left them and danger has receded, then indeed do they joyfully run together to the temples of the deities; to them they pour out libations, to them they offer sacrifice, them do they crown with garlands. But to God, whom they had called upon in the stress of necessity, not even in word do they offer thanks.'

"Underlying Polytheism, and even such philosophical Pantheism as it is to be found in modern India, there still exists in each human heart, if no longer in book-religion and in systems of Philosophy, an innate belief in the One, True and Living God, who is not a 'Stream of Tendency,' not 'The Unknowable,' nor 'A Power not ourselves that makes for Righteousness,' but the Heavenly Father whose name is preserved even in the traditions of the modern savage. . . .

"As we have already seen, there is good reason to believe that the true knowledge of God 'shone on the cradle of our race.' The noble vision became veiled, and idolatry with all its attendant abominations showed itself in history as a result of a Fall which calls for a restoration, rather than as the starting point of a continuous advance." Pp. 125, 126.

PRENOTES TO THE PROOF.

To make our proof clear, a few notions, explained in previous parts of philosophy, are recalled.

1. The essence or nature of a thing is that which makes a thing what it is fundamentally. When the question is asked about something, "What is that?," it is answered accurately and completely by giving the essence or nature of the thing. For example, a being is passing by of a certain size, form and color; erect, having two legs, arms and hands; now talking, now laughing, and I am asked what it is. I answer, and correctly, by neglecting everything else, and denoting that which makes him what he is fundamentally, "It is a man." So if you ask "What is God?" I answer by denoting His essence

or nature, "He is a necessary being, i. e., a self-existing being."

2. **A singular thing,** is *so one* that it *cannot be multiplied.* For example, *this* man cannot be *many* men. *Only one* man, and of necessity, only one man, can be *this* man. Every singular nature, therefore, *as such,* is of necessity *one and only one.*

   I may, however, consider the nature *which* is in a singular being, either *as* singular or *apart* from its singularity. In the first place, I consider the nature which makes him to be, for example, *this* man, in the second case, the nature which makes him to be merely *a* man.

   When we say, then, in our argument that the nature of a necessary being cannot be multiplied, we mean the nature looked at *apart* from singularity, hence the nature by which a necessary being is merely *a* necessary being makes him to be also *this* necessary being. Therefore, the very nature which makes God to be God, makes Him also to be *this* God, and as a singular thing cannot be multiplied, it follows that the nature of God, however it be looked at, cannot be multiplied.

3. **Whatever exists is necessarily a singular thing.** If that were not so, then each existing being could be many. Hence, for example, an existing man could be this man and that man, i. e., *not this* man, at the same time. Which is evidently absurd.

4. **Whatever can be conceived as non-singular can be conceived as non-existing.** As a thing cannot exist unless it be singular it follows that, if I can rightly conceive the nature of any being without conceiving it as singular, I can rightly conceive that nature as not existing, for I can conceive it without something which is necessary for its existence. An example will make this conclusion clear. If the pos-

session of a heart and lungs is necessary in order that a man may live, I can certainly and rightly conceive him as dead, if it is possible for me to conceive him as having lost, i. e., as being without, both heart and lungs.

PROOF OF THE THESIS.

If more than one necessary being, i. e., more than one God, is possible, the nature of necessary being *as such* i. e., the nature considered apart from its singularity, may be conceived as capable of being found in more than one necessary being.

But the nature of necessary being *as such,* i. e., considered apart from its singularity, cannot be conceived as being capable of being found in more than one necessary being.

Therefore only one necessary being, i. e., only one God, is possible.

Maj. The Major appears to be self-evident. For if the nature of necessary being be not monopolized by one individual, it may be found in more than one. Hence it may be conceived as capable of being so found.

Min. If the nature by which a necessary being is constituted *not this* necessary being *but merely a* necessary being can be conceived as capable of being found in more than one necessary being, it can be conceived as non-singular, for if it were necessary to conceive it as singular, it could be conceived only in one necessary being.

But the nature of a necessary being, i.e., a nature which cannot be conceived as non-existing, cannot be conceived as not singular. If it could, it could be conceived without that which is necessary for existence, as shown above; and hence it could also be conceived as non-existing. But it is impossible for the nature of a being whose existence is absolutely necessary to be conceived as non-existing.

Scholion. The Unicity of God and the Mystery of the Most Blessed Trinity.

Divine revelation teaches that in God there are three Divine Persons, really distinct one from another; and at the same time it teaches that there is only one God. The same, identical, singular nature, therefore, is common to the three Divine Persons. Hence, between our thesis, which asserts only the unicity of the divine nature, and revelation, there is no opposition.

DIFFICULTIES

1. A proof which proves only the unicity of the singular divine nature does not prove the thesis.

But the proof of the thesis, which is derived from the nature of a necessary being, proves only the unicity of the singular divine nature.

Therefore the thesis remains unproved.

D. Min. It would prove only the unicity of the singular divine nature, if it were derived from the nature of necessary being looked at as singular, i.e., as constituting him *this* necessary being, *C.;* if it is derived merely from the nature of necessary being considered apart from singularity, *N.* *Cd. Min.*

2. If the multiplication of a perfection in others, does not diminish it in those who already possess it, the nature of a necessary being, even though it be infinite, need not be restricted to one individual.

But the multiplication of a perfection in others, does not diminish it in those who already possess it.

Therefore many necessary beings are possible.

D. Maj. If the multiplication of a perfection in others, does not diminish it in those already possessing it, but if, nevertheless, the fact that it can be multiplied is a sign that the perfection is contingent and finite.

the nature of a necessary being, even though it be infinite, need not be restricted to one individual, *N.;* if the fact that it can be multiplied were not such a sign, the nature of a necessary being might be multiplied, *C.* *Cd. Min.*

3. If the same witnesses who testify to the existence of God, and whose testimony is accepted, testify also that there are many gods, that testimony is also to be accepted.

But the same witnesses who testify to the existence of God testify also to the existence of many gods.

Therefore, the existence of many gods should be admitted.

D. Maj. If adequately the same witnesses testify, i.e., if the testimony is just as universal and just as constant, with regard to both facts, their testimony is to be accepted with regard to both facts, *C.;* if inadequately the same witnesses testify with regard to both facts, i.e., if the testimony with regard to the existence of God, is universal and constant in the history of the human race, on account of which qualities this testimony is accepted with regard to that fact, whereas the testimony with regard to the existence of many gods is not universal and not constant, their testimony is to be accepted with regard to both facts, *N.* *Cd. Min.*

4. If there be but one necessary being, who is God, He finally is the cause of the evil in the world.

But God cannot be the cause of the evil in the world. Therefore there must be more than one necessary being.

D. Maj. He is the cause of all the reality in the things that are evil, in the sense that whatever reality is produced by any creature is also produced by the concurrent action of God, *C.;* He is the cause not

merely of the reality in the thing, but of the evil looked at in itself, *Subd.*, He is immediately its cause, *N.;* mediately, *Subd.*, He is in any sense the cause of the evil looked at in *itself,* in the case of moral evil, i.e., sin, *N.;* in the case of physical evil, *Subd.,* He is its cause, making use of it as a means to a good end, which may be either a higher physical good or something which looks to the moral welfare of man, *C.;* not making use of it as such a means. *N.* *Cd. Min.*

The Problem of Evil. We make no attempt here to treat fully the problem of evil which is presented in this difficulty. Such treatment will be given later. A brief explanation of the formal distinctions given above will help to their better understanding.

Evil. A thing is said to be evil when it is in some way wanting in order. In the evil thing we distinguish the reality which is evil, and the evil looked at in itself.
Evil looked at in itself consists in the privation or want of due order.
Physical evil in itself is the want of conformity with the physical laws.
Moral evil in itself is the want of conformity with the laws that bind in conscience.

As evil looked at in itself is not a reality but a privation, it cannot be the immediate effect of an action, since every action immediately produces some reality. A privation, therefore, is connected with, and consequent on, the production of some reality.

As physical evil is opposed only to some finite good, it may, according to the right order, in a complicated system, where parts are subordinated to other parts and to the whole, be intended as a means to the well being of a higher order or of the whole. And hence, what may be considered a physical evil, if we confine our attention to

one small portion of this complicated world-order, will be seen to be good if we consider that portion in its relation to others and to the whole. So, the loss of an arm, looked at merely in itself is a physical evil, but to lose an arm to save the whole man, is according to right order, and therefore, under that aspect, not an evil. So, sickness, which sends a man back to God, is not, if viewed adequately, an evil. God, therefore, may intend, if He wishes, the happening of physical evil as a means to a good in a higher order.

As moral evil is opposed to God Himself, seeing that it is the deliberate turning of the creatures man uses, and, at times, even of man himself, away from the ultimate end for which they were made, God can never intend it. Nevertheless, whilst hating and prohibiting it, He may permit it, only however, on the supposition, that, such evil being presupposed, He makes it the occasion for obtaining some good. Otherwise, it would not be directed towards the ultimate end for which all creatures were necessarily made,—God Himself.

Moral evil, it must be noted, is due to man's deliberate misuse of the greatest gift that God has given him, namely, the gift of freedom; through which, as master of his own actions, he has the power to win God as his own.

Short of taking this gift away from him, God does all that He can to urge man to a right use of it. If man fails to use it properly, then man, not God, is to blame.

If we were to deny to God, the right to give this gift to man, or to place him in circumstances in which He foresees that man will abuse it, even to the extent of losing his soul, we should be making God the slave of man's depravity. An example will show this clearly. Let us take a man who for two whole years, with the exception of one half-hour, deliberately chooses to live at enmity with God; and let us suppose that God wishes to summon

him to judgment during that time. The sinner thus addresses God: "My Lord and my God! with a clear knowledge of the great gifts You have given me and the love You have shown me in forgiving me the innumerable sins of my past life, I nevertheless intend this coming year to profane Your Holy Name, to trample Your gifts under my feet, and whenever occasion offers, and as far as in my power lies, to crucify You. When the year is done I will give one half-hour to Your service. The year that follows will again be mine. It is in Your power to call me to account when You will, but at the risk of being called unmerciful, unjust, unholy, You dare not call me from life outside of the miserable half-hour I give to Your service." If God were obliged so to act, who would be master, God or the sinner?

THESIS VI.

The unproduced, necessarily existing, first cause of all things produced, God, one and only one, is an intelligent, personal being.

PRENOTES TO THE THESIS.

Still advancing in the development of our scientific concept of God, our aim in this thesis is to show that He is an intelligent and personal being.

That God is a personal being can be proved easily enough, once His intelligence has been established. To establish this, then, will be our main endeavor.

Two proofs of it suggest themselves. The first, quite simple and needing little or no explanation, is drawn from the existence in the world of intelligent beings. The second is drawn from the order which everywhere abounds in nature. It is known as the argument from design, the argument from final causes, the teleological (*telos*, end) argument. It is a classical argument, a strong argument, an appealing argument. Small wonder, then, that it has been bitterly assailed by its many adversaries, Atheists, Agnostics, Pantheists, Kantian Theists, Pragmatists, Modernists. To meet these attacks successfully, one must have a firm grasp of it, and this cannot be had without a clear and accurate knowledge of its nature and scope. It will be necessary, then, before presenting the argument to explain fully these two points.

Fundamental to an understanding of the nature of the argument is an understanding of the notion of order. This demands, then, immediate explanation.

Order is the adaptation of many, and most frequently of diverse, things to some one definite result.

Order of Beauty (æsthetic) is the outcome when the definite result of such adaptation is the harmonious combination of the many into a whole capable of giving pleasure to those perceiving it.

When the combination is based on quantitative relations, beauty of symmetry results; when it is based on qualitative relations, the result is beauty of harmony.

Order of Finality (teleological) is the adaptation of the many as a means to a definite intended result to be attained by their combined physical action.

Order of beauty may be said *to tend*, by the appeal it makes through the intellect, i.e., *by moral causality, to the giving of pleasure, as to an end purposed or designed;* teleological order *tends, by the physical action* of its parts, *to the result it achieves, as to an end, purposed or designed.*

Both, then, may be said to *tend towards an end*, and so both may be called *teleological.* However, as that order is more properly said to *tend towards* an end, as an effect purposed or designed, which reaches it through the united *physical action* of its parts, the name *teleological* is usually given to it alone.

The term teleological order, or order of finality, even as broadly applied also to order of beauty, may be understood in two senses.

Order of finality materially taken. In this sense, an order is considered *which* implies finality, not *as* implying it, the end reached being considered merely *as the term, or result,* in the physical order, and in no sense as the cause, of the ordered action of the means used to reach it.

Order of finality formally taken. In this sense, an order is considered not only *which* shows finality but *as* showing it, the end reached being considered not merely as a result, or term, in the physical order,

of the ordered action of the means, but also *as the cause,* in the intellectual or the moral order, i.e., *the final cause,* of it.

The result, therefore, reached in the physical order, before its existence there, existed in the intellectual order as a known result whose attainment was desired; the result so desired, and existing as yet merely as a thing desired, being the cause of the selection and ordering of the means suitable to bring about its actual existence.

In the world abundant evidence is given of both orders, that of beauty, and that of finality. From either of them separately, or from both combined, arguments proving the intelligence of God may be derived. These arguments are forms of the teleological argument.

The teleological argument, therefore, derives from presence of order in the world the intelligence of the first unproduced cause of all things,—God. It concludes from the presence in the world of *finality materially taken,* to the presence there of *finality formally taken.*

In other words, from a consideration of the constant concurrence of the innumerable forces of nature in producing continually those countless effects of wondrous beauty and utility that make this ordered world, the intellect is forced to the conclusion that such concurrence can be explained only on the hypothesis:

1. That those effects, prior to the world's existence, were present in thought and efficacious desire to an intelligent efficient cause;
2. That the means to achieve them through countless combinations of natural forces was intelligently planned;
3. That the result of this efficacious desire was the actual carrying out of the plan—the ordered universe.

In the same way considering the marvelous adaptation

of part with part in a giant locomotive, we immediately conclude that before it existed some intelligent being must have conceived the desire to construct a self-propelling machine, carefully planned its parts, and then, as the result of his desire, executed the plan.

Various forms of the teleological argument. As we noted above, the teleological argument may draw its conclusions either from the order of beauty in the world, or from the order of finaltiy, or from both together.

The argument less strictly teleological, sometimes called the argument from order, is that drawn only from the order of beauty in the world. This order, as we have seen, is teleological in a less strict sense.

The argument strictly teleological, very often called the argument from design, is drawn from the order of finality in the world. This order is strictly teleological.

It may be made in two different ways:

1. One form derives its conclusion from the order of finality but not exclusively; it argues from both orders. However since it concludes mainly from the order of finality, it is classed as a strict teleological argument.
2. A second form draws its conclusion solely from the order of finality. **St. Thomas** uses this form. This also we shall use, considering the world under one aspect only; inasmuch, namely, as it is a complexus of many active agents whose various operations, in marvelous combination, constantly produce, in the midst of innumerable changes, effects both beautiful and useful.

W. Knight, who rejects the teleological argument, makes mention of its double form in *Aspects of Theism.* He writes,

"One branch of it [the teleological argument] is the popular argument from design or adaptation in nature; the fitness of means implying, it is said, an architect or designer

"Another branch is the argument from the order in the universe: the types or laws of nature indicating, it is said, an orderer or law-giver, whose intelligence we thus discern. In this case it is not that adjustment of means to ends proves the presence of a mind that adjusted them; but that the law itself, in its regularity and continuity, implies a mind behind it, an intelligence animating an otherwise soul-less universe." P. 60.

Points to be noted concerning the development of the argument. Having defined, and given the divisions of, order and the teleological argument, we have still to explain some points touching the argument's development.

1. **Even though it could be proved that nature is not orderly in all its works, our argument would still stand.**

Our argument in no way rests on the assumption that everything in the world is rightly ordered; nor on this assumption, that everything in the world is rightly ordered, even though we consider the world solely inasmuch as it is subject to the laws of nature, and hence altogether apart from, and independent of man's free acts and their consequences. But it is based on this assumption, which no one can fail to admit, viz., that, even though it were true that natural agents now and again acted counter to right order (which we do not admit), still this world of ours is an ordered world; a *cosmos* (order), a *mundus* (ordered), a universe (*versus,* towards; *unum,* one), in which everywhere countless creatures of bewildering variety and diverse tendencies, in the midst of continual changes both accidental and substantial, steadfastly, changelessly, and frequently in ways most intricate, harmoniously concur in the production of effects of surpassing beauty and usefulness. To emphasize the above point we cite here two non-Catholic philosophers, leaving to a corollary an account of some particular instances of nature's marvelous workings.

Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, "The plausibility of teleology depends we are told, on our exclusive attention to picked instances, which successfully simulate the characters of intention; but it is not these alone that ought to be cited as witnesses: we have only to enter another compartment of nature, and we shall find them not only unconfirmed but contradicted. Numerous cases are adduced of natural arrangements which attain their ends so clumsily as to leave but a poor impression of their originating intelligence: or, worse, which work such mischief as can never have been an end to any intelligence at all.

"These cases undoubtedly demand a patient estimate—at the same time we must bear in mind the real position of the argument and not suppose that positive marks of intention and intellectual method can be cancelled or neutralized by any appeal to inexplicable or seemingly opposite instances. Even if they implied the absence from them of intelligent causation they do not withdraw it from the field which it already occupies; but only embarass us with the problem, how it is that the disposing mind, conspicuous through so vast a range, has not left its vestiges everywhere.

"The clear is not set aside by the obscure: and if the utter helplessness and absurdity of the hypothesis of fortuitous concurrence in the face of well understood natural order have been established, the threatened sufficiency of final causes to account for a residue of ill understood and exceptional phenomena will add nothing to its competency." Vol. 1, p. 330.

Diman, *The Theistic Argument*. "The universe everywhere reveals itself to us as a whole, all the parts of which are related to each other by precise and unvarying laws. . . . . .

"The reign of law is, then, the result which science has everywhere reached. It lies at the root of every conception we can form of the universe either without us, or within us; for while regularity and order are most conspicuous in the grand phenomena of the external world, we are not less assured of their pervading presence in the most intricate and obscure processes of life. Beginning with astronomy, the idea has passed to every department of science, and to every domain of thought. It refuses to be excluded from any sphere where there is change and progress and growth. It meets us at every step. Pp. 104, 105.

2. **Our argument is derived from the world-order, looked at in its entirety.**

In the development of the teleological argument, we

prove the necessity of admitting intelligence in the first cause of all existing things, from a consideration, not of particular instances of order in the world, but of the world-order looked at in its entirety, i.e., from a consideration of the constant, complicated, universal concurrence of nature's countless forces; the result of which is, in the midst of endless changes and through the ceaseless production and destruction of the individual, the preservation of innumerable genera and species of unsurpassing beauty and bewildering variety in the mineral, and especially in the plant and animal kingdoms.

It is to be noted, however, that whilst drawing on the universal world-order for our argument, we insist that there are in nature many particular instances of adaptation of means to end which can only be explained by admitting them to be the result of intelligent purposeful action. This is especially true in the case of vital functions, and in a still more marked way in the case of many instinctive acts of animals.

Among the particular instances of world-order to be given in a scholion at the end of this thesis will be included some from organic life and the instinctive actions of brutes.

Muckermann, S.J., *The Humanizing of the Brute,* **remarks on this point, "It is obvious that the influence of 'purpose' or a final tendency is met with everywhere in the universe. . . . . It is clearly demonstrated by the laws of organic life in general, and especially by the study of the human body, its organs and functions, the eye, the heart, the circulation of the blood, the activity of brain and nerves.**

"But nowhere is the direction of final tendency demanded more emphatically than in the activity of animals which originates in their instinctive faculties. Indeed, we meet with so many actions appropriate to specific ends that, if anywhere in nature, then surely in the domain of instinct 'final tendency' holds the sceptre of sovereignty." P. 17.

3. **Our main argument is not analogical; the argument from analogy is not invalid.**

The charge has been made by many adversaries of the teleological argument, that it is wholly and solely an argument from analogy, and an invalid one at that. Both of these charges we deny. We deny, in the first place, that our argument is based solely on the similarity which exists between ordered effects artificially produced and ordered effects naturally produced. Secondly, we deny that an argument based on such analogy is invalid. The warrant for these denials will be found in the two valid arguments which we shall develop later on; the first of which will be drawn solely from a consideration of the world order itself, the second will be from analogy.

Diman, *The Theistic Argument*, "The argument from design, is not, as often represented, a mere argument from analogy. Thus it is said that in this argument we infer, from the likeness which certain natural objects bear to artificial objects, that there must be a likeness in their causes. We know that a watch can only be the work of an intelligent maker, and hence in the wonderful adjustments in the hand or the eye we can conclude that they in like manner must have been framed by an intelligent being.

"But whatever analogy there may be between the operations of nature and the works of man, as part of the design argument, it is rather a means of illustration than a condition of inference.

"When we infer that the eye or the watch are the work of an intelligent being, there is an inference in either case and an inference of precisely the same nature. It is as direct and independent in one case as in the other. "Hence the argument of design rests directly on the character of the works of nature." P. 136.

4. **As our argument concludes directly from order, it is of necessity based on an order which could not have been produced non-intelligently.**

Having demonstrated the existence and unicity of God, as the unproduced, necessarily existing, first cause of all things, we purpose in this thesis, as we

have already declared, to prove directly from a consideration of the ordered action of nature's combined forces, that that cause must be an intelligent being. We admit, moreover, that the same conclusion may be also derived directly from particular instances in nature, of adaptation of means to end.

To derive this conclusion directly, however, it is clear that the order on which the argument is based must be such as to exclude its having been produced non-intelligently. For if, as far as it is concerned, it could have been produced non-intelligently, even though for a fact it was intelligently produced, still the intelligence of its cause could not be derived directly and solely from it.

Now, experience shows us that some ordered effects, of a few parts simply arranged and not involving constant adaptation in the midst of change, may be produced non-intelligently. An infant, for example, may arrange four or five letters of the alphabet so that they spell its own name; or some bits of straw, casually, i.e., non-intelligently, dropped may take the shape of a star or a regular pentagon. Evidently, then, an argument cannot be based on order of this kind, for the possibility of its having been non-intelligently produced precludes a direct conclusion from it of intelligence even in the first cause of all things.

What, then, is the nature of that order which excludes the possibility of non-intelligent production and on which our argument is necessarily based? Answering in the abstract, we may say that any order which exhibits a marked constancy of adaptation of part to part in the production of a definite, complicated result excludes of itself the possibility of non-intelligent production, and this is more emphatically true when, as in the concrete case of the world order of

finality, from which our argument is drawn, the constancy of adaptation of part to part, is almost beyond our comprehension. For here the parts are almost countless; the adaptation of part to part in the individual, of individual to individual in the different species, of species to species, and of kingdom to kingdom, are most complicated; and the effects of the complicated action of these countless individuals of different natures are produced not once, nor twice, but continuously and for centuries.

Fr. J. F. Driscoll, *God*, "It may be objected that chance can explain the coincidence of phenomena. This objection is not new; it is as old as philosophic speculation. That it should be advanced today, seems strange in view of the fact that it has been refuted so often and so thoroughly.

"Chance is a word which cloaks our ignorance. It has no objective value. It is not a cause. It is a name given to a group of phenomena, independent of one another and without any known connection. . . . . Now that such a grouping can occur, cannot be denied. The admission does not touch our trend of reasoning. Our basis is the constant repetition of this group with the same result. A single combination might be due to chance. The frequent combination of the same elements and their manifold content is a phenomenon which demands a cause." Pp. 157, 158.

Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, "He who selects takes for realization one out of several possibilities. Observing him in a single instance, you cannot tell his act from a mere fortuity; he may have chosen, or he may have chanced, the things he took. But if through a score of a hundred similar opportunities, he repeats the same appropriation, you know that it is no random hit he makes; there is here a new phenomenon, over and above the individual events, namely a certain order among them, consisting in the regular reproduction of the same; and for this phenomenon you need a cause and have it, in the controlling preference of the agent. Selection, therefore, has its external, legible feature, namely, among several possibles, steadily one." Vol. I, pp. 258, 259.

Diman, *The Theistic Argument*, "It is not surprising that some of the most earnest of recent opponents of theism have recognized this [the teleological argument] as the most formidable weapon drawn from the armory of natural theology. It is admitted that the perpetual and uninterrupted uniformity of method is a cogent if not a

> convincing proof of a presiding intelligence, since the progress of science has rendered the hypothesis of fortuity irrational. 'And let us think of this supreme Causality as we may', says one of the ablest of these, 'the fact remains that from it there emanates a directive inference of uninterrupted consistency, on a scale of stupendous magnitude and exact precision, worthy of our highest possible conceptions of Deity.'" p. 115.
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> "[The] confusion of opinion with regard to its [the design argument's] meaning and scope is undoubtedly the main cause of the discredit which has been attached in our times to an argument which has been advanced and defended for two thousand years. In the minds of many it has been connected with such unintelligible and preposterous conclusions that it has been set aside as destitute of any logical basis.
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> "It is thus of the utmost importance to understand clearly, at the outset, what this basis is. The argument of design, then, is simply this: that there is a certain interpretation which the facts of nature themselves call for and necessitate, the interpretation or explanation which attaches to manifest arrangement and adaptation. This explanation adheres to the facts of nature and cannot be separated from them. It is stamped upon these facts. In this sense, and in this sense only, it is claimed that design or finality is in these things. It is not an explanation of nature derived from theory, but one forced upon the mind by nature herself. By the constitution of our minds and by the laws of thought, we are forced to put this construction upon the facts presented. Just as we connect uniform occurence with law, so we connect manifold coincidence and adaptation with design. . . .
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> "It is the agreement and concurrence in the system of separate facts, which constitutes the whole force of the argument. That Bacon did not deny that nature, in this sense, is penetrated and illumined by the presence of design, is proved clearly enough by his own words: 'For while the mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them and go no further, but, when it beholdeth the chain of them confederate and linked to-gether, it must needs fly to Providence and Deity.'" Pp. 137, 138, 139.

In the explanation given, of various points concerning the development of our argument from design, mention has been made more than once of final causality, and fortuitous or chance events. What is a final cause? What is chance? A clear understanding of these terms is necessary for a clear understanding of our argument. Our explanation of them will be brief and restricted to our present needs.

The end of an action considered as a cause; final cause; final causality.

When we speak of the end of an action we may mean either the result, i.e., the terminus, of the action as it exists as an accomplished fact in the physical order, or the same result, not however as already accomplished, but as that for the accomplishment of which an efficient cause exercises its energies. In this latter sense the word *end* signifies the *final cause* of the action of the efficient cause. Hence—

A final cause, or end, is that on account of which, or for the accomplishment of which, an efficient cause acts. It is that which the efficient cause desires and, by its actions, intends to effect. Hence, as positively influencing the action of the efficient cause, it exercises a positive influence on the production of the effect, and so is a true cause of it. It is the goal desired by the efficient cause, and the actions of this cause are the means taken to reach it.

It is *first* in the order of intention, i.e., of efficacious purpose to attain it, in which order, and in which order alone, it is a cause; a cause, namely, of the actions by which it is finally accomplished.

It is *last* in the *order of achievement,* in which order it is in no sense a cause, but merely the term of the actions actually performed in order to attain it. The final cause, therefore, influences the existence of the effect not by physical action, but only in as much as it is an object desired by the efficient cause, who is moved thereby to action.

That which is the final cause may be *existing* or *non-existing,* but the final cause can never be existing *under the aspect under which it is the final cause.* If *that which is* the final cause be non-existing, then its existence under some aspect is desired; if it be already existing, then its possession may be desired; if it be already

possessed, then the enjoyment of it in some way or other, or the giving of it to another, may be the motive leading the efficient cause to act.

From the foregoing, it is clear that, strictly speaking, only intelligent beings can be said to act on account of an end. When unintelligent beings are said so to act, they do so only in as much as the end, for the attainment of which they strive, is determined by an intelligent being, which fits them to attain it, and thus directs them towards it.

Our contention, therefore, in the teleological argument is, that the natural agents, which in the world tend towards the production of countless effects of wonderful beauty and utility, do so under the direction of an intelligent being, who ordered them for that purpose and directs them continually towards its achievement.

Driscoll, *God*, "The principle of finality can now be drawn from the facts enumerated. When we find manifold activities of different kinds combining to produce a future effect, so that the effect results not from any one in particular, but from the mutual and harmonious activity of all working as a unit, the mind is constrained to admit that this coincidence of action can only be explained by admitting that the effect in some manner influenced the arrangement of the activities. The necessity and existence of this very influence transforms the effect into a cause." P. 156.

How it can be known that an efficient cause acts for an end. There are two ways, at least, in which this can be known.

1. When the efficient cause explicitly states that he so acted.
2. When the effect produced is of such a nature that no sufficient reason for its existence can be given unless it be admitted that it was intended by an intelligent being. Hence, for example, that man would be considered foolish who would declare that the costly, complicated marine engines that drive our ocean liners were not produced intentionally and after much careful planning, but by chance. In our argument it will appear, first, that nature produces

effects infinitely surpassing in perfection the driving of a vessel, and by processes infinitely surpassing in complication the workings of any machine devised by man, and, secondly, that these effects so produced can be explained only as the result of the planning and consequent action of a being of wonderful intelligence and power.

Shearman, *The Natural Theology of Evolution*, "If it is inconceivable that a watch or a clock could come into existence without the exercise of intelligence and foresight, it is much more inconceivable (if such an increase of inconceivability is possible) that the more wonderful and complicated plant or animal should come into existence without intelligence or design." P. 47 .

Diman, *The Theistic Argument*, "The order and harmony everywhere apparent in the universe are conceded facts. Those who refuse to refer them to intelligence are bound therefore to account for them in some other way. To say that they originated with chance, is an explanation so manifestly absurd, that it need not be considered." P. 120.

We heartily agree with the writer just cited in branding as preposterous any attempt at explaining the order in the world as due to a chance combination of merely natural forces. Preposterous though it be, it is, nevertheless, practically the explanation commonly offered by Evolutionists. They are almost unanimous in asserting that, "there is no evidence in nature of a designing mind" and, as a consequence, no matter how they theorize, their theories give but one solution; the ordering of nature's forces is due to chance. It will be necessary, then, to say a few words about chance. This we shall do after citing a few authors in confirmation of this estimate of Evolution as generally defended.

J. Gerard, S.J., *Evolutionary Philosophy*, "So far as positive doctrine is concerned this only is common to the various groups amongst which Evolutionists, properly so called, are distributed—that the universe has been evolved by some process or other, and in obedience to some law.

"On the negative side, however, they are more explicitly in unison, the essential backbone of every evolutionary system being the denial of an intelligence presiding over and direct-

ing the processes of nature whatever they have been. Evolution, as commonly explained, means nothing, if it does not mean that everything has been worked out by blind, automatic forces, and that we find in all nature no evidence of a designing mind. This is clearly the cardinal point of the doctrine, which being granted, all can harmoniously agree to differ. But for the idea, that to explain the existence of nature, as we observe it, is required a First Cause possessed of understanding and free-will, there is no tolerance, and nothing so surely arouses the anger of the more eager partisans of the New Philosophy, as to hint that the world bears traces of design." P. 73.

J. N. Shearman, (an Evolutionist) *The Natural Theology of Evolution*, "We come then to the theory of Evolution which has had the greatest effect on the course of thought in modern times, namely, that which is associated with the names of Darwin and Wallace—the theory of Natural Selection. . . . . "We have in this theory three points of great importance—chance variation, survival of the fittest, and heredity . .. Nobody could or would believe that any chance assemblage might add chimes to a clock or watch already existing? Nobody could and nobody would. Why then do some imagine that chance variations may account for the advance of an animal organism from a lower to a higher stage in the scale of being? . . .

"It would be as easy to believe, that the Sphinx is merely a rock, which has come to be of its present form as the chance result of long ages, during which it was worn away by the continual friction of the desert sands that were blown against it, as to think that the organization of one of the higher animals is the result of fragments of design, each the work of chance and all added together by Natural Selection." Pp. 42, 43, 56, 57.

"When thoughts and theories are strictly catechised, they are found to contain nothing which can be supposed to account for order, but chance on the one hand and design on the other, and when the question is plainly put to us 'Is it chance or design?' our answer can never be really doubtful." P. 264.

Gray, *Darwiniana*, "The issue between the sceptic and theist is only the old one, long ages argued out, namely, whether organic nature is the result of design or of chance. Variation and natural selection open no third alternative; they concern only the question, *how* the results, whether fortuitous or designed, may have been brought about." P. 153.

Chance, its nature.

Chance is sometimes considered to be the cause of an effect neither foreseen by, nor intended either by nature or

by the free choice of, the causes by chance producing it. In reality, however, chance is not a cause at all, but the name given an effect neither foreseen by, nor intended either by nature or by the free choice of, the causes by chance producing it. Hence a chance effect would be the finding of a pearl necklace on the road by the farmer's wife on her way to market, or the killing of a man by a rock hurled into the air by a distant blast. On the other hand, a man who deliberately poisons himself does not die by chance, nor does a tree by chance put forth leaves in the springtime.

It is clear, then, that chance is nothing more than the unintentional and unforeseen concurrence of the effects of two or more causes, acting simultaneously or at different times, but all of which effects individually were intentionally produced by some one or other, or perhaps by all of their proper causes. It is only the concurrence and the effect resulting from it which are unintentional and unforeseen.

It is quite evident, therefore, that a chance effect is not without its proportionate cause.

It is also quite evident that what is a chance effect for the cause who neither intends nor foresees it, may in no way be a chance effect with regard to some one else, by whom it is intended or foreseen. For example, two young people meet at a mutual friend's house; for them the meeting is a chance one, as they neither foresaw nor intended it; not so, however, for their parents who intentionally brought it about.

Since God, as will be proved later, foresees and intends, either positively or permissively, everything that will be, nothing can be said to happen by chance with regard to Him.

Absolute chance, therefore, is impossible; relative chance, i.e., relative to finite causes, is of frequent occurrence.

Properties of chance.

Chance happenings are, relatively, of *infrequent* and *irregular* occurrence. For example, twenty bits of paper consecutively numbered allowed to flutter down through the air from a lofty tower on a gusty day will alight somewhere. If the operation be repeated, how frequently will they fall in exactly the same places? How frequently will they fall in the order of their numbering?

Again, the greater the number of causes acting, and the greater the number of the conditions to be fulfilled, in producing a definite concurrence, the more infrequent and irregular will be a chance happening of it; and for two reasons. In the first place, an increase in the number of causes or elements concurring *increases* the possibility of many other combinations, and, secondly, an increase in the number of conditions to be fulfilled with regard to a definite concurrence, makes this concurrence more difficult, and, hence, *decreases* the possibility of its frequency. For instance, suppose that the number of pieces of paper, of the foregoing example, be increased to five thousand; suppose that the gusty winds, in place of blowing from one point of the compass and with constant velocity, blow now from this now from that point and with changeable velocities; suppose, that in place of having to fall again merely in the same place they fell at first, it was further required that they should fall with the same side up, each parallel with the other, with numbers pointing in the same direction and reading consecutively from one to five thousand; it is quite evident that under these conditions to have them fall continuously that way by chance five thousand times is absolutely inconceivable.

Nor is it hard to see that definite chance effects are necessarily relatively *infrequent* and *irregular*. For since the concurrence of the causes and conditions which results in their production is not at all necessary, be-

cause not intended, and since, as we just saw, in a case where the causes and conditions that are to concur are many, many other combinations are equally possible, a constant and regular definite concurrence would be without proportionate cause.

Hence, whenever an effect is produced constantly and regularly by many concurring causes acting simultaneously or at different times, we conclude, and rightly so, that it cannot be due to chance.

It is quite easy to see, then, how irrational it is to attribute the wonderful order of the world to chance, for here we have innumerable forces, under conditions most complex, concurring in the production of effects most complicated, with unvarying regularity, year after year, and century after century,—everywhere .

Von Hammerstein. *Foundations of Faith*, "Farraday says: 'When I contemplate the innumerable united forces working in nature; when I reflect how quietly and silently they maintain their mutual equilibrium, so that the most antagonistic elements, in themselves strong enough to destroy completely the whole economy of nature, subsist peaceably side by side, and are made subservient to the needs of animal creation; when I consider all this I am more than ever convinced of the Almighty Ruler's wisdom, goodness and greatness, which our language is powerless to express!'

"Inspired by the same views, Herschel says: 'The aim of physical geography is to exhibit the compiled and accumulated mass of details as forming one harmonious whole united by mutual relations and influences, and subject to one great plan. '

"Now where there is a plan, there must have been some one who conceived it . . . If, therefore, we would regard as possible the procession of the universe from an unconscious being we must renounce the idea of purpose in the universe, together with the idea of a rational nexus of events. All that is, all that happens, would then be the work of blind chance; an aimless, meaningless chaos. . . .

"He who should deny the existence of an all wise creator in the face of so many millions of correspondent instincts and other harmonious ordinances, who should consequently neglect to render to this, his Creator, the respect and gratitude due Him, must lack either understanding or conscience. I would more readily admit that one of Beethoven's symphonies had been composed by no one, that no architect ever

designed the Cathedral of Cologne, that an ingenious and complicated machine had no inventor, than that the harmony of creation is not a sufficient proof of the existence of a planning and calculating Creator." Vol. 1, pp. 117, 140, 185.

Shearman, *Natural Theology of Evolution*, "To those who suppose that chance variations [Mr. Shearman is refuting Darwinism] may account for everything if by any means those which are most suitable can be selected and preserved, the case seems to present itself in this way. We can suppose some one alteration to occur by chance, then why not another, why not any other? One particle may by chance alight on the proper spot, why not also a second and a third? It is only a matter of chances, and if a sufficient number of trials be granted, anything that is needed will certainly arise.

"The mistake here lies in thinking that the arrival of a second particle and a third at the right place are events of the same kind as the arrival of the first. For the reason that there seems to be nothing impossible in the arrival of the first particle at the right spot is that it is taken to be a solitary event, unconnected with any other. The particle must be somewhere, why not there as well as anywhere else? But the reason that the arrival of the second is of any importance is that it is not an unconnected event but is linked on to what has gone before and forms a basis for what is to follow.

"In an orderly arrangement every event is co-ordinated with the past and the future, and this co-ordination is not fitful, it is not a thing that comes and goes; it is steadily maintained and must be steadily maintained, during the building up of the whole structure. Now this co-ordination of the past with the future is an act of thought; it manifests purpose and exhibits a plan. To ascribe it to chance is to suppose that co-ordination arises without any cause to produce it. . . .

"If a chisel were thrown at a block of marble it may happen to knock off such a chip as a sculptor would take by his first stroke . . . But it would not be reasonable to set a blindfolded man to throw chisels at a block of marble in the hope of producing a fine statue . . . For the regular effect which is required is not produced by isolated blows . . . but by a series of efforts made into one by a constant regard for the purpose of the whole.

"The first stroke that the sculptor makes is made in subordination to the whole design. It is the continued consciousness of this design that gives regularity and order to his work. If you take away the consciousness of a design, as you do, when you trust to chance, you take away the cause of the order, and taking away the cause of the order you cannot expect the order to remain. We do not find events in Nature happening without sufficient cause . . .

"We had four things before us, order, confusion, mind and chance, and our decision was that order always implies mind, and that chance can only bring about confusion." Pp. 57, 58, 59, 91.

Scope of the teleological argument.

An argument cannot be rightly understood or properly defended against attack, if its aim, or intent, or scope, be not clearly grasped. This clear grasp is all the more necessary when, as in the present case, the argument is an important one, when it may be presented in different ways with varying effect, and when many who find fault with it and reject it, do so because, either through ignorance or malice, they misrepresent it.

The importance of the argument may be gathered from the following:

Driscoll, *God*, "The oldest and most popular argument for the existence of God is drawn from the order and harmony of the universe. In the remnants of ancient literature which exhibit the mind seeking a solution for the mysteries of life, this argument appears in simple and crude forms. Language, true index to thought and feeling, goes far beyond the known records of time and presents in its vocabulary words which bear the indelible marks of order and design. Thus to the Greeks the world was a *cosmos*, to the Latins a *mundus*, to our forefathers a *universe*, i. e., one united and harmonious whole. . . .

"The Christian Fathers and Apologists most frequently insist upon this consideration. They cite the sublime Psalm of the Hebrew Psalmist, 'The heavens show forth the glory of God and the firmament declares the work of His hands.' Ps. 18. They call the mind of the lowest and humblest to the marvelous harmony of the heavenly bodies in their course, to the regular succession of the seasons. They find considerations which constrain the ignorant and the learned to admit an intelligence and providence all powerful and beneficent which shapes the course of all things and appointeth to each its place and its time.

"In our own time this argument has been most bitterly assailed. The rise and influence of the physical sciences, especially of Biology and of Physiology, have for a time seemed to deprive it of force . . . The attempt, however, has utterly failed." Pp. 147, 148.

As the argument may be presented in different forms and with different results, it will be necessary to determine separately its scope under each form:

1. **The teleological argument combined with the cosmological argument.**

The teleological argument may be combined with the cosmological argument in various ways.

a. *Combined with the bare cosmological argument.* By this combination is proved the existence of an intelligent, first, unproduced cause of this universe; and nothing more.

b. *Combined with the cosmological argument, the latter's conclusion being developed to the point of proving the unicity of the first, unproduced cause.* In this case the combined arguments prove the existence of an unproduced, first cause who is intelligent and who is necessarily one and only one; and nothing more.

This is practically the way we present the argument in our thesis. Hence the combined arguments, as we use them, do not prove, nor is it intended that they should prove, either that the intelligence of the first cause is infinite or that it is a creative intelligence.

Furthermore, it is to be noted that in this combination the conclusion that the intelligence guiding this world is necessarily only one, is not derived by us from a consideration of the remarkable unity in the world-order, but from a consideration of the nature of an unproduced being. We admit, however, that the unity of plan and execution in the world order points strongly to one governing intelligence, still it does not prove it conclusively, nor does it, nor can it prove that only one unproduced governing intelligence is possible.

c. *Combined with the cosmological argument, the latter's conclusion being developed to the point of proving that the first unproduced cause is infinitely perfect and the creator of the universe.* The conclusion of this combination is that an unproduced cause of all things produced exists who is necessarily one and only one, infinitely intelligent and the creator of all things.

2. **The teleological argument uncombined.**

The teleological argument, considered apart from mediate and immediate conclusions of the cosmological argument, demonstrates the existence of an intelligent being, superior to the world, the cause of its ordered existence, who disposes and controls all the activities at work in nature; on whom, therefore, man depends for his existence and to whom he owes reverence and service. In other words, it proves the existence of God as He is known, not in the scientific, but in the popular concept we have of Him. Consequently, considered apart from all conclusions derived through the cosmological argument, the teleological argument does not prove, nor is it used to prove, either the existence of God as the unproduced cause of all things, or that He is necessarily one, or that His intelligence is infinite, or that He is the creator of the world. In a scholion to our thesis we shall give a brief development of this form of the argument, adding thereto that of St. Thomas, who uses the argument in this way.

In the second part of our thesis we declare that the necessarily existing first cause of all things produced is a person. What is a person?

A person is an intelligent being, substantially complete and self-possessed. Or, more explicitly, a person is a singular, complete substance, which is intellectual, and self-possessed, i.e., *sui juris*, or not united to another being by whom it is possessed.

The name, person, is derived from the Latin, *persona*. This word primarily signified the mask which actors wore. Later it was used to signify the part or character they sustained; still later, the one sustaining such a part, and, finally, it came to denote any intelligent, sub-

stantially complete, self-possessed being, from the fact that such a being also plays his part in the drama of life. A person, then, is the ultimate principle to which are ascribed all the actions, properties, passions of a substantially complete, intellectual nature forming a whole by itself, i.e., which is self-possessed. Hence it is the person, John, who walks, talks, thinks, suffers, desires. In Christ our Lord, the God-man, there is but one Person, the Divine Person; for though the human nature of Christ is a singular, intellectual and complete substance, it is not a human person, because it is not self-possessed. It is possessed and owned by the Divine Person, the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, in whom are united hypostatically two natures, the divine and human. All the actions of the God-man, therefore, whether they be performed through the divine or human nature, are actions of God the Son, the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, and so are of infinite excellence and value.

A singular, complete and self-possessed substance, *which is not intellectual,* is not called a person, but merely a thing, in the full sense of the word, i.e., not part of a of a thing, like, e.g., the color of a thing.

Less generically it is called, e.g., an animal, a horse, a plant, etc. Technically such a substance is also called a *suppositum,* or an *hypostasis,* i.e., the *subject* to which all the actions which proceed from it are attributed. These names are derived respectively from the Latin, *sub-positum, sub-jectum,* and the Greek *hypostasis,* which signify that which is placed under, i.e., the subject.

The special name, person, is given to a complete, singular, self-possessed substance, which is intellectual, because it is self-possessed in a more perfect way than a mere *suppositum.* It has individual control, i.e., self-possession, of some of its actions, i.e., its free actions,

while a mere *suppositum* has individual control of none. It is falsely asserted by not a few non-Catholic philosphers that a person is necessarily a finite, a limited being. As a consequence, some of them, holding God to be infinite, deny that he is a person; others, insisting on His personality, deny His infinity. Their error springs from a false notion of the way all perfections are possessed by an infinite being. For them, an infinite being is one in whom is found all reality in such wise that it is impossible that any reality should exist outside of him. Consequently, they reason, a person, who is of necessity a being distinct from and excluding other persons and *supposita,* cannot be infinite.

Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx*, "The attribute of infinity contradicts and neutralizes all the other attributes of God, and makes it impossible to ascribe to the Deity either personality or consciousness or power or intelligence or wisdom or goodness or purpose or object in creating the world; an infinite deity does not effect a single one of the functions which the religious consciousness demands of its God. . . . An infinite God can have neither personality nor consciousness, for they both depend on limitations.

"Personality rests on the distinction of one person from another, consciousness on the distinction of self and not self. An all embracing person, therefore, is an utterly unmeaning phrase, and if it meant anything, it would mean something utterly subversive of all religion. For the infinite personality would equally embrace and impartially absorb the personalities of finite individuals, and so Jesus and Barabbas would be revealed as co-existent, and therefore as coequal, incarnations of an infinite God." P. 306.

Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*, "Pantheism, as we understand it, has no intention of depriving God of anything or of denying him anything but human limitation. It will not permit us to define God by the concept of personality, simply because the notion is too narrow for the infinite fulness and depth of his being. . . . . We might call God a super-personal being, not intending thereby to define His essence, but to indicate that God's nature is above the human mind, not below it." P. 254.

Paulsen is a Pantheist, and insists that personality is a notion "too narrow for the infinite fulness" of God. To show what confusion with regard to fundamental con-

cepts reigns in these false systems of philosophy we shall call another Pantheist to witness against Paulsen.

Knight, *Aspects of Theism*, "The original meaning of 'persona' was the mask through which the actor performed his part; but if 'each man in his time plays many parts' 'personating' each, surely the Infinite Being may manifest himself in an infinite number of ways, and assume an infinite number of guises; although his likeness is not to be found in any one of them. . . . . It neither follows that a nature which partakes of personality is therefore a limited nature; nor that, if unlimited in space, time and degree, it cannot be personal. . . . . That personality cannot co-exist with infinity is an assumption without speculative warrant or experimental proof." Pp. 158, 159, 167.

ADVERSARIES.

Among those who deny the possibility of demonstrating the existence of an intelligent, personal God, and either implicitly or explicitly reject the teleological argument, may be numbered:

1. All professed **Atheists**, dogmatic, sceptic and agnostic, of whom very many are **Materialists.**
2. All **Pantheists,** of whom many, whilst admitting that the being they call God is intelligent, still deny that he is a person. Pantheists, as before noted, are really Atheists.
3. The general run of **Evolutionists.**
4. **Kant** and a countless number of modern philosophers more or less infected with **Kantianism.** In this class are found the **Modernists.**
5. **In general,** all who insist that unaided reason cannot demonstrate God's existence.

What modern non-Catholic philosophy quite generally thinks of the design argument has already been made evident. In a passage of his *Gifford Lectures for 1914, Theism and Humanism,* **Balfour,** who concedes some pragmatic value to the argument, will tell us again,

"The argument [for Theism] then, which I propose to lay before you, though its material is provided by our common-sense beliefs, is not an argument from common-sense . . . Is it then

you may be tempted to ask, some form of the yet more familiar argument from design? . . . And if so, has not the vanity of all such endeavors been demonstrated in advance; from the side of Sceptical philosophy by Hume; from the side of Idealist Philosophy by Kant and his successors; from the side of Empirical Philosophy by the 19th century Agnostics; from the side of science by the theory of natural selection? Do not the very catch words of the argument—'contrivance,' 'design,' 'adaptation,' exercised by the 'Architect of the Universe' fill us with a certain weariness? Do they not represent the very dregs of stale apologetics; the outworn residue of half forgotten controversies?" P. 28.

PROOF OF THE THESIS.

Part I. The unproduced, first cause of all things produced, i.e., God, is an intelligent being.

First Proof. Derived from the existence in the world of intelligent beings.

If intelligent beings exist in the world, the unproduced first cause of all things produced is an intelligent being. But intelligent beings exist in the world.

Therefore the unproduced, first cause of all things produced is an intelligent being.

Maj. If the first cause of all things produced were not an intelligent being, no produced being could be intelligent. If it could, then, since every perfection that is must originate from God, the first cause of all things that exist, an effect could be more perfect than its efficient cause, and, consequently, the principle of causality would be violated.

Min. The Minor is immediately evident.

Second Proof. The teleological argument.

If in this visible world innumerable natural agents are at work producing an order most widespread, most complicated and most constant, and if such a combination of natural agents producing such an effect must necessarily be attributed to some intelligent cause or causes,

the first, unproduced cause of all things produced must be intelligent.

But, 1, in this visible world innumerable natural agents are at work producing an order most widespread, most complicated, most constant, and, 2, what is more, such a combination of natural agents producing such an effect must necessarily be attributed to some intelligent cause or causes.

Therefore the first, unproduced cause of all things produced is intelligent.

Maj. To admit the existence of any intelligent being and at the same time to deny intelligence to the first, unproduced cause of all produced being, from whom, consequently, all perfections flow, is to reject the principle of causality, to hold that an effect may exist without a proportionate cause. Hence the Major must be admitted.

Min. First Part.—In this visible world innumerable natural agents are at work producing an order most widespread, most complicated, most constant.

The natural sciences without exception, and one's own contemplation of nature give indubitable testimony to the truth of this assertion. For they witness to the presence in the world of an—

Order. In the world there are beings innumerable; great and small; simple and composed of many elements and many parts; of varying degrees of perfection, non-living and living, plants, animals, man. All of these beings are so marvelously arranged, both with regard to their parts and amongst themselves, that, mutually supplying to one another all those things which are necessary for the proper performance of each one's special work, the lower continually serves the higher, and the higher those still

higher; and so are perpetuated the numberless species and genera in the various kingdoms that give us our *mundus*, our *cosmos*, our *universe*.

Most widespread. In the various kingdoms which constitute our world are innumerable individuals of innumerable species and innumerable genera; all are subject to Nature's laws; order reigns supreme.

Most complicated. The world-order is produced—

1. By many elements in innumerable and complicated combinations;

2. By countless individual, efficient agents of numberless species and genera;

3. Under conditions innumerable, ever varying and most complicated; the individual substances being subject to constant changes both accidental and substantial;

4. The result of all of which is an order of the *greatest stability* founded on *the maximum of instability*. For, whilst kingdoms, genera, species and the apt combination of elements endure, the elements themselves are in a constant flux resulting from the action of mechanical, physical and chemical forces operating either in their own spheres or as vitally elevated. Everywhere is found local motion, and, what is of deeper import, everywhere the destruction of inferior beings that superior beings may exist, and, in turn, the return everywhere of superior beings, in part at least, to the earth from which that part was taken, lest, the inorganic kingdom being depleted, life vanish from the world and death reign supreme.

Furthermore, if we consider the organic world only, and restrict our inquiry to creatures endowed with the higher forms of plant or animal life, we shall

find in each one of them, in some, however, more than in others, an adaptation of part to part, and function to function, most complicated. How many and varied the organs, and how marvellously united; how many and varied the functions, and how perfectly co-ordinated and subordinated; in order that a living being of one of the higher species nourish itself, grow and perfect itself; give birth to others like unto itself; defend itself against hostile forces of nature; expel whatever could be harmful to it; repair injuries; and through its mysterious sensitive faculties put itself in touch with the visible world round about it!

Most Constant. Not merely for days, nor weeks, nor months, nor years, but for centuries, with unfailing regularity, the countless changes and combinations which give us our world-order have been produced by Nature's forces.

Dïman, *The Theistic Argument* "What strikes us at the first glance is the universal prevalence of order. I say at first glance, for though the nature and endless manifestations of the order that runs through the universe are only partially perceived after prolonged and elaborate investigation, the fact of the existence of this order is the first thing that strikes the observing eye.

"We are not more impressed with the great fact of change than with the fact that change everywhere proceeds in accordance with fixed and invariable rule . . . It has been the mission of science to extend further and further on every hand the reign of law, and to show that what at first sight seems most exceptional, most unaccountable, most incapable of being reduced to regular rule, is after all but another and more striking illustration of the principle, a principle which equally finds its illustration in the falling of a pebble to the ground, and the flight of a flaming sphere through the furthest removes of space." Pp. 100, 101.

"The universe everywhere reveals itself to us as a whole, all the parts of which are related to each other by precise and unvarying laws. The system of which our earth is a member is a vast and orderly system, the various parts of which are so adjusted,

as regards mass and magnitude and distance, and rate and plane of motion, that the whole is rendered stable and secure . . . While each orb is affecting the orbit of every other, while each is exerting a constant influence which, if left uncounteracted, would destroy itself and all the rest, all are balanced in their motions with such wondrous accuracy as to convert the element of danger into a source of strength.

"And so in the structure of matter we are everywhere confronted with the same system of definite proportions, no chemical union being possible except where the different elements bear to each other a definite numerical ratio. The least alteration of this proportion would convert the most wholesome substances into the most deadly poisons, and, instead of furnishing nutriment to animals and plants, spread everywhere destruction and death.

"The reign of law is the result which science has everywhere reached. It lies at the root of every conception we can form of the universe, either without us or within us; for while regularity and order are most conspicuous in the grand phenomena of the external world, we are not less assured of their presence in the most intricate and obscure processes of life.

"Beginning with astronomy the idea has passed to every department of science, and to every domain of thought. It refuses to be excluded from any sphere where there is change and progress and growth. It meets us at every step." Pp. 104, 105.

Min. Second Part. The combination of natural agents producing an order most widespread, etc., must necessarily be attributed to some intelligent cause or causes.

First Proof. From the very nature of the order itself. The only reasons that can be advanced as sufficient to explain the world-order are either:

a. An intelligent cause or causes who intended it, and selected and so arranged all the forces of nature, and the many and complicated conditions under which they operate, that universally and with the greatest constancy they effect it,—or

b. Natural causes, which of themselves, and altogether independently of any selection or direction

from without, tend constantly to produce it,—or

c. Mere chance, i.e., no intelligent cause produces it, nor is there any tendency in natural causes constantly directing them to its production.

But of these reasons:

a. The reason given under (a) alone is valid. For

b. As natural causes are contingent beings, they do not contain in themselves a sufficient reason for existence, hence in them and independently of any selection or direction from without, can be found no sufficient reason why *they rather than others* exist; why they exist *in the proportions now given* in the world, and *not in other proportions;* why the qualities and forces which are theirs are in intensity *just what they now are,* and *neither greater nor less;* why they have the relative positions *they have,* and *not others.*

But the order in the world depends on all these factors. Hence natural causes in themselves, and independently of direction and selection from without, cannot explain it.

c. Nor can *chance* explain the world order.

From the very nature of chance, as we gather from our prenotes, a definite effect brought about by the *chance* coming together of many causes is produced *rarely* and *irregularly; still more rarely* and *irregularly* if the number of causes concurring by chance in its production, and the number of conditions to be satisfied, be increased; and with the *greatest rarity* and *irregularity* when the number of causes producing it and the conditions under which it is produced are increased indefinitely.

Now, in the world order, where the causes are innumerable and the conditions under which they act most complicated, *not only with the greatest fre-*

quency but *always* and *everywhere* and *with the greatest regularity* the causes supply to one another whatever is necessary for the performance of each one's proper work, and consequently for the preservation of the universal order; individuals are being constantly produced like unto their producers, and kingdoms, genera and species are constantly preserved. Chance, therefore, is absolutely ruled out.

Diman. *The Theistic Argument*, "To suppose that a universe, such as science reveals to us, so real, so intricate, so harmonious, so stable, could have been called into being by the operation of blind chance, is an hypothesis that no man in his senses, at the present day would think for a moment of maintaining. . . . .

"To account, then, for this order and harmony everywhere so apparent in the external world, we are shut up to one of two hypotheses: the hypothesis of mind, working through the forces of nature and coordinating them into a mutual adjustment, or the hypothesis of matter endowed with inherent powers and potencies [i. e., independently of an intelligent cause] and working in an endless succession of combination and dissolution. There is no other explanation possible, and in the present state of speculative opinion no other explanation is proposed. The choice lies between intelligence and blind force; between reason enthroned above physical causation and the unconscious working of purely natural laws." P. 121.

Second Proof. From the analogy existing between ordered effects naturally produced and artificially produced.

Ordered effects of a very complicated nature artificially produced are of necessity attributed to intelligence.

Therefore effects of a similar kind naturally produced must be attributed to a like cause.

Ant. The Antecedent is universally admitted.

Cons. The Consequent or Conclusion is also to be admitted. For although the elements which combine to form a *natural*, ordered effect have a natural

tendency, i.e., a tendency from within, to produce it, whilst the elements which combine to form an *artificial,* ordered effect have no such intrinsic tendency, still as in both cases the elements are essentially contingent beings, and so not self-determined as regards existence, neither are they self-determined as regards the combination which produces the ordered effect. Hence if in complicated works artificially produced we necessarily call on intelligence to explain such combination, so in complicated works of nature we must do the same.

Hettinger, *Natural Religion,* "The assertion of some atheists that the forces and laws of nature are necessarily in action, is simply another subterfuge. Strauss argues, 'We have no right to conclude that because man cannot produce a work requiring the adaptation of means to an end without consciously aiming at the end, therefore such works in nature must be similarly produced, that is, by an intelligent creator. For nature herself proves that her adapted work does not imply conscious intelligence in the worker.' But, on the contrary, this necessarily fixed action of the forces of nature, and conformity to their purpose, are an additional argument for the existence of a cause which has determined this fixedness and conformity." P. 86.

Shallo, *Scholastic Philosophy,* "Nature is nothing but the collection of contingent agencies at work in the universe; hence it is true to say that nature *executes* the order of the universe, but not that it *originated* or *designed* it. . . . . Such a collection will never give us the ordered world in which we live, without adjustment and co-ordination and subordination of those various activities for the attainment of manifold particular and universal ends; and for this, Mind is needed." P. 333.

Part II. of the Thesis. The unproduced first cause of all things produced is a person.

First Proof.

A singular, complete, intellectual and self-possessed substance is a person.

But the unproduced first cause of all things produced is a singular, complete, intellectual and self-possessed substance.

Therefore the unproduced first cause of all things produced is a person.

Maj. The Major gives the definition of a person. This definition is formed partially under the guidance of divine revelation which teaches us that a singular, complete and intellectual substance may *not be a person,* and that, because it may be *not self-possessed.* This happens in our Lord, the God-man, whose human nature is possessed by the Divine Person, the Second Person of the Most Blessed Trinity. In Christ our Lord, therefore, two complete, distinct natures, the human and the Divine, are united in one Person, the Divine Person.

Min. The unproduced first cause of all things produced is a singular, complete, intellectual, self-possessed substance.

The unproduced first cause is a —

Complete substance—Accidents and incomplete substances, by their very nature, are not self-sufficient but dependent on other things, to unite with which they have a natural tendency. The unproduced cause of all things produced, on the contrary, is a necessarily existing being, who is, therefore, absolutely independent of other beings, and excludes, as absolutely impossible, any union with them which would imply a deficiency in himself.

Singular—Only singular beings exist, and the unproduced first cause exists and with absolute necessity.
Intellectual—As is proved by the two proofs of the first part of this thesis.
Self-possessed—The unproduced first cause exists of necessity and by his very essence, and is the only being who so exists. He exists, therefore, as an ab-

solutely independent being, hence as a self-possessed being.

Second Proof.

The unproduced, first cause is an absolutely necessary being, and consequently, as will be proved later, an infinitely perfect being. This, however, he would not be, if he were not a singular, complete, intellectual substance, self-possessed.

What is more, as the first cause of all existing beings, and hence of all existing persons, he must also be a person, otherwise an effect could be of greater perfection than its cause.

Scholion I. The existence of God, as popularly conceived, proved by the teleological argument apart from all other arguments.

If the world-order cannot be explained without admitting the existence of an intelligent being, superior to the world, on whom the world depends, its ruler, and on whom man depends for his existence and all he has, and to whom, consequently, he owes reverence and service, the existence of God, as conceived in the popular concept we have of Him, is proved by the teleological argument, apart from all other arguments.

But the Antecedent of the above proposition is true.

Therefore the Consequent is also true.

Maj. The truth of the Major is immediately evident to one who knows what the teleological argument is, and how God is represented in the popular concept we have of Him.

Min. The world-order cannot be explained without admitting the existence of an intelligent being, superior to the world, etc.

1. That there is order in the world we have already proved.

2. That this order cannot be explained without admitting the existence of an intelligent being has also been proved.

3. That this intelligent being is superior to the world, a being on whom the world depends, its ruler, and on whom man depends for his existence and all he has, and to whom, consequently he owes reverence and service, remains to be proved; and is proved as follows:

   a. This intelligent being is neither the world itself, nor the soul of the world, as Pantheists would have us believe, for the world, composed as it is of beings of many different species and many individuals—*supposita* and persons—has not that unity which is found necessarily in a living, intelligent being.

   b. Therefore the being who is responsible for the ordered universe is distinct from it, and as its ruler is superior to it; and as the existence of all things, man included, depends on this order, all things depend on the author of the order for all they have. But the being who is superior to man and who gives man what he has is his Lord and Master, and to Him man owes reverence and service.

St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, 1, q. 2, a. 3, develops the argument as follows, "The fifth way [of proving God's existence] is taken from the governance of the world; for we see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for some purpose, which fact is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their purpose. Whatever lacks intelligence cannot fulfill some purpose, unless it be directed by some being endowed with intelligence and knowledge; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are ordained towards a definite purpose; and this being we call God." (Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.)

Scholion II. The teleological argument as viewed by its enemies.

How necessary it is to have a clear grasp of the nature and scope of the argument will be evident from a rapid glance at the difficulties brought against it by its adversaries. **Knight,** who rejects the argument, has made, in *Aspects of Theism,* quite a complete collection of them. We shall let him be spokesman for the many who agree with him.

1. "Reverting to the form . . . of the argument . . . which is ordinarily known as the argument from design . . . the argument is based upon analogy and it might be termed analogical as strictly as technological. . . .
2. "The objections to this mode of proof are manifold. The effects it examines and from which it infers a cause are finite; whereas the cause it assumes is infinite. . . .
3. "By this argument, at its best, we only reach an artificer, not a creator—one who arranged the phenomena of the world not the originator of its substance—the architect of the cosmos not the maker of the universe. . . .
4. "There is no parallel whatever between the process of manufacture and the product of creation, between the act of a carpenter working with his tools, and the evolution of life in nature. . . .
5. "To infer the existence of a personal divine agent, from the observation of the mechanism of the universe, is invalid. Where is the link connecting the traces of mind discernible in nature, those *vestigia animi,* with an agent who produced them? . . .
6. "Why should we rest in our inductive inference from the phenomena of design, in a single designer, when the designs are so varied and complex? May not the complexity and variety of the latter suggest a polytheistic group of ruling, yet conflicting powers? Might not the two broadly marked classes of phenomena—the one good and the other evil, and both presenting evidence of design—warrant the dualistic inference of two hostile deities?
7. "Or if in all that we observe, a subtle and pervading 'unity' is found, and as a consequence existing arrangements point to one designer, why may not he himself have been, at a remoter period, designed? And so, *ad infinitum* . . .
8. "Design is a plan to overcome hindrance, to effect a contemplated end by conquering a difficulty and by adjusting phenomena each to each. But it is only a being of limited resources that requires so to act or to work . . . With the infinite the idea of design is incongruous . . .
9. "The phenomena of the universe which distantly resemble the operations of man, do not in the least suggest an agent

exterior to themselves; and we are not intellectually constrained to ascribe the arrangement of means to ends in Nature to anything supra-mundane.

10. "We are not conscious of the process of creation, nor do we perceive it. We have never witnessed the construction of a world. We only perceive the everlasting flux and reflux of phenomena, the ceaseless pulsations of nature's life—evolution, transformation, birth, death and birth again. But Nature herself is dumb as to her whence or whither.
11. "Even if, as already hinted, we could detect a real analogy between the handiwork of man and the processes and products of Nature, we should not be warranted in saying that the constructive intelligence which explains the one class of phenomena is the only possible explanation of the other. . . . It can never assure us that those traces of intelligence to which it invites our study, proceeded from a constructive mind detached from the universe; or that if they did, another mind did not fashion that mind and so on *ad infinitum* . . .
12. "If the inference from design is valid at all, it must be valid everywhere. All the phenomena of the world must yield it equally. No part of the universe can be better made than any other part . . . Therefore if the few [?] phenomena which the teleologists single out from the many are a valid index to the character of the source whence they have proceeded, everything that exists must find its counterpart in the divine nature.
13. "If we are at liberty to infer an archetype above from the traces of mind beneath, on the same principle must not the phenomena of moral evil and malevolence be carried upwards by analogy? A procedure which would destroy the notion of deity which the teleologists advocate. . . . Consider the elaborate contrivances for inflicting pain, and the apparatus, so exquisitely adjusted, to produce a wholesale carnage of the animal tribes . . . The whole world teems with the proofs of such intended carnage . . . If, therefore, the inference of benevolence be valid, the inference of malevolence is equally valid: and, as equal and opposite, the one notion destroys the other. . . .
14. "The notion of design breaks down from the very width of the space it covers. Seemingly valid in the limited area of finite observation and human agency, it disappears when the whole universe is seen to be one vast network of interconnected law and order. . . . .
15. "The teleological argument must be pronounced fallacious.
16. "It is illusory as well as incomplete;
17. "And were we to admit its relevancy, it could afford no basis for worship, or the intellectual and moral recognition of the Object whose existence it infers." Pp. 61 to 77, passim.

These are the main objections to our argument. A grasp of the principles already laid down should make

their solution fairly easy. They will be given at the end of the thesis in form, and also solved in form.

Scholion III. The teleological argument and Evolution.

Many of the enemies of the teleological argument claim that it has been deprived of all its force and rendered practically useless by the theory of Evolution, and especially by Darwinism. On the other hand, however, we find some, though not many, Evolutionists who insist that Evolution has not only not weakened the argument but rather strengthened it.

Before giving *our* answer, it may be well to hear what both sides have to say on the matter.

Royce, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, "There is no doubt about this, that the doctrine of evolution has rendered the popular empirical proof of a special designing power much harder than we used to suppose . . . As to the intelligence of the higher powers, what the theory of evolution has done for us in this respect is simply to make us feel that we know not and cannot even guess, how much what we empirically call base mechanism can do to simulate the effects of what, in an equally empirical and blind way, men call intelligence." Pp. 280, 281.

James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, "As for the argument from design, see how Darwinian ideas have revolutionized it." P. 407.

Weber, *History of Philosophy*, "What characterizes modern materialism, is not its mechanical explanation of the world nor its absolute negation of final causes,—in this respect, as well as in others, materialistic principles have not changed since the time of Democritus,—but solely the fact that, thanks to Darwin, it found, as its adherents claim, a ready answer to the constantly reiterated and never refuted objection of the Teleologists." P. 571.

In an altogether contrary sense, write the following Evolutionists.

Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, "I have not been deterred from vindicating the teleological interpretation of nature by the opprobrious treatment, or, at best, condescending excuse, which seems to be deemed 'the right thing' for the 'argument from design.' 'Advanced thought' also, like dress and manners, is not without its fashions and its fops. And many a scientific

sciolist who would bear himself *comme il faut* towards such questionable deceivers as final causes now thinks it necessary to have his fling at Paley and the Bridgewater Treatises. He has it on the best authority that Darwin has exposed their imposture; and he must show that he is not going to fall into their tracks. It is probable that, of those who speak in this tone, nine out of ten have never read the books with which they deal so flippantly; and it is certain that the tenth is incompetent to grasp the essentials of an argument, letting its separable accidents fall away. . . . .

"And this evolution, whatever its extent, is not a cause or even a force, but a method, which might be the path either of a voluntary cause or of a blind force, and has nothing to say to the controversy between them. If there were design before, so is there now; if not, then there has none been added. But on the other hand, if marks of thoughts were early found before, they have now become marks of larger and sublimer thought." Vol. 1, Pp. XII, XIII.

Diman, *The Theistic Argument*, "It has not been my purpose to press Evolution into the service of Natural Theology but simply to establish the negative proposition that it does not conflict with any of the grounds which have been advanced for believing in a first and in final causes." P. 197.

Hall, *The Being and Attributes of God*, "Many theistic writers have conceded, unwarrantably, we think, that the Darwinian Theory has nullified Paley's argument for design. . It ought to be clear that so far from overturning the teleological argument, the objections which have been brought against it in modern days enable theistic believers to exhibit its validity more convincingly than ever." Pp. 169, 175.

Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx*, "Evolution is meaningless if it is not teleological, and we cannot conceive of purpose except in the intelligence of a personal being. And we are forbidden by the principle of not multiplying entities needlessly to invent gratuitous fictions like an impersonal intelligence or unconscious purpose." Pp. 303, 304.

Truth to say, Evolution *as such*, since it is concerned *in no way* with the *source* of the world order, but only, as its very name implies, with the *method* of that order's production, whatever be its source, in no way affects the design argument, the sole object of which is to determine whence that order comes. Evolution or no evolution, the order is there. How did it get there? The design argument answers this question. Evolution *as such* has no answer to give; it is outside its province to give any.

When we consider, however, not Evolution *as such* but the evolutionary theories commonly proposed, the case is altogether different. These theories not only claim that the world order, either wholly or in part, has been evolved by some process or other, but insist also that the *source* or *origin* or *cause,* of this evolving order was not necessarily an intelligent being. In this latter point they run counter to the design argument, and on this point only the design argument takes issue with them.

Our conclusion, then, is that any theory of Evolution, which in its explanation of the world-order denies the necessity of attributing it to intelligence, is flatly opposed to the design argument, and this not because it advocates an evolutionary explanation of the world's development, but because it denies the existence of its intelligent cause. All general Evolutionary systems as usually explained and defended do this. And on this ground, and on this only, the design argument rejects them as false. They are impossible in many other ways, metaphysically and physically, as is shown elsewhere in philosophy. At present we are not concerned with those questions.

Scholion IV. Some examples in confirmation of the assertion on which our teleological argument is based, namely, that the constitution and preservation of the world-order is the result of the universal, complicated and constant co-operation of the numberless parts and forces of nature.

For a full confirmation of this assertion, one should go to the natural sciences. We have space here only for a few examples. These will be stated as briefly as possible without any attempt at fulness of treatment, and popularly rather than scientifically.

1. **The atmosphere and plant and animal life.**
The quantity, quality or kind, proportion, and general

properties of the substances of which our atmosphere is almost wholly composed are marvelously adapted to the needs of plant and animal life, in fact, so marvelously adapted, that a marked and continued change in any one of these factors would make organic life either absolutely impossible or extremely difficult.

On their side plants and animals are just as marvelously fitted with organs capable of utilizing all the benefits offered them by the atmosphere. Is all this the outcome of chance?

a. **Quantity of the atmosphere adapted to the needs of plant and animal life.**

"If the quantity of air surrounding the earth were to be greatly increased, . . . its density . . . and its momentum when in motion would all be increased in like proportion. It is, therefore, obvious that it would not require any very great increase in the mere quantity of the gases which form the atmosphere, to convert what would now be a gentle breeze into a destructive hurricane, without any actual increase in the velocity of the wind.

"Moreover a mere augmentation of the quantity of the atmosphere without any change in the proportion of its different constituents would so greatly increase its power as a supporter of combustion that fires once started would be almost inextinguishable."

b. Quality and proportion of substances in our atmosphere adapted to the needs of plant and animal life.

Nitrogen forms almost four-fifths, by volume, of the atmosphere, in which it is found in the free state. Its most important function is the dilution of the oxygen of the atmosphere. Nitrogen is one of the constituents of chlorophyll, the substance which gives to foliage its green color, and which, in the presence of sunlight, is active in the production of plant food. In this process the carbon-dioxide of the air is decomposed, the oxygen being returned to the air and the carbon retained as one of the food constituents. This food is stored in the leaves of plants during the day as starch. At night it is converted

into sugar, which, in a state of solution, is carried to the different parts of the plant as food. If there were no chlorophyll, there would be no life on earth.

If the proportion of nitrogen in the air were notably greater, and the amount of oxygen were notably less, respiration would be extremely difficult, or altogether impossible, owing to lack of sufficient oxygen.

"Our lives would become lethargic and stolid, nothing but dull heavy movements compelled by hunger or physical necessity. Our fires would die out, or, if by chopping wood into very thin splinters and drying it thoroughly, we could get an occasional fire to cook some delicacy, the labor required would be very great. Hard coal would then be as difficult to ignite as are diamonds or graphite under the conditions which now exist.

"Under such circumstances man would be confined to the tropics for it would be impossible for the lungs to perform their functions with such energy as would furnish enough oxygen to generate sufficient heat to protect the body from even a moderate degree of cold.

"If the proportion of nitrogen were greatly decreased, the process of oxidation which under present conditions, either directly or indirectly makes life on earth possible, would be so intensified that life would be destroyed.

"The slightest spark would start forest and prairie fires which would spread over the surface of the land, burning up grass and herbs and leaving nothing but desolation in their path . . . We could no longer use iron for stoves and furnaces, for the simple reason that the iron itself would burn with . . . fierceness.

"As for animals . . . if they could continue to live and perpetuate their species under such circumstances . . . their lives would be one fitful fever . . . and their existence would be intense but brief."

Oxygen, uncombined, is about one-fifth of the atmosphere by volume. It is the most widely distributed and most abundant element on earth, forming not only one-fifth of the atmosphere by volume, but also eight-ninths of water by weight, and almost one-half by weight of the solid crust of the earth.

If there were no oxygen in the air animal life would be impossible. If the proportion of oxygen in the air were notably greater or less, the results would be the converse

of those described above when speaking of a change in the proportion of nitrogen in the atmosphere.

Carbon dioxide (CO_2) is another substance found in the air, in much less quantity, however, than either nitrogen or oxygen. Of one thousand parts of air, carbon dioxide is only four-tenths of one part. Relatively small though this amount be, if it were totally removed from the air, plant life would be impossible, and, as a consequence, animal life also, for carbon is an essential constituent of all living bodies, and all that they have is taken from the air through the leaves of the plant, as noted above. If the proportion of carbon dioxide in the air were greatly increased and at the same time that of oxygen diminished, as carbon dioxide is a non-supporter of combustion, the respiration of animals would be rendered extremely difficult and even impossible. Plants make use of the carbon dioxide in the air, animals make use of the oxygen, each returning to the air what the other needs, the plants giving back oxygen and animals carbon dioxide. To this, no doubt, in some measure it is due that, though both these substances are in continual flux, their quantity in the atmosphere is always practically the same.

Water vapor. Another constituent of our atmosphere is water vapor; a gas lighter than any of the three above mentioned. The amount of it in the air varies from one-sixty-sixth to one-two-hundredth of the whole volume. Other conditions remaining the same, the higher the temperature, the greater the amount of moisture the air will hold in solution without precipitation. If there were no moisture in the atmosphere there would be no plant or animal life, for there would be no rain, no springs, no rivers. Without rain plant growth is impossible; without water animals cannot live.

The water vapor in the air prevents the too rapid evaporation of water from plants and animals.

"By its mere mechanical action, falling on mountain tops and collecting into brooks and rivers . . . . . it wears down hills and fills up lakes and valleys, converting water-covered surfaces first into swamps and bogs and then into fertile meadows." In this process of soil making, the disintegration of rocks by the rain is aided very much by the presence in it of carbon dioxide which is extremely soluble in water.

Not only by erosion does water level mountains, and disintegrate rocks, but owing to a remarkable property it has, under certain conditions it rends them asunder. Water contracts as it cools till it reaches four degrees C., then it begins to expand. This expansion is gradual till the freezing point is reached, at which point there is a sudden expansion of the water equal to one-tenth of its volume. As moisture soaks into the mountain soils and pores of the rocks, it is plain how in places where low temperatures are reached it causes them to crumble.

It will not be out of place to note another far-reaching effect due to this most unique property of water. If water on cooling did not expand as it does, the ice which would form when it froze would sink. As water is an extremely bad conductor of heat, this ice would accumulate from winter to winter. The result in time would be the transformation of the waters of the earth into solid masses of ice, and a change in climate detrimental, if not absolutely fatal, to all forms of life.

"Another very important effect produced by the presence of moisture in the air is due to its power of preventing the [too rapid] radiation of heat from the earth." Moist air allows the heat radiated from the sun to pass through it readily and heat the earth. The heat, however, which in turn is radiated from the earth passes through moist

air with great difficulty. In this way the earth and the air are kept at a temperature beneficial to plant and animal life.

General properties of the air beneficial to life.

Owing to these properties air is a medium capable of propagating sound, it does not impede the passage of heat from the sun to the earth, it does not impede the passage of light, it is adapted to the generation of winds. Owing to the general law of the diffusion of gases, the gases of the air do not arrange themselves according to their densities, the heaviest lowest, etc. If they did so, carbon dioxide, being the heaviest, would cover the surface of the earth to a depth sufficient to bring about the destruction of life.

Though the presence of innumerable particles of dust in the air cannot strictly be called a property of the air, still their presence helps very much the formation of the rain drops, and also gives us our diffused light.

c. Some concluding remarks.

"We are now able to understand and appreciate in some slight way "those characteristics and adaptations of the atmosphere which make this earth a suitable habitation for plants and animals as we know them. The conditions necessary to this end involve [as we have seen] not only the chemical and physical qualities of the air, but they extend even to its mere quantity and mass.

"At the time when the earth assumed a separate existence the quantity and proportions of the various materials which now form it and its atmosphere were absolutely fixed and they must have been adjusted either by intelligent design, or, as the materialists claim, by 'blind chance.'

"Let us see now how close and, at the same time, how complicated this adjustment was. The calculation is easily made, and as a result it will be found that the atmosphere is considerably less than one-millionth part of the material which, at the separation of the sun and earth, constituted this planet. From this, therefore, it is easily seen that the adjustment by which our atmosphere attained its present physical characteristics and its special relations to the rest of the planet, must have been made to less than the one-millionth part of the entire amount of matter involved.

"In other words, a deviation to the extent of one-millionth part or even less, would have left us either with no atmosphere at all or with one of double its amount according as too much or too little matter of a special kind had been assigned to it.

"This relates wholly to the physical or mechanical relations of the atmosphere or to the atmosphere as a whole, but the chemical adjustment had to be far closer than this. Oxygen forms but one-fifth of the air, and therefore if the amount of oxidizable matter (hydrogen, carbon, calcium, magnesium, iron, zinc, etc.) in this globe had been the one five-millionth part more than it is, there would have been no oxygen at all, in the atmosphere, and animal life as we know it, would have been impossible.

"But it was necessary to adjust these materials, even more closely, than to the five-millionth part; if there had been one ten-millionth part more of these oxidizable matters, including a greater proportion of hydrogen, the amount of oxygen in the air would have been reduced by one-half and none of the higher animals could have adjusted themselves to these conditions."

"On the other hand, if the quantity of these oxidizable materials had been reduced by one ten-millionth part, the atmosphere would have been so rich in oxygen that organic matter would have been in constant danger of destruction by fire, if it could ever have come into existence at all, which is very doubtful. . . .

"Out of the . . . [80 or more] elements known to the chemist, the quantities of at least twenty-five had to be carefully adjusted in order to leave an atmosphere such as we now have, and in this adjustment due regard had to be paid to the special character and combining weight of each individual element. This involved a complex combination of conditions, . . . and to ask us to believe that these adaptations with all their minute details, were the result of mere chance, is to demand an [inconceivable] amount of credulity. . . .

"We are therefore compelled to dismiss the hypothesis of monistic mechanical evolution determined by blind chance as utterly inadequate to explain the great riddle which this universe with all its varied manifestations of adaptations presents.

"On the other hand, that evolution [Phin, the writer quoted, believes in evolution] which is the expression of the will and power of a supreme, self-conscious personal Ruler, furnishes a simple and adequate explanation of all the wonderful adjustments which we have described and no other hypothesis is competent to do this."

The quotations in the above section are taken from **Phin,** ***The Evolution of the Atmosphere as a Proof of Design in Creation.***

2. **The Human heart; the circulation of the blood; the blood.**

Everywhere in the world is found abundant evidence of intelligence, in the selection and complicated co-ordination and subordination of its parts, innumerable and varied, each performing its own proper work and all constantly furthering the common end for which they were linked together. Nowhere, however, is this evidence so striking as in the higher forms of animal life. Here the intricacy and ingenuity of adaptation is bewildering, not only when we view the living organism as a whole, but even when some one part alone is under consideration. A few words about the human heart, the circulation of the blood, and the blood itself will make this clear.

The human heart is a muscular pump which in adults is about 5 inches in length, 3½ inches in its greatest width and 2½ inches in its extreme thickness. Its weight is between 1/150 and 1/160 that of the body. It is enclosed in a sac called the pericardium in such wise as to leave it relatively free motion, otherwise it could not perform its work.

It is hollow, its interior being divided by a longitudinal partition into two cavities, which have no direct communication with each other. Each of these cavities is in turn subdivided transversely into two compartments; the upper is called the auricle and the lower the ventricle. Both auricles communicate directly and freely with their corresponding ventricles through openings called the auriculo-ventricular openings.

The auricles are the smaller, less muscular portions of the heart, since their function is merely to receive the blood and transmit it to the ventricles. The walls of the left ventricle are four times the thickness of the right, since upon it falls the work of propelling the blood for

the entire systemic circulation, while the right ventricle has to send the blood only through the pulmonary vessels. The direction of the course of the blood through the heart is maintained by four valves, two of which guard the orifices between auricles and ventricles, the other two guarding the openings into the aorta and the pulmonary artery. The tri-cuspid valve, consisting of three flaps of fibrous tissue, guards the right auriculo-ventricular opening, and the bi-cuspid, or mitral valve, consisting of two flaps, guards the left. We might add here that in the normal heart which beats about seventy-two times a minute, each one of these valves opens and closes about one hundred and three thousand times a day. During this same time the heart does two hundred and sixteen thousand foot-pounds of work.

Near the base of attachment, the flaps of the valves are tough and able to withstand the pressure of the blood, while at the edges, they are thin and delicate and yield to it. When the blood has passed into the ventricle and the ventricle begins to contract they prevent by their perfect apposition any return of it into the emptied auricle. Similar arrangements guard the proper closure of the aortic and pulmonary valves.

The circulation of the blood. Starting from any one chamber of the heart the blood will in time return to it; but to do this it must pass through at least two sets of capillaries; one of these is connected with the aorta and the other with the pulmonary artery, and in its circuit the blood returns to the heart twice. Leaving the left side it returns to the right, and leaving the right it returns to the left: and there is no road for it from one side of the heart to the other except through a capillary net-work. Moreover it always leaves from a ventricle through an artery, and returns to an auricle through a

vein. There is then really one circulation; but it is not uncommon to speak of two: the systemic, through the body, and the pulmonary, through the lungs.

The dark, venous blood returned from the circuit through the body, where it has become charged with waste products and other impurities is poured into the right auricle. This contracts, the tri-cuspid valve opens, and the blood is discharged into the right ventricle. Here it remains a small fraction of a second, when this ventricle contracts, the tri-cuspid valve closes, the valve at the mouth of the pulmonary artery opens, and the blood is driven through this artery into the lungs where it is spread out through the countless capillaries distributed through the lung tissues. Here it is freed from its carbon dioxide, oxygenated and returned through the pulmonary vein into the left auricle.

The contraction of the left auricle discharges this oxygenated blood through the mitral opening into the left ventricle, whose powerful contraction sends it into the aorta to perform its systemic circuit. The timely opening and closing of the valves controlling the course of the blood in this operation, are brought about in a way similar to those of the right heart described above.

During the systemic circulation blood is supplied through the aorta to the arteries, which carry it to all parts of the body by their continuation, first, through the arterioles and, then, through the capillaries distributed throughout all the tissues. Here the blood through the thin capillary walls comes into contact with the intermediary fluid known as the lymph, which fills all the tissue spaces through which by osmosis an interchange takes place. The blood exchanges its oxygen and nutritive elements for the waste matter of the body and effects that transference of chemical substances from the organs in which they are produced to those others

in any way depending on their activity. This includes the transmission not only of the elaborated products of digestion but likewise the internal secretions. It is to be noted, that the various tissues, e.g., bone tissue, liver tissue, etc., act selectively, that is, each takes from the blood those substances necessary for its proper nourishment. Selective also is the action of the different glands in taking from the blood those materials, which either unchanged or chemically changed, are poured out on a free surface, whether that of the general exterior or of an internal cavity. These materials so poured out are separated either for removal from the body or for further use. In the latter case the secretion may be either something taken from the blood which is delivered by the secretory organ unchanged, or something taken from the blood which is chemically changed by the secretory organ. From the capillaries, after exchange of products with the tissues through the lymph has taken place, the blood is collected by venules into the veins, which finally unite into the *vena cava* which carries the blood back to the right auricle. This process goes on continuously during life. The heart has its special system of blood supply in the coronary arteries; the blood entering the coronary arteries from the aorta and passing into the capillaries which surround the fibres, and returning in a deoxidized state through the coronary sinus into the right auricle. The walls of the arteries are thicker and stronger than those of the veins; both consist of three coats and are quite elastic. Except the pulmonary artery and the aorta, which possess the semi-lunar valves at their cardiac orifices, the arteries possess no valves; many veins, on the contrary, have them. These valves, sometimes single, oftener in pairs, and sometimes three at one level, permit blood to flow only towards the heart. They are most frequently found where two veins communicate.

The walls of the capillaries consist of only one coat and are extremely thin, and so are well adapted to allow of filtration or diffusion taking place through them. The capillaries are innumerable; their average diameter is about one fifteen-hundreth of an inch; in many parts of the body they lie so close that a pin point cannot be inserted between any adjacent two.

The blood. The blood is made up of a liquid plasma and solid cells or corpuscles. It contains at least four separate and important ingredients: the plasma or blood serum, red cells, white cells, and blood plates.

Plasma. Fifty-six per cent of the blood is plasma; of this ninety per cent is water. In the plasma are found the foods for the various tissues, and the waste products.

Red cells. These are the most abundant of the formed elements of the blood. There are thought to be in man at least five million blood-cells to every cubic millimetre of blood. These cells are mostly manufactured in the marrow of the long bones. Their main function is to carry oxygen from the lungs to the tissues, and carbon dioxide from the tissues to the lungs.

White cells. These are much less numerous than the red cells, varying in number from five thousand to twenty thousand to the cubic millimetre. They may be aptly termed the human body's "army of the interior" in the fight with disease-causing agents. They are useful both physically, by eating, as it were, the bodies of invading bacteria (phagocytosis); or chemically, in the elaboration of certain counter-poisons (antitoxins); or in the manufacture of specific immunizing bodies for the blood-serum.

Blood plates. Our knowledge of these is very meagre. Cf. Encyclopedia Americana, 1918, from which our remarks on the blood, etc., were taken almost *verbatim*.

3. **A bird and its flight.** Here again are most convincing evidences of design. We quote from **Martineau,** *A Study of Religion,* and also from **Ronayne, S.J.,** *God Known and Knowable.*

With the bird "it is impossible to be indifferent to weight, as with an animal that never quits the ground. It is impossible to balance the weight with the medium, as with an animal that lives in the sea. A portion of the locomotive strength must be spared from its work of progression to lift and sustain the body in a fluid lighter than itself; and to minimize what is subtracted for this purpose must be the fundamental problem in constructing this new order of being .

"The bird, accordingly, is a complete study of economy in weight and intensity in muscular power. By relegating to the gizzard the triturating process of the food, the head is lightened of its teeth and greatly reduced in size. The viscera and ribs are thrown far back, and packed in a small compass under the dorsal vertebrae, several of which are anchylosed [united in one bone], to give a firm base of support for the wings; but, these central solidities secured, all beyond is arranged with a view to lightness.

"The cylindrical bones are hollow, and filled not with marrow but with air, which also has access to the interior of the broad bones, honeycombed as they are with cells; similar cells run through the membranes of the abdomen; so that the small lungs have the power, through their connections, of permeating the whole body with air.

"As the arms are pre-engaged for flight, the mouth is the only prehensile organ, with some help from the feet; and, to perfect it for this function, it is not only furnished with a beak varied according to the dietary of the species, but is set upon a single condyle to turn every way; and at the end of from ten to (in the swan) twenty-three cervical vertebrae, instead of the seven allotted to the mammals; so that there is never any part of its body which a bird cannot reach with its beak. . . .

"With all this provision however for lightening the body, there is still need of a most powerful apparatus to counterbalance its gravitation, and give it its free passport through the air. Weight enough must be left to supply the counter force to the relative motion of the atmosphere and the wing; for the line of flight is but the result of these two; and the real problem is to have neither of them excessive in comparison with the other, while both are allowed their play.

"Often in a moderate wind, you may see a hawk . . . hanging aloft with its axis not far from the verticle, and half-folded wings apparently at rest: in this case the sails are set and the helm is turned at so nice an angle as to play off

the line of the wind against that of gravitation, and so sustain the body at its height; and though it cannot be held from drifting on the breeze, ... yet the residuary impulse of the wind is counteracted by the inconspicuous exertion of the bird . . .

"When the atmosphere is still, the only difference is, that the business of creating the wind is thrown upon the bird: by the beat of his wings he compresses the air into motion and rises and advances by its re-action, the direction which he takes being determined by the angle of the stroke. The elements of structure needed to meet these conditions are not difficult to define, but are very delicate in fact." Martineau, Vol. 1, p. 278 ff.

"The length and breadth of the surface covered by the open wings pressing on the air cause that the upward pressure far surpasses that of gravitation, while the thinness of the wings takes very little from the air pressure. Again, that the wing may gain a rebound by striking the air, it is made large enough to compress a volume of air, proportioned to the size of the bird,—and that it may be light and at the same time strong enough, it is furnished with feathers.

"Another contrivance for the execution of purpose, we find in the form and arrangement of the feathers. The elasticity of the air under the downward stroke of the wing enables the bird to rise, but this effect, if the aerial property alone were taken into consideration, would be neutralized by the upward stroke, and thus flight would become impossible. To meet this difficulty the wing is so shaped that its under surface is concave while its upper surface is convex,—so that, when the wing strikes the air, it gathers it in or focuses it and is acted on by the full force of atmospheric resistance; on the other hand, when it strikes the air with the upper or convex surface, it meets with little resistance, since the convexity of the surface offers scarcely any resistance to the air. Add to this, that in giving the up-stroke the bird more or less flexes or contracts the wing and extends it for the contrary motion; and thus the flexion of the wings in the former case opens the feathers, in the latter, the extension, on the contrary renders them airtight, underlapping each other as they do.

"All this, however, will enable the bird to ascend, but will not enable it to fly. How is this to be accomplished? Again, by the combination of the wings' mechanism with natural forces. The power of forward motion is given to birds, first, by the direction in which the wing-feathers are set, and, next, by the structure given to each feather in itself. The wing-feathers are all set backwards, that is, in the direction opposite to that in which the bird moves; whilst each feather is at the same time so constructed as to be strong and rigid toward its base and extremely flexible and elastic toward its end. On the other hand, the front of the wing along the greater part of its length, is a stiff, hard edge, wholly unelastic and unyielding to the air. The anterior and posterior

webs of each feather are adjusted on the same principle.

"The consequence of this disposition of the parts as a whole and of this construction of each of the parts is, that the air which is struck and compressed in the hollow of the wing, being unable to escape through the wing, owing to the closing upwards of the feathers against each other, and also being unable to escape *forwards*, owing to the rigidity of the bones and the quills in that direction, finds its easiest escape *backwards*. In passing backwards, it lifts by *its* force the elastic ends of the feathers, and thus, while effecting this escape, in obedience to the law of action and reaction, it communicates in its passage, along the whole line of both wings, a corresponding push forward to the body of the bird.

"By this elaborate mechanical contrivance the same volume of air is made to perform the double duty of yielding pressure enough to sustain the bird's weight against the force of gravity, and also communicating to it a forward impulse." **Ronayne**, p. 153.

"Nor does the instinctive feeling ever fail, which directs to the skilled use of this delicate instrument [i.e.,the wing]. Would the bird poise itself at a given point, like the humming bird looking for insects in the flower below? He so inclines his body as to let the plane of his wings be horizontal and their stroke rectangular, and thus prevents progressive motion by any backward beat. Would he turn to the left? He depresses that side as compared with the other and inclines the head and tail upwards, and the flow of air on the sails thus altered does the work for him, and he wheels like a skater circling without a stroke, by more or less rotation on its axis; determining the curve to be sharp as the swallow's or deliberate as the heron's.

"The habit of the wing he accommodates to its strength and to his own needs; if it is short, multiplying its beats, till they quiver out of sight, enabling him to put forth fits of velocity, as with divers pursuing shoals of traveling fish; if it is long, demanding from it less vivid strokes, but trusting it for distant ventures of hundreds, even thousands, of miles. **Martineau**, Vol. 1, p. 281.

4. Instinct.

In the instinctive actions of animals we find innumerable examples of adaptation and use of means to achieve a definite result, so ingenious and at times so complicated, that we are forced to look for an intelligent cause of them. That the brute beast is not such a cause can be proved, hence the intelligent cause must be the one from whom it received its nature, in which the instinct is implanted. We cite a few examples.

The Sphex. Gerard, S.J., *Science and Scientists,*

"Wasps of the genus called Sphex lay up with their eggs a store of animal food for the benefit of their young when hatched. It is desirable . . . that the victim chosen for this unhappy function, should be rendered helpless, but at the same time not killed, so that the provisions may keep fresh. This is effected by stinging him in one or more nerve centres, thus paralyzing him for motion, but not immediately affecting his life. One species of Sphex, for instance, preys upon crickets, in which three nerve centres have to be thus dealt with, to reach one of which the neck has to be stretched back while the others are minute spots in other parts of the body. For a man to do this would require the nicest knowledge of anatomy. Yet the Sphex performs the operation with unhesitating accuracy, and a young mother doing so for the first time cannot be guided by experience, while she certainly has not an elder instructor at her elbow. . . .

"Another species of the same genus uses caterpillars instead of crickets, and to paralyze them from six to nine stings are needed, one between each of the segments of the body, the brain being also partially crushed by a bite with the mandibles. . . .

"An instinct fundamentally the same is occasionally found in animals altogether different. Thus there have been found in a polecat's nest as many as forty frogs and toads, all alive and able to sprawl helplessly, but each bitten accurately through the brain, so as to incapacitate them for locomotion." Pp. 102, 107.

Sitaris Humeralis (Muralis). Muckermann, S. J., *The Humanizing of the Brute,*

"In its larval stage this interesting blister-beetle of the family of Meloidae cannot live except on the egg of a bee, whereas the indispensable food of the second stage is honey, which would have been virulent poison to the beetle in his earliest existence.

"The following organs are at the disposal of our beetle to secure possession of the egg: six strong legs, well adapted for climbing and clinging to other objects, fully developed mandibles and feelers, and finally good eyes. But after the transformation of the first larval stage into the second, the worm-like grub is blind and has almost lost its legs and feelers, but is endowed with a large mouth admirably adapted for sipping the honey which is necessary for its subsistence in this second stage of development.

"The spot where Sitaris first beholds the light of day is near the entrance of the bees' habitation. The larva is hatched towards the end of September or early in October, and remains quietly in the same spot throughout the winter without any food until the bee leaves its home in the early spring.

Then the moment for action has arrived, and it is highly interesting to perceive how our beetle procures its suitable nourishment in the most appropriate manner." P. 18.

Shearman, *The Natural Theology of Evolution,* will tell us the rest of the story of *Sitaris,*

"The male bee is hatched first and comes out of the nest nearly a month before the female, so that it is probable that the greater number of larvae [of Sitaris] become attached to the male, but they take an opportunity of transferring themselves to the female and remain with her until she lays an egg.

"This egg is laid in a cell containing a supply of honey, upon which it floats, and the cell is then closed by the bees. But at the moment when the egg is laid, the Sitaris gets on it and remains there, using the egg as a raft and feeding on its contents. As it can neither float on the honey nor feed on it it would perish if it left the egg. After living in this way for about a week it undergoes a moult and then assumes another form [described above by Muckermann], admirably adapted for floating on the honey and able to use it as food. It now spends about forty days in consuming the honey, after which it changes its form again and passing into the pupal stage appears as a perfect insect in the following month." P. 254.

Rynchites Pubescens. Von Hammerstein, S. J., *Foundations of Faith,* Vol. 1,

"The saw-fly is an example of foresight, or would be, were there no Creator to look into the future for it . . . Our little saw-fly has sufficient wisdom to provide itself on its entrance into the world with the implement which it will one day need for the performance of its instinctive actions. This is a dainty saw. Nor is this all. Rynchites pubescens is capable of making distinctions, and only when it is a female does it provide itself with a serviceable saw; if it is to develop into a male it knows that it will have no future need of the instrument, and therefore contents itself with a tiny one, which, while practically useless is sufficiently recognizable to enable it to be identified as the proper consort of its future mate. The female . . . does not roll funnels like its cousin (Rynchites betulae, the funnel-roller), but bores and saws for its eggs little holes in oak-twigs, and for this it needs its saw. Its mode of operation is described for us by Fr. Wassmann: 'We have long spoken of the saw-fly without having accurately established its claim to the title. From the great number of operations witnessed by us we shall select one . . . which is particularly noticeable for the precision of its separate parts . . .

"'A beautiful dark-green female . . . had just mated, and soon began to wander undecidedly up and down on the oak-twigs . . . Finally the proper spot was found, and beneath a knot which in better days had borne a leaf, the saw-fly began its task.

"'At first the little animal sat quite still, gnawing the outer bark with a scarcely perceptible motion of the jaws, but before long began its serious life-work. Sinking its head and raising its neck, it began to bore a hole in the bark, continually enlarging this . . . and accompanying by a regular movement of the whole body the action of the proboscis, upon which it seemed to have concentrated all its feeble energy.

"'That the entrance to the hole might be afterwards closed, the little carpenter merely pushed to one side the loosened bark, but the interior of the cavity was cleanly sawed out in the shape of an ellipsoid. When able to insert its proboscis up to its eyes, the Rynchites considered the cradle finished, and turning let fall into it a tiny drop of yellowish adhesive matter. Once more facing around, it smoothed down the inner walls of the cavity with this gum, which afterwards hardens and turns brown. This serves to preserve the tender skin of the future larva from friction against the rough surface of the wood. Again the beetle turned, probably to ascertain whether the cavity was all ready to receive the egg; a few splinters were removed from the aperture, and the most important business of the insect's life began.

"'The female inserted her ovipositor as deeply into the hole as possible . . . after three minutes of perfect quiet the young life had begun, a single amber-yellow, shining, elliptical egg, one millimetre in length, lay in the dark receptacle . . .For the last time the mother inserts her proboscis into the cavity . . . to place the egg in proper position; she then begins with a satisfied movement of the antennae to close the aperture. The entrance is stopped up with the greatest care, and the loosened bark pressed tightly on the wound so that the spot where the treasure lies concealed may present no suspicious appearance—the bark merely looks as though it has been scratched and loosened with a fingernail. . . .

"'Of its own reasoning . . . the young saw-fly would never arrive at this exercise of ingenuity. The female of this bluish-gray beetle does not know that it is to lay an egg in which the hope of its race is slumbering; and could it foresee the tiny larva in the egg, the rules of human prudence would certainly not suggest hard wood as nourishment for this feeble little worm. The adult beetle, notwithstanding its strong jaws, lives only on the tender young foliage of the oak, and would the anxious mother feed her incomparably more tender offspring on chips?

"'And further, who instructed the little carpenter in the use of her six-toothed saw? How does the beetle know that the points on its snout are a saw? Does it remember the proboscis of its mother who concealed a tiny egg in an oak-twig last year never to see it again? Whence does the new-born artist know that it must hold the corners of its upper jaw obliquely in order not to hurt itself when sawing? . . . Who advised the beetle at the very outset of its labor not to tear off the bark, but merely to loosen it, so that it could be used later to close the opening? Who told it, that on penetrating deeper into the twig, it must devour the hard chips made by its saw? Its ordinary food is of quite a different sort, and what similarity is there between shavings and the fresh or dried leaves of the young oak? . . .A prophetic appetite for hard oak-wood takes possession of the female at breeding time; for on careful observation scarcely a couple of grains fell on the glass held beneath; an appetite which could only appear reasonable and proper to the mind of Him who gave the little beetle its digestive apparatus and its peculiar organic development.

"'Who previously informs the beetle of the size, form and tender nature of the future egg? By whose counsel does it so cleanly saw the interior of the cavity, and plaster it so smoothly? As we saw above, the young larva occupies the whole of the ellipsoidal cavity; if this latter were of angular form, smaller in size, or roughly lined, the tender creature would soon lay down its young life.

"'And who gave the artist that secretive gland which produced the substance proper for the smoothing and polishing of the cradle? Did the anxious mother, of her own great prudence, cause a chemical glue-factory to grow inside her? . . . Whence, finally, has the fly learned the necessity of closing the cavity? Where has it made the acquaintance of the ichneumon-fly, which would try to lay its egg in that of its neighbor? Where did it discover that the action of air would have a dessicating effect on its egg? Humanly speaking, it could only have gathered this information from its own experience, and were this the fact, we should not have the pleasure of occupying ourselves with a beautiful blue-green Rynchites; a dried-up, yellowish, leathery particle would be all left us by that famous animal reason.

"'Only in the unity of an inborn organico-physical law of development which, denying the influence of individual reflection and free choice, awakens the organic feelings of the animal in a wonderfully consistent succession, only in the specific individuality of the sensuous nature of the tiny creature which received its order at the beginning of time from the hand of the Divine Artist,—only in this, do we find a satisfactory explanation of the instinctive perceptions of the saw-fly.' . . .

"Nor has the saw-fly any cause for pride in being able at its birth to foresee. . . . Numerous other animals are en-

dowed with the same prophetic gland . . . The larva of the male stag-beetle, for instance, knows that it will afterwards have antlers, and therefore leaves room for them at the end of its hole." Pp. 177 ff.

5. Some miscellaneous examples taken from various authors.

The stomach.

"The organ most universal in the animal kingdom, namely the stomach, secretes a gastric juice which dissolves and digests flesh. Why, then, it is asked, does not this juice digest the stomach itself, this being of its nature perfectly digestible, so that after its owner's death it can serve as food for other flesh-eating creatures? But while its possessor is alive this difficulty is anticipated by the provision of a special varnish, *the epithelium*, which lines the internal walls of the stomach, rendering these unassailable by the action of the gastric juice, just as if coated with porcelain. This protection, it is argued, must already have been supplied to the first stomach in which digestion was ever performed, or the process could never have gone any further. What clearer proof of design is it possible to imagine? "*Nature and her Author*, The Month, August, 1910.

The young bee is hardly able to move its wings when it leaves the hive in search of flowers, and begins to labor not to supply its own immediate wants, but for a common and future good; for from its first journey, it sometimes makes a collection of bees-wax. Bees have been seen to return to the hive loaded with two large balls of this substance the same day they were born.

The spider has not so much as seen the insects which will serve for its food when it hastens to lay a snare for them by weaving a curious web. The spinning machinery which is set up in its body is not more accurately adjusted to the secretion of which its web is formed, than is its instinct directed to the construction of the web, and to the selection of suitable places for the capture of its prey. Each step it takes is adapted to a determinate result. The thread of the spider is secreted by an appara-

tus of small vessels twined and wound around many times on each other, terminating in four or six nipples pierced by a multitude of little holes or rather microscopic tubes. These tubes are so many spinnerets where the viscous liquid is emitted in long threads and with which the insect weaves its meshes.

"It has been calculated," says **Milne-Edwards** in his *Zoology,* "that ten thousand of these delicate threads . . . . . are not equal in thickness to one of our hairs." Nevertheless one of these threads can bear a weight one hundred times that of the insect itself.

Birds' nests. In examining the nests of birds we shall soon learn that their form and structure are always the same for the same species, but very different from one species to another, and particularly adapted to the needs of the little family.

"The eggs," as **Milne-Edwards** tells us, "must be placed on a soft bed, warm and comfortable for the naked weakling just come out of its prison shell. The bird which has never before built nor seen a nest constructed, makes his own for the first time, and turns out a perfect model of a nest suited to his kind. In order to make it solid, he secretes a kind of viscous saliva, with which he mixes dust or clay, and thus makes a perfect paste or putty. In order to furnish the interior he gathers brush, hair, or the tufts of cottonous flowers, and ofttimes it is at the cost of their own proper substance, that the parents make a resting place for their progeny. Thus the eider, a large duck found in Iceland and Lapland, plucks out the silky down from its own breast in order to spread under its little ones a soft bed of eider-down.

"When a bird sits precisely three weeks on its eggs, how does it know that exactly that period of time is required to metamorphose the eggs into young? It could not have seen whether or how long its own mother brooded. Neither has it studied zoology. How then does it know that its species must brood, while the megapodius in New Holland deposits its eggs in mouldering vegetation? It is evident that the singular correlation of habit and purpose was planned by some one. It was not planned by the bird, still less by an unconscious something in nature, for an unconscious thing can not plan. It follows that the Creator conceived this design, and so disposed the organism of the animal that it is

in some way driven at the proper time to brood during the prescribed period."

DIFFICULTIES

1. The argument from design draws its conclusion from an analogy existing between orderly effects naturally and artificially produced.

   Such an argument, however is invalid. Therefore, etc.

   So **Knight** and many other moderns.

   Tr. Maj. *N. Min.*

   The reasons for transmitting the Major and denying the Minor will be found in the prenotes to the thesis, and in the valid proofs of the first part of the thesis drawn directly from the world order itself, and indirectly from analogy.

2. In order that the teleological argument may transfer to God the conclusion that it draws, viz., that the cause of the world-order in an intelligent being, it must make use of the cosmological argument.

   But such argumentation is invalid; it involves the invalid ontological argument.

   Therefore the teleological argument invalidly concludes that there exists an intelligent God.

   So argue **Kant, Knight** and a host of **Kantians.**

   R. 1. *D. Maj.* In order that the teleological argument may transfer to God, as He is conceived scientifically, the conclusion, etc., it must make use of the cosmological argument, *C.;* in order that the teleological argument may transfer to God, as He is popularly conceived, the conclusion, etc., it must make use of the cosmological argument, *N.* *Cd. Min.*

   2. *Tr. Maj.* *N. Min. and its proof.*

   The reasons for the first solution will be found in the prenotes, and also in the proof given in Cor-

ollary I. The denial of the Minor and its proof in the second solution is warranted by Theses II and III.

3. The teleolgical argument is valueless unless it proves that the intelligence which produced this ordered world is one, and only one, infinitely wise, and the world's creator. But the teleological argument cannot prove these points. Therefore it is to be rejected.

Knight and many other moderns make this assertion.

D. Maj. It is valueless in proving the existence of an intelligent God, as conceived in the popular concept, unless it proves, etc., *N.;* it is valueless in proving the existence of God, as conceived in the scientific concept, unless it proves, etc., *Subd.,* it is valueless unless it proves all these points independently of the cosmological argument, and its developed conclusion, *N.;* unless it is able to prove them dependently on that argument and its developed conclusion, *C. Cd. Min. D. Con.*

In the prenotes to the thesis, and in the teleological proof given in Corollary I will be found the reasons for the answer to this difficulty.

4. If a chance combination of moving atoms could produce this ordered universe the teleological argument is invalid. But a chance combination of atoms could produce this ordered universe.

Therefore the teleological argument is invalid.

So reason all materialistic **Monists.** Their latter-day leader is **Haeckel.** Many **Evolutionists** belong to this school.

N. Min. The following reasons for denying the Minor will suffice:

a. The many atheists who urge this difficulty deny the existence of a first cause of the world,

distinct from the world itself, its producer, and a necessarily existent, immutable, infinite, intelligent being.

The position they take is metaphysically impossible.

b. They assert, moreover, that from brute matter have been evolved all living things; plants, animals and even man. This assertion is absolutely false.

c. When asked whence came the order that is found everywhere in nature, their answer is that it all happened by chance. Our thesis proves the falsity of this answer.

"To suppose that a universe such as science reveals to us, so real, so intricate, so harmonious, so stable, could have been called into being by the operation of blind chance, is an hypothesis that no man in his senses, at the present day, would think for a moment of maintaining. Diman, *The Theistic Argument*, p. 121.

A word about Haeckel will not be out of place. Dwight, *Thoughts of a Catholic Anatomist*, writes of him,

"There is little trouble in finding the prototypes of Haeckel and others of his class—violent, restless and unscrupulous. I should be glad to pass this man by without more words, but for the very reason that he is looked upon as a leader and a prophet, not by the ignorant alone, but by many who should know better. For their enlightenment it is necessary to show what his word is worth. This was done as long ago as 1874 by the late Prof. Wilhelm His, the great embryologist and one of the most respected leaders of science."

After showing how Haeckel had been proved by His to be absolutely unscrupulous in his dishonest handling and falsifying of plates in an effort to bolster up his theory of evolution, Dwight continues,

"His then points out other false dealings by Haeckel in the matter of illustrations, some of which he declares to have been invented, and remarks very

justly that his play with facts is far more dangerous than his play with words, in as much as it requires an expert to denounce it—'Let then others honor Haeckel as an efficient and reckless party leader; according to my judgment he has forfeited through his method of fighting, even the right to be counted as an equal in the company of serious investigators.' There is only to add that Haeckel in spite of plenty of subsequent exposures, has not reformed his ways . . . If anyone would know what the late Alexander Agassiz, whom we all honor as a scholar and gentleman, thought of Haeckel, let him consult Agassiz' report on the expedition of the Albatross in the Bulletin of the Museum of Comparative Zoology at Harvard College, Vol 23, 1892, pp. 32 to 40. His tone is not that of one arguing with an equal, but of one exposing a knave." Pp. 21 ff. Cf. also Gerard, S.J., *Prof. Haeckel and his Philosophy*, Month, October, 1910.

5. If some one or other of the current evolutionary theories can satisfactorily explain the world-order without appealing to an intelligent being as its cause, the teleological argument is invalid.

But some one or other of those theories can so explain the world-order.

Therefore the teleological argument is invalid.

N. Min. Evolution or no evolution, some sufficient reason must be found for the existence of order in the world. Our argument proves that it is necessarily the effect of intelligent action. *Cf. also prenotes to the thesis and Scholion III, p. 143.*

"It has not been my purpose to press evolution into the service of natural theology, but simply to establish the negative proposition that it does not conflict with any of the grounds which have been advanced for believing in a first cause and in final causes . . .

"Evolution is simply a scientific interpretation of the facts of nature. It is to be proved or disproved by an appeal to facts, and in this respect rests on precisely the same basis as the argument from design. As a scientific interpretation of nature it deals with physical or second causes. . . . Confined to its legitimate field, it does not touch one of the problems with which natural theology deals." Diman, l. c. pp. 197, 389, 181, 196.

On the question of Evolution the following books will be found very helpful. They are brief, to the point, and sufficiently thorough:

Evolutionary Philosophy, **Gerard, S.J.**
Attitude of Catholics Towards Darwinism and Evolution, **Muckermann, S.J.**
Thoughts of a Catholic Anatomist, **Thomas** Dwight, M.D., LL.D., Professor of Anatomy at Harvard.

6. If we admit design or finality in nature, we are forced to conceive an infinitely powerful being as making use of means to produce a desired result.

An infinite being, however, cannot be conceived to act in this way.

Therefore design or finality in nature cannot be admitted.

So argue **Mill, Knight, Schiller** and many others.

N. Min.

"It is difficult to treat with seriousness an argument which when analyzed will be found to be destitute of force. What it amounts to is simply this: that working towards results in regular and orderly methods is proof of limitation in a being who, if infinite, would achieve results by a direct and immediate exercise of power. In other words, if every chicken were called into being by a creative fiat we might infer that the power was infinite to which such a phenomenon was due; but if this power chose to endow the egg with a potency by which in accordance with invariable law the chicken was to be produced, we are bound to infer from such resort to an indirect method of production that it was shut up to the employment of natural agencies, and hence was finite.

"Aside from the strange omission to note that all the natural agencies called into requisition to produce a definite result are the very proof of the intelligence on which the [teleological] argument insists, this objection fails to recognize the simple principle, that in producing definite results infinite power must always work under limitations, limitations not in the power but in the method adopted and in the end proposed." **Diman,** l. c., p. 119.

7. If the present world-order was intended by God, the most minute particulars must have been intended by Him, for example, "that that particular swallow should snap up that particular gnat at this particular instant."
That, however, appears to be incredible.
Therefore the present world-order was not designed by God.

Darwin and others present this difficulty.

R. 1. Our first answer to this difficulty is, that it is wide of the mark. The aim of our thesis and of the teleological argument, is not to prove from the order existing in the world the existence of an *infinitely intelligent* designer but merely the existence of an *intelligent designer,* and this conclusion stands even though, as was stated in our prenotes, disorder existed here and there in the world, and hence even though every minute happening were not intended.

Answering the difficulty in form, then:

D. Maj. If the present world-order was intended by God, the most minute particulars must have been intended, and the scope of our thesis and of the teleological argument obliges us to defend this conclusion, *N.;* it does not so oblige us, *C. Cd. Min.*

2. In our second answer we shall suppose that the intelligence ruling the world has been proved to be infinite indirectly, through the cosmological argument, as explained in the prenotes.

This presupposed, our solution in form is:

D. Maj. The most minute particulars must have been intended by God, so that each particular event was designed by a particular act of the divine mind, *N.;* so that each particular event was designed by one act of the divine mind which

planned the universal order, and each and every part of it great and small, *Subd.,* in such wise that each particular effect produced served as a means in the attainment of the ultimate end desired by God in creating this universe, *C.;* in such wise that that end was not so furthered, *N. Cd. Min.*

"What shall be the answer to this? At first sight it might seem reasonable to doubt whether it is necessary to admit design everywhere in nature, if you admit it anywhere. There is indeed no immediate appearance of intrinsic contradiction in the idea of a universe in which only the more important operations should be guided by design.

"Considering however, that the first Designer of the world is self-existent, and infinitely perfect, He must know from eternity, not only in general, but in detail, all conditionally future results of any plan whatever. Moreover, His infinite wisdom necessarily prevents any event from happening, the occurrence of which would in no way serve His plan. From this it follows that every effect in the universe has been designed by God, in as much as He has foreseen it, and has from eternity decreed not to prevent it happening but to make its occurrence serve the end of all creation.

"Granting that Darwin's assertion that we cannot be consistent with ourselves, unless we admit that all the effects in nature have been foreseen and preordained, we deny altogether that there is any thing repugnant to reason in this admission. Reason forbids us indeed to admit that each particular event has been designed by a particular act of the Divine Mind distinct from the act by which the whole Universe was planned. Such an assumption would clash with God's simplicity and infinite perfection. But there is nothing intrinsically repugnant in the statement that God by one act of his infinite intellect foresaw all events, and by one act of his infinite will subordinated each of them to a particular good purpose. On the contrary, this cannot be denied without denying what is logically connected with God's infinite perfection, as will appear in our treatise on divine knowledge and providence." Boedder, *Natural Theology*, pp. 185, 186.

8. If the world-order were the effect of intelligent action, the world would not contain many things whose existence is purposeless.

But there are many such things in the world; for example, the countless seeds that never grow; and in living beings, rudimentary organs and organs fully developed but functionless.

Therefore the world-order is not the effect of intelligent action.

So **Darwin, Lange, Knight** and others argue.

R. 1. *N. Maj.* The order we see in the world can be explained only as the effect of intelligent action. Hence there exists an intelligent being, its cause. This we have proved, and this only we wished to prove here. Granted, then, that there are many useless things in the world, their presence in no way does away with the order which warranted our conclusion. We deny the Major, then, in the sense that it does not disprove the conclusion we wish to defend in this thesis.

2. *N. Min.* In this solution, going beyond the limits of this thesis and defending the infinite intelligence of God, the author of the world-order, we transmit the Major and deny the Minor proposition.

It is true that there are many useless things in nature if by useless our adversaries mean that they do not reach the end which our adversaries have determined they should reach, and not that which God has determined. They claim that nature is like a bad marksman who shoots a million bullets and hits the bull's-eye only once. This is true, if the bull's-eye be the one set up by our adversaries, and not that set up by God. But who, we may ask, has constituted these men the counsellors of God?

Not in one way only, but in many ways the works of nature are directed by God to the end for which He fashioned them. Some praise God by their usefulness, others by showing forth His beauty, others in manifesting His mercy, His justice, His omnipotence. As to the examples cited we note:

Seeds that never grow are not on that account useless.

"Have you ever eaten bread? Of what was it made? So far as I know 'wasted' seeds. On what do birds live? To the best of my knowledge on 'wasted' seeds. And what becomes of the seeds which are not used as food by anyone? If I mistake not they usually decay and form humus." **Von Hammerstein,** l. c., p. 188.

Rudimentary organs may serve either for adornment, or to show the unity of type according to which the author of nature fashioned his many creatures, or for uses unknown to us. This last answer may also be given with regard to those fully developed organs which appear to us to be useless. What is more, our adversaries themselves are now beginning to see the weakness of their argument from this source. Nature is slow to yield its secrets to man.

"In estimating a charge," says **Martineau,** l. c., "against any contrivance, of failure to answer its end, we must start with a clear conception of that end, else we may measure the means by a false or variable standard." P. 339.

"Complaint is made of several useless and unmeaning arrangements [in nature's plan] . . . . . Facts of this kind may fairly enough be called unmeaning, if no more is intended by the phrase than that we do not know their *raison d'être;* and useless, if, in order to try them, a purpose is assumed which they fail to serve." P. 330.

"Neither our ignorance of any organ, nor its subordinate duty warrants our condemnation of it as good for nothing." P. 335.

"A different answer must be given to the objection founded on what are called 'rudimentary organs.' So long as we shut ourselves up with the individual and his wants, and estimate his build by reference to this alone, it may perplex us to meet with parts he cannot use. But nature, far from being utilitarian only, is ideal too." P. 335.

"All these rudimental organs," writes **Paget**, *Lectures on Surgical Pathology*, "must, as they grow, be as excretions, serving a definite purpose in the economy by removing their appropriate materials from the blood, thus leaving it fitter for the nutrition of other parts, or adjusting the balance which might otherwise be disturbed by the formation of some other part. Thus they minister to the self-interest of the individual." P. 31.

"Now when we are offended by the superabundant genesis of things as so much waste, we forget that nature has no occasion for parsimony, and that it is only in our finite economy that a close reckoning of resources acquires an appropriate place. With Plato, the crowning glory of the creative Power was its 'ungrudgingness', and if, in tenanting the elements with life, a liberal margin was left for its possibility beyond its actual range at any moment, it expressed the large thought and ample readiness of the Maker, without harm to any creature that He had made. . . . . Nor should we entirely disregard a further end which is incidentally raised by this method, viz., the investiture of the world with a glorious exuberance, furnishing it as a majestic palace with endless galleries of art and beauty, instead of as a cheap boarding-school, with bare benches and scant meals. How much the splendor and significance of nature depends upon its fulness,—upon the irrepressible rush of life into every open inlet and over every surface newly spread!" **Martineau**, l. c., p. 349.

"Now if we are to judge from the appearance of nature whether God does hit the bull's-eye [in each case with precision], ... we must first be certain what is the bull's-eye at which He is aiming when He lays down and maintains laws of evolution for matter and life. . . . .

"The advocates of the design argument have never imagined that the divine intention in framing this world was to disregard the inherent tendencies to corruption, and to secure to each form of organic life the completion of its natural development and the fulness of comfort and enjoyment. This has not even been supposed of man, the high-

> est among living organisms. If indeed man's life as a whole to the inclusion of the life to come were meant, we should have to speak differently. But as far as that portion of his life is concerned which is led here below, it was acknowledged many thousand years ago by one whose theism is beyond suspicion that, 'Man born of woman, living for a short time, is filled with many miseries.' (Job, 14: 1.)
>
> "We conclude, then, by saying that the target at which the Designer of nature is aiming, is not the prosperity of corporeal life, and the bull's-eye in the target is not the perfect adaptation of each individual life to its surroundings. The true target is God's glory and the final happiness of those rational creatures who obey the voice of their conscience, and the bull's-eye in the target is precisely that degree of God's glory and man's final happiness which the Creator in the light of His infinite knowledge has fixed absolutely." Boedder, *Natural Theology*, pp. 180, 181.

9. If the world-order were intended by God, all the sickness, pain and sorrow that afflict creatures must have been intended by Him.

It is impossible, however, to conceive God as intending such miseries.

Therefore the world-order was not intended by God.

So **Darwin** and others object.

Noting again that this difficulty tends to disprove, not that the world-order is the effect of intelligent action, but of infinitely intelligent action, *we answer in form*:

D. Maj. If the world-order were intended by God, God must have intended also those evils which flow, and in as much as they flow, from man's morally bad acts, N. (these He permits, making them serve some good purpose); God must have intended other physical evils, *Subd.*, as ends in themselves, *N.*; as means to some end which may be the physical good of His creatures, or man's moral good, or the pay-

ment of the penalty incurred for faults committed, *C.* *Cd. Min.*

It is to be noted that this difficulty makes no mention of moral evil. God's attitude towards moral evil is touched on briefly in the solution of Diff. 4, Thesis V.

10. If natural agents by their very nature, and, hence, through an intrinsic impulse, tend constantly to produce the ordered effects we see in the world, it is not necessary to have recourse to an extrinsic designer to explain them.

Now, natural agents have such an intrinsic impulse.
Therefore it is not necessary to have recourse to intelligence to explain them.
Caird and others give this difficulty.

D. Maj. If they have such an impulse, and if they have received it from God, the Author of nature, it is not necessary to, etc., *N.;* if they have such an impulse wholly and solely from themselves, it is not necessary, etc., *C.* *Cd. Min.*

The reason for the distinctions will be found in the teleological proofs drawn from the nature of the world-order and also from the analogy existing between ordered effects naturally and artificially produced.

11. If animals, when they act instinctively, in some subconscious way see the end for which they act and will it, an argument for the existence of an intelligent cause of the world cannot be derived from such actions.
But animals, when they act instinctively, so act.
Therefore from the instinctive actions of animals no such argument can be drawn.
So **Von Hartmann** and others object.

R. 1. *N. Maj.* Even if it were true that animals showed signs of intelligence in their instinctive actions, their intelligence could not be explained without admitting intelligence in the first cause of all things, God.

2. *N. Min.* Brute beasts have neither understanding nor free will.

12. If the order in the world were intended by God, God would have had to make use of finite means to attain finite ends: for example, He would have had to make the eye for vision.

But God cannot so act. If He did so, He would be moved to action by a finite thing.

Therefore the world-order was not intended by God.

So **Spinoza** reasons.

D. Maj. God would have had to make use of finite means to finite ends, in such wise, however, that His own infinite goodness is the ultimate motive and end of His action, to which end all finite beings with their proximate ends are ordered by Him, *C.;* in the sense that anything finite could be the ultimate motive for God's action, *N.* *Cd. Min.*

St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles,* Bk. 1, cc. 74, 75, writes,

"Good understood is the object of the will. But what is understood by God in the first place is the divine essence. Therefore the divine essence is the first object of the divine will. . . . .

"Now that essence is not augmentable and multipliable in itself, but can be multiplied only in its likeness, which is shared by many. God, therefore, wills the multitude of things, in as much as He wills and loves His own perfection. . . . . .

"The will follows the understanding. But God with His understanding understands Himself in the first place, and in Himself understands all other things. Therefore in like manner He wills Himself in the first place, and in willing Himself wills all other things." (Translated by Father Joseph Rickaby, S.J.)

13. If we are obliged to conceive the intellect as a faculty whose acts are changeable and composite, we cannot rightly predicate knowledge of God.
Now, we are obliged so to conceive the intellect.
Therefore we cannot predicate intelligence of God.
Hume proposes this difficulty.

D. Maj. If we are obliged so to conceive all intellects, we cannot rightly predicate intelligence of God, who is absolutely changeless and absolutely simple, *C.;* if we are obliged so to conceive finite intellects, such as our own, we cannot rightly predicate intelligence of God, *N.* *Cd. Min.*

This difficulty arises from the false notion that the concepts we derive from finite things are to be applied to God just as they are and without any change.

14. The teleological argument rests on the principle that all order must be intelligently produced.
This principle, however, is false.
Therefore the teleological argument is inconclusive.
So **Hume** reasons.

D. Maj. It rests on the principle that all complicated order such as we have in the world, taken as a whole, and in some parts of the world, must be intelligently produced, *C.;* absolutely every kind of order. *Tr. Cd. Min.*

15. If order frequently results from the cooperation of many causes, from the order in the world the unicity of its designer cannot be proved.
Now order frequently arises from such cooperation.
Therefore from the order in the world the unicity of its designer cannot be proved.
Hume so argues.

D. Maj. From the world-order an argument cannot be drawn to prove *most probably* the unicity of the world-designer, *N.;* to prove with absolute certainty His unicity, *Subd.,* by means of the teleological argument alone, *C.* (we deny, however, that we intend so to prove it) ; by means of the teleological argument, combined with the proof of God's unicity, which in turn, is derived from the notion of necessity being supplied by the cosmological argument, *N. D. Con.*

THESIS VII.

The existence of God, as a being superior to the world, on whom the world and all its creatures, including man, depend, a being to be supplicated, propitiated, worshipped, is proved from the fact that mankind at all times has admitted the existence of such a being.

PRENOTES TO THE THESIS.

Just as our proof of the existence of God, as the intelligent maker and ruler of this physical universe, was derived from a fact in the physical order, viz., the universal and constant ordered action of nature's forces, so too another proof of the existence of God, as the ruler of this physical world, and in a special way as the ruler of mankind, is derived from another fact, as wonderful in its way as the marvelous world-order; a fact in the moral order, viz., the universal and constant testimony of the human race to the existence of a being (or beings) superior to the world, on whom the world and all its creatures, including man, depend; a being to be supplicated, propitiated, worshipped. This fact, we contend, cannot be explained, unless we admit that the being, whose existence is so universally and constantly proclaimed, really and actually does exist.

To substantiate our claim it will be necessary:

1. To make clear the nature of the consent which is said to exist;
2. To establish the fact of such consent;
3. To show how this fact can be explained only by admitting the actual existence of the being whose existence is so universally affirmed.

The common consent of mankind in affirming the existence of God may be expressed thus: There exists a being

(or beings) superior to the world, on whom the world and all its creatures, including man, depend; a being to be supplicated, propitiated, worshipped.

The nature of this consent. That some being of such nature exists, is the persuasion common to all peoples. When we come, however, to the question of the attributes of that being, and whether he be one or share his nature with others, we find no longer agreement among our witnesses. With regard to these points, errors of various kinds have crept in, none of which, however, are either universal or constant. Now these errors which are neither universal nor constant in no way lessen the value of the witnesses for the purpose of our argument; for though their testimonies may differ with regard to other points, they are unanimous, and constantly so, with regard to one, viz., the existence of a being such as described above. And this is all we require for our argument. We shall not expect to find, therefore, nor shall we find, nor is it necessary for us to find, a clear and true concept of God amongst all our witnesses; but we shall find universal and constant agreement at least with regard to some perfection proper to God. We shall find them all asserting that some being exists, superior to the world, on whom the world and all its creatures, including man, depend; a being to be supplicated, propitiated, worshipped. That being is God.

The universality and constancy of this consent. It will be sufficient for our argument if we find this consent to be constant, and morally speaking universal, that is, constant and universal to the extent, that at all times and in practically speaking all places, all men, with relatively few exceptions, either by word or by deed, have professed a belief in the existence of a supreme being such as we have described in our thesis.

If, then, in each age of the world, some individuals, or one or two relatively small groups of men, should be proved to have existed without this conviction, our argument would be in no way weakened. For an exception, even on the part of one or two such groups, in the present case, would no more prove the testimony of the rest of mankind to be false, than would the hate which one or two parents might possibly have for their offspring, prove false that universal law of love of parents for their children, deep rooted as it is in their very nature; rather would such exception prove those parents to be unnatural, inhuman,—monsters.

What is more, those peoples or tribes which our adversaries falsely claim to have existed without any knowledge of a supreme being, will be found living in the lowest stages of barbarism. And so, in place of trying to disprove through them the testimony of the rest of mankind, our adversaries should rather admit them to be wanting in those traits which mark the normal man.

"In seeking for peoples that know no God, who live without faith or worship, where do our philosophers go? Do they select for their inquiry peoples that have stood on the highest pinnacles of civilization. . . . . No, not they. But they go to some cannibal South Sea island, scarce touched by the foot, or known to the science, of the white man, or to some degraded and wretched African tribe, and then with these specimens dug from the heart of the most dismal barbarism they come forward and cry: 'Behold, peoples who acknowledge no God!'" **Fairbairn**, *City of God*, p. 87.

How unfounded, however, are the statements of those who assert that they have discovered peoples devoid of all knowledge of a supreme being will appear immediately.

That such consent is actually given, nay more, that no race nor nation nor tribe can be surely said to have existed in ignorance of a supreme being, cannot be doubted. It is a fact that no nation nor even tribe, no matter how savage and wanting in culture, has as yet been found that can be *surely* said to be ignorant of the existence

of a supreme being. In support of this assertion we have the clearest kind of testimony in historical records of all sorts, and in the conclusions drawn by careful students of the religions of the relatively primitive races, from data painstakingly gathered by explorers and missionaries.

It is true that some of these peoples in a greater or less degree held sacred, or treated as gods,—spirits, men, animals, the forces of nature and idols of wood and stone, yet at the same time they admitted the existence of, and worshipped, or at least considered to be worthy of worship, some divinity strictly supra-mundane, i.e., one whose nature was acknowledged always to have been distinct from, and superior to, that of any creature.

If the testimony of our witnesses went no further, we should have solidly established the existence of the fact on which our argument is based. But the testimony of our witnesses does go further, and makes it clear that:

1. Not only no people has been heard of nor found without a religion, but no one has been found nor heard of, in which religious worship could be said to be in a nascent or immature state, or of recent growth: history nowhere tells us of the introduction of religion anywhere.
2. No polytheistic people has been found without some evidence or other of a belief in one God who was supreme among the others. Hence we may say that no people has been found professing pure Polytheism.
3. There is not only no evidence of evolution in religious worship, whether it be from a primitive zero of Atheism, through Naturalism, Fetichism, Totemism, Animism, and Polytheism to Monotheism, or any other of the varieties of evolution proposed by our adversaries, but on the contrary, there is much evidence that goes to prove that the primitive religion of

mankind was strictly monotheistic and hence that those peoples who were given to the practice of lower forms of worship, such as Totemism, Animism, Polytheism, etc., were religious degenerates.

Fr. P. J. Gannon, S.J., *Comparative Religion,* **Irish Theol. Quarterly,** Oct., 1916, writes,

"It must be admitted that the followers of the New Science [of Comparative Religion], from Max Müller onwards, have shown a fine enthusiasm and admirable industry. . . . Further it may be freely conceded that they have made great additions to the sum total of our knowledge of human thought, and have rendered signal service to the cause of religion, in so much as they have corrected the views of earlier explorers who sometimes spoke of races with no vestige of religion. They are as one to-day upon the universality, temporally and locally, of the religious instincts, and this is a clear gain for apologetics. They have also incidentally sent definitively to the scrap-heap encyclopedist explanations of religious phenomena which reduced all to priest-craft acting under the stimulus of greed and playing upon the ignorance of the crowd.

"Finally, they have revealed the existence of purer and higher beliefs underlying the most abject forms of religious aberration. They have given us more and more support for the hypothesis [i.e., an hypothesis, from the natural view-point], formerly weakly enough based on authenticated facts, that monotheism is prior to polytheism, and that, so far from man rising naturally and consistently to nobler thoughts about religion, he has frequently let go his hold upon the much closer approximations to truth which he possessed in the infancy of his race. The widespread prevalence of religious degeneracy cannot now be denied by scientists with a name to lose. Of course, they save their theory of evolution by making still ampler provision for partial retrogression; but then it requires a lot of saving in view of the number of the exceptions."

Christlieb, *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief,* gives like testimony:

"It is a matter of fact that, even in polytheistic religions, the presentiment of the one personal God has not entirely faded away. Only to take one instance, we should scarcely find a negro in Africa who denies the one God, the Creator of heaven and earth. The history of religions is making it more and more evident at the present day, that in the most ancient traditions of all nations, there are to be found scattered traces and features, distorted but still recognizable, of a primitive revelation of the one personal God." P. 182.

Some few testimonials to the universal religious belief of mankind. For brevity's sake we shall cite mainly the conclusions reached by those who have consulted original documents and works concerned with our present subject-matter. Our first concern will be the religious beliefs of the civilized races, after that we shall see how savage and barbarous peoples acknowledged the existence of, and honored, a supreme being. In a corollary we shall give further and more detailed testimony concerning the religious belief of savage, relatively primitive peoples. This testimony will be drawn from two authors who have studied the question deeply. They are: **Andrew Lang**, *The Making of Religion;* and **Rev. Philo Mills, S.T.L.**, *Prehistoric Religion.* Fr. Mills has treated his subject-matter from every angle. His work is thorough and exhaustive.

Religious belief of civilized peoples. Fr. John Driscoll, S.T.L., *God,* in a brief, but sufficiently thorough summary, says,

> "Religion is a phenomenon universal not only in place but in time also. The records of all nations from the dawn of history show that the human race has at all times sought for God. Abundant proofs are furnished by the new department of science, The History of Religions. The materials so far collected are imperfect. Yet they all converge to the important truth that the farther back we go in the history of religious thought, the more certain it appears that the earliest belief of mankind was monotheistic . . . . . .
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> "In India. The sacred books of the Hindus are made up of various writings covering the space of a thousand years. The most ancient is the collection called the Vedas. . . . . Its [the Rig-Veda's] age has been variously estimated from 1500 to 2000 B.C. A careful examination of these records shows traces of a primitive monotheism. . . . . The farther back we go in the history of the Indian peoples the purer becomes the form of religious belief. Idolatry is shown to be a degeneration. . . . .
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> "In Irania. The oldest and most trustworthy records of the Iranian worship are contained in the Gathas. The sacred chants are attributed to Zoroaster. . . . . They form the kernel about which the sacred literature of

the Persians clustered in an aftergrowth. Now the Gathas inculcate a belief in Ahura-Mazda, the self-existing, omniscient being. He is the all-powerful lord who made heaven and earth and all that is therein, and governs everything with wisdom. . . . . .

"We can, therefore, with perfect safety accept the conclusions of d'Harlez, of Darmesteter, of Tiele, that the primitive form of Iranian belief was monotheistic.

"**In Greece and Rome.** The same truth comes out from a critical study of the religions of Greece and Rome. When we ascend to the very dawn of Grecian history we are met with the fact that the idea of God, as the supreme being, was firmly implanted in the minds of this branch of the Aryan race. The worship of the powers of nature came afterwards, and gave rise to the family of gods which in Greece and Rome surrounds the person of Zeus. . . . . .

"**In Egypt and China.** Under the strong light thrown by contemporary scholarship upon the ancient religions of Egypt and China, the same truth is brought into clear view. Polytheism is shown to be an aftergrowth and corruption.

"In the most ancient monuments of Egypt the simplest and most precise conception of one God is expressed. He is one and alone no others are with Him. . . . He has made everything and He alone has not been made. . . . . More than 5000 years ago in the valley of the Nile the hymn of praise arose to the true God. . . . That the worship of the Egyptians was polytheistic from the beginning was taught by Tiele in *Outlines of History of Religion;* in a later work (Egyptian Religion) he expresses the contrary opinion. . . . . These primitive truths now shine forth from the rank growth of mythology and superstition in which they had been well-nigh buried.

"**In China** the power of nature, the spirits of ancestors are invoked and worshipped. But behind all these is found the conviction in the existence of some higher power, who is the creator and preserver of the world. This monotheistic belief is a tradition handed down from the earliest period of their history. . . . . Mr. Legge and Mgr. d'Harlez unhesitatingly declare that 5000 years ago the Chinese were monotheists.

"**The Semitic Races.** When we turn to the Semitic races we have in the Holy Bible a record of Jewish belief which is beyond question. . . . They stand forth a clear example of a nation monotheistic throughout the course of its history." Pp. 29 ff.

Plutarch tells us of his age, "Travel the world over and you may find cities without kings, without palaces, without treasures, without money, without theatre, without circus; but a city without temples, without gods,

without prayers, without oaths, without sacrifices to obtain blessings and avert evils, no man has ever beheld nor ever will behold." *Adv. Coloten*, 31.

Religious beliefs of uncivilized peoples. We quote again from Fr. Driscoll.

"In Africa, South America, Australia. The natives of Africa have sunk to the lowest grade of humanity. Covered over, as their belief is, with the crudest forms of superstition and fetichism . . . . we yet find reminiscences of a supreme God. In their conceptions the ethical element predominates. As Dr. Robinson Smith truly observes, 'Even in its crudest forms, Religion was a moral force.' The Bushmen, Fuegians, Australians have moral and omniscient gods, i.e., makers of things, fathers in heaven, friends, guardians of morality, seeing what is good or bad in the hearts of men. The aborigines of Australia are probably the lowest extant in the scale of civilization. Yet their religious conceptions are so lofty. . . . An all-knowing being observes and rewards the conduct of men; he is named with reverence, if named at all; his abode is in the heavens, he is maker and lord of all things; his lessons soften the heart . . . . This supreme being is not the product of ancestor worship; for it is held where the latter is not found. In Guinea the natives worship 'The Ancient One', 'The Ancient One in the Skyland', 'Our Maker', 'Our Father', 'Our Great Father'. . . . . The belief in one supreme being who made and upholds all things is universal.

"In North America. The Pawnees worship . . . . . the Spirit-Father . . . . . or our Father in all places. The Zunis speak of God as . . . . . the All-Father. The Indians of Missouri worship . . . . . The Old Man Immortal, The Great Spirit, The Great Mystery . . . . The Algonquin speaks of 'Kitche Maneto,' who created the world by an act of his will. The Aztecs of Mexico pray to . . . . . Our Father." Pp. 39 ff.

This consent has grown stronger as mankind advances in knowledge. That the constant and universal belief of mankind in the existence of a supreme being has grown stronger with man's growth in knowledge is a patent fact. The civilized nations of the earth witness to it, as do also the most eminent philosophers and men deeply versed in all other branches of knowledge.

The common consent of mankind as a source of certain knowledge. We stated above that from the fact that

mankind universally and constantly has acknowledged the existence of a supreme being we derive another argument for that being's existence.

In general that common consent of mankind, which by some is called *"the voice of nature"*, and which is a source of certain knowledge, is had:

1. When the consent is morally speaking universal, and of enduring constancy, that is, when substantially the same judgment is affirmed by practically speaking all the peoples of the earth, not for years, but for centuries, and with a persistency that has increased with mankind's increasing knowledge.
2. When the judgments in question are concerned with matters of fundamental and vital import to man, and hence, a sure knowledge of which is necessary if he is to live a stable physical, intellectual, social, moral, religious life.
3. When many, who give their consent to these judgments, do so unwillingly. This last condition is not absolutely necessary; when, however, it is given, the strength of the testimony is increased.

When these conditions are fulfilled such consent is a source of certain knowledge, for it is necessarily motived by objective evidence or, what is the same, it proceeds from the intellect acting purely of itself, i.e., under the influence of no disturbing cause. Hence, either its judgments are true, or universal Scepticism must be admitted. Our reasons for these assertions are the following:

a. The consent in question is one of world-wide universality and enduring constancy, and no reason is sufficient to explain it which is not of equal constancy and equal universality. On the other hand, the peoples who are in intellectual agreement differ so widely one from another that no reason, which

could possibly lead them into error in the matter proper to the judgments under consideration, i.e., matter fundamental to the life of man, could conceivably be of such constancy or such universality. That reason, therefore, which alone leads the intellect surely to truth, that is, objective evidence, is the sole reason sufficient to explain this constant and universal agreement of mankind.

That only objective evidence can explain the constant agreement of mankind in matters of vital import is shown also in the present instance, viz., in the question of the existence of God, negatively, viz., by rejecting the puerile reasons advanced by our adversaries to explain this consent. These reasons, and their refutation will be found in the confirmation of our proof.

b. Moreover, if objective evidence were not the constant and universal reason, these judgments should grow not stronger but weaker as mankind advances in knowledge. For touching as they do on questions fundamental to the whole varied life of man, and as a consequence it being of the highest importance that their worth should be carefully ascertained, they would not be accepted by the learned without diligent and searching examination. If, however, these judgments were not motived by objective evidence, i.e., if they were not true, such a scrutiny should have discovered, to some extent at least, their falsity, and so, in place of growing stronger as the world grew in knowledge, they should have grown weaker, and in course of time they should have been rejected.

c. Finally, as a witness, who testifies to the truth of that which he wishes were not true, is apt to be an unprejudiced witness, where there are many such in

agreement with the rest of mankind, the combined testimony is made stronger.

Judgments affirmed by the common consent of mankind. The judgments described above are sometimes called judgments of the *common sense of nature* (*sensus communis naturae*), *the voice of nature* (*vox naturae*), and are defined as those judgments which mankind universally and constantly affirms; which are concerned with matters fundamental in the physical, intellectual, social, moral, religious life of man; and which as man's knowledge increases, grow ever stronger. **Father Hontheim** in his *Theodicea* (Natural Theology), after enumerating many such judgments, concludes,

"These are weighty principles which no nation ever denied; of which no nation lived in ignorance. These are truths so necessary for man's welfare that the providence which rules the world has never permitted them to be utterly lost sight of by the nations. These are truths so evident, and as it were innate and ingrained in our nature, that we cannot help knowing them, we can never lose the memory of them. And if, here and there, one may chance to be found who denies them, he is looked on as one devoid of human nature, who has become like unto the brute beasts in whom no intellect is found." P. 229.

Justification of these judgments. Attention is called to the justification of the judgments of mankind given by us above. We based their truth on the fact that they are judgments of the intellect motived by objective evidence, and hence of the intellect acting purely of itself, i.e., in no way influenced by any disturbing cause; so that an admission of falsity in them would be an admission of absolute Scepticism. Another justification of these judgments is sometimes given, which, however, cannot be used in the present instance, in which our object is to prove the existence of God, since its use would involve a *petitio principii*. This justification is based on the fact that falsity in these judgments would imply an essential defect in human nature. Such defect, however, is

impossible only on the supposition that the author of our nature is an infinitely perfect God. As this justification, therefore, finally appeals to God, it is quite evident that it cannot be used where there is question of proving God's existence.

ADVERSARIES.

Either indirectly or directly opposed to this thesis are all those philosophers mentioned in previous theses who deny the existence of God, or, admitting His existence, deny that man can prove it.

In a closer way opposed to this thesis are all those philosophers who have forced the evolutionary theory into religion. Among these may be mentioned:

The Positivists, with their three periods of religious evolution: The Theological, The Metaphysical, and The Positivistic. In this last period man realizes he can have no supernatural knowledge. He becomes his own god.

Von Hartmann, who begins with Naturalism and expects a final evolution into a composite of Monism and Judaic Monotheism. This will be a Panmonotheism.

Lubbock, who starts with Atheism, and expects a final evolution into Pantheism.

H. Spencer, Tylor, Tiele and others, who claim that man's primitive religion was Animism.

Frazer, King, Marett and others, who insist that prior to the animistic period, another existed in which man practiced Magic. This age they called preanimistic

PROOF OF THE THESIS.

The common consent of mankind in affirming any judgment concerned with matter fundamental to the life of man, which consent grows stronger as mankind advances

in knowledge, and which counts among its witnesses many who would deny if they could the judgment they affirm, must necessarily be true.

But the common consent of mankind in affirming the existence of God is such a consent.

Therefore from the fact that mankind so agrees in affirming the existence of God, we rightly conclude that God exists,

Maj. The Major is to be admitted for the reasons given in the prenotes. Such a consent is necessarily motived by objective evidence.

Min. a. That mankind agrees in affirming the existence of a supreme being is evident from the testimony given in the prenotes.

b. That the judgment of mankind is strengthened with man's advance in knowledge is a fact to which history witnesses.

c. That the fact that God exists is fundamental to man's life is self-evident.

d. That many who admit the existence of God, the rewarder of good and punisher of evil, would wish that He did not exist, that so they might live as they please, without fear of punishment, needs no proof.

THE PROOF CONFIRMED.

Many of our adversaries, finding it impossible to deny the fact that mankind does agree in proclaiming the existence of a supreme being, offer many false explanations of it. We subjoin, in brief form, these explanations and their refutation, as a confirmation of our proof.

1. Religion owes its rise and propagation to the fraudulent and venal actions of priests and rulers, who desired to increase their power and wealth.

R. This assertion has never been proved. What is more, it cannot be proved as we have no historical record of the introduction of religion anywhere. Again, if religion were rooted in fraud, it would have disappeared long ago. Many other reasons for rejecting this false and ridiculous explanation might be given. They are not necessary.

2. Ignorance of natural causes led man to treat as persons natural forces and objects; to imagine that superior beings dwelt within them; and fear of their power and desire to placate them gave rise to prayers and sacrifices.

R. This explanation is founded on the absolutely false and metaphysically impossible theory that man, soul and body included, is evolved from the brute beast. Moreover, it goes counter to facts. It supposes evolution in religion, and a man-made god. We have seen, however, that the lower forms of religion are due to degeneration, and also that all races acknowledge the existence of a strictly supramundane being, i.e., a being in no sense man-made, or the product of evolution. Finally, if religions were founded on ignorance of natural causes, with the disappearance of that ignorance it also should have disappeared.

3. The beginning of religion is due to the conjuring up of ghosts and spirits by the imagination of primitive man. These spirits, more especially if they were supposed to be the spirits of heroes and ancestors, were gradually transformed into gods. Hence, Polytheism, which gradually developed into Monotheism.

R. This explanation, besides falsely presupposing the evolution of man from the brute beast, does not agree with the facts. It is true that some peoples worshipped ghosts and spirits, but it is also true

that simultaneously they worshipped gods strictly supramundane. Again, Animism was never universally practiced. What is more, if religion was built on ghost or finite-spirit worship, there would be no religion in the world to-day.

4. Through sentimental promptings and a desire for the pleasing companionship of a friend, consoler and helper, man created for himself super-human beings. So began religion amongst men.

R. Our adversaries offer no proof of this assertion. It cannot be proved. Religion is not a matter of sentiment. If it were, it would have long since disappeared, for reason leaves no place for mere sentiment in the serious affairs of life. Again a sentiment-made god is not the supreme being that mankind worships. Mankind's God is the ruler of the world, the rewarder of good and the punisher of evil.

Scholion I. A very brief description of some of the erroneous, relatively primitive, religious beliefs.

Naturalism (Naturism) is the belief that the forces of nature are the activities of different spirits having more or less the nature of gods. It is a form of Polytheism.

Animism attributed all phenomena not due to obvious natural causes to finite spirits of all kinds.

Fetichism considers material objects as the abode of spirits, or as animated by them. The possession of the object was supposed to procure the services of the spirit lodged within it. These spirits were worshipped.

Totemism is the belief that animals or the souls of animals were closely related to men, so as to be as it were brothers of the same tribe. These animals are called totems. Different tribes have different totems. Each tribe holds its own totem sacred; honors it, and is supposed never to kill or eat it.

Scholion II. Some examples of the religious beliefs of uncultured, relatively primitive peoples.

"No existing type of humanity", says **Mills**, *Prehistoric Religion*, "can be regarded as the bearer of undiluted primitive faith except as an approximation, as something similar to what was once upon earth. Hence all the existing savage beliefs are more or less tainted, but exhibit greater or less approximations to absolute truth in proportion to their antiquity or to the purity with which the primitive revelation has been handed down. . . . [some races] seem to mirror the conditions of life of an age which has long since perished — to represent, in fact, a type which is relatively primitive — an approach at least to primitive man. It is with such a type that our present study is occupied." P. 17 of Preface, and p. 1.

We shall cite first some examples from **Lang**, *The Making of Religion*:

"Of all races now extant, the **Australians** are probably lowest in culture . . . . . Their religious conceptions are so lofty that it would be natural to explain them as the result either of European influence, or as a relic of a higher civilization of the past. The former notion is discredited from the fact that their best religious ideas are imparted in connection with their ancient and secret mysteries, while for the second idea, that they are degenerate from a loftier civilization, there is absolutely no evidence. . . . .

"In the Bora or Australian mysteries, at which the knowledge of 'The Maker' and of his commandments is imparted, the front teeth of the initiated are still knocked out. . . . . The cult among the Australians is the keeping of certain laws expressed in moral teaching, supposed to be in conformity with the institutes of their god. . . .

"From all this evidence it does not appear how non-polytheistic, non-monarchical, non-Manes-worshipping savages evolved the idea of a relatively supreme, moral, and benevolent creator, unborn, undying, watching men's lives. 'He can go everywhere and do every thing.'" Pp. 175, 176, 177, 184.

"The case of the **Andaman Islanders** may be especially recommended. . . . . For long these natives were the joy of emancipated inquirers as the 'godless Andamanese' . . . . . .

Yet when scientifically studied *in situ* by an educated Englishman, Mr. Man, who knows their language, has lived with them eleven years . . . . . they turn out to be embarrassingly rich in the higher elements of faith. . . . . ..

"The people are probably negritos, and probably 'the original inhabitants, whose occupation dates from pre-historic times' . . . . . Their religion is probably not due to missionaries, as they always shot all foreigners, and have no traditions of the presence of aliens on the island before our recent arrival. Their god, Puluga, is 'like fire,' but invisible. He was never born and is immortal. By him were all things created, except the powers of evil. He knows even the thoughts of the heart. He is angered by sin (Yubda) or wrong-doing, that is, falsehood, theft, grave assaults, adultery, bad carving of meat, and (as a crime of witch-craft) by burning wax. . . . . He is judge of souls; and the dread of future punishment 'to some extent' is said to affect their course of action in the present life. . . . . There is the usual story of the deluge caused by the moral wrath of Puluga. The whole theology was scrupulously collected from natives unacquainted with other races." Pp. 194, 195.

"The Banks Islanders 'believe in two orders of intelligent beings different from living men'. 1. 'Ghosts of the dead'. 2. 'Beings, who were not, and never had been, human'. This, as we have shown, and will continue to show, is the usual savage doctrine. On the one hand are separable souls of men, surviving the death of the body. On the other are beings, creators, who were before men were, and before death entered the world." P. 197.

"If many of the lowest savages known to us entertain ideas of a supreme being such as we find among Fuegians, Australians, Bushmen, and Andamanese, are there examples besides the Zulus, of tribes higher in material culture, who seem to have had such notions, but to have partly forgotten or neglected them? Miss Kingsley, a lively, observant and unprejudiced writer, gives this very account of the Bantu races. . . . To take an example; the Dinkas of the upper Nile 'pay a very theoretical kind of homage to the all-powerful being, dwelling in Heaven, whence He sees all things. He is called 'Dendid' (great rain, that is, universal benediction?).' He is omnipotent, but being all beneficent, can do no evil; so, not being feared, he is not addressed in prayer." P. 211.

"The celebrated traveller, Mungo Park, who visited Africa in 1805, had good opportunities of understanding the natives. . . 'I have conversed with all ranks and conditions upon the subject of their faith', he says, 'and can pronounce without the smallest shadow of doubt, that the belief in one God and in a future state of reward and punishment is entire and universal among them.'" P. 221.

"It is my object to set certain American creators beside the African beings whom we have been examining. We shall range from Hurons to Pawnees and Blackfeet and end with

Pachacamac, the supreme being of the old Inca civilization, with Tui Laga and Taa-Roa. It will be seen that the Hurons have been deprived of their benevolent Creator by a bibliographical accident, while that creator corresponds very well with the Peruvian Pachacamac, often regarded as a mere philosophical abstraction. The Pawnees will show us a Creator involved in a sacrificial ritual . . . . while the Blackfeet present a Creator who is not envisaged as a spirit at all, and, on our theory, represents a very early stage of the theistic conception." P. 230.

Father Mills' *Prehistoric Religion* deserves high praise. Everything has been done to make it complete, thorough and trustworthy. Witnesses on both sides of disputed questions are cited, their testimony weighed and sifted, and conservative conclusions drawn. The reliability of witnesses is another point to which strict attention has been given. One who would wish to make a thorough study of prehistoric religion will find Father Mills' book invaluable. We have space only for a few citations. The first treats of the authority of his witnesses, the others will give a very inadequate summary of the conclusions drawn from the well digested testimony of those witnesses. These conclusions will be found to fully confirm our thesis.

"The field of comparative religion is a new one, that of prehistoric religion quite recent. The latter department is being pioneered by men who, whatever their powers of observation, are certainly beyond the average of trustworthiness. Names that include Catholic Bishops, like Schneider and LeRoy; Prefects Apostolic, like Mgr. Dunn; missionaries of the Divine Word, like Schmidt and Hestermann; apostles of the Sacred Heart, like Meyer and Egedi, are apt to solicit our attention on the score of seriousness, if no other. But apart from this, they have lived, or are living, on intimate personal terms with the natives; they have penetrated into regions that are rarely, if ever, visited by the white man; and they have studied their customs, their folk-lore and their mythology in a manner that is epoch-making. . . . . If to this be added the names of Breuil and Cartaillac, of Piette and Obermaier — experts in the allied fields of palaeontology and rock-paintings — the honor-list of the Catholic Church swells to a noble figure.

"If, however, their writings be suspected of 'tendency', these tendencies can easily be corrected by more secular writers,

whose 'tendencies' though in an opposite direction, have involuntarily brought on the same results. Graebner, Thomas, Foy, and Ankermann are admittedly colorless while Mrs. Parker and Andrew Lang are frankly 'converts', who have been brought to change their opinions solely by an impartial examination of the overwhelming evidence of facts. . . . . .

"So much for a general survey. As to special sources for particular areas, we have in addition to the above, a large number of individual authors, whose divided voices might be open to question, but whose united testimony is surely powerful. Only the most important can be given here.

"Thus we have Skeat, Vaughan-Stevens, and Martin, for the Malakkan races; Man and Portman for the Andaman Islands; Meyer, Reed and Montano, for the Philippines; Rawling and Williamson for New Guinea; Howitt and Ling-Roth for the Tasmanian-Australian region. For the central African Negrillos we have only one standard work, that of Mgr. LeRoy, Bishop of Alinda. The same for South African Bushmen, where the name of Stow stands easily first. . . . . We have Skeat again for the Sakai; Seligman for the Veddas; and Sarasin for the Toalas; and in the New World, Von den Steinen and Ehrenreich for the lank-haired primitives of the Amazonian belt." Pp. XXV, XXVI.

"By the word 'prehistoric' is here understood that long period that preceded the days of the Jewish Covenant." Prolog, p. 1.

"To put it briefly, the 'prehistoric' religion of man may be said to embrace a belief in God as Creator and Judge, the binding power of the ten commandments, and the offering up of some kind of atonement-rites. . . . . .

"As the golden thread of the supernatural has never been entirely lost in any age of the human race, whether historic or prehistoric, as we cannot say to what extent the primitive revelation has not been preserved in this or that fragment of prehistoric antiquity, or by this or that section of primitive man, it is clearly impossible to treat this subject in such a manner as to exclude the influx of all supernatural light from the rich body of folk-lore which we are about to examine." Prolog, p. 2.

"Nevertheless as the primary aim of our present study is simply to bring out a voluminous collection of prehistoric facts, and then to interpret these facts in the light of our supernatural standpoint, it is evident that the question of fact should be the primary one; theories and explanations should in every instance be made to follow." Prolog, p. 3.

"There are those who have dabbled with Tylor's *Primitive Culture*, with Frazer's pretentious work on *Totemism and Exogamy*, and who are firmly convinced that primitive man was either entirely atheistic, or if in possession of any religion at all, that the idea of God was developed out of the ghost or the magical nature-cult. To them we shall oppose an enormous array of religious facts which have been only recently unearthed, but which in their united force point to

conclusions of precisely the opposite character, — it is the All-Father belief which precedes the totemic or animistic cult by indefinite ages. Prehistoric man believed in God, and only in later times was the belief corrupted." Prolog, p. 4.

And truly remarkable is the array of facts, vouched for by witnesses whose worth is closely scrutinized, which Father Mills presents as the ground-work of his conclusions,—facts mythological, ethnological, sociological, morphological, biological, religious. Dividing the prehistoric period into "three wide epochs" the Primitive, Totemic and Neolithic, and holding as probable "the existence of two intermediate layers", he arranges his facts accordingly. Then after a painstaking and just examination of them he draws his conclusions, many of which support our thesis as far as prehistoric man is concerned, whilst many others go far beyond its scope. Of the former we select a few.

"On no account can the primitive type be derived from any existing anthropoids, as the morphological traits of these peoples show a striking divergence from any of the Simian types, as well as an equally strong convergence into an unknown type, which cannot now be constructed. The combined evidence, however, points to *a relatively symmetrical high-brow form.*

"The *mentality* of primitives is far higher than was formerly suspected. There is no essential difference between man recent, glacial, or preglacial, nor is there any shred of evidence for the '*homo alalus*' or speechless man. In every case we have a '*homo sapiens*' endowed with different degrees of mental facility, depending upon the complexity of his needs and environment. In this respect the above races compare favorably with the higher peoples.

"The *morality* of primitives has recently been placed in a far more favorable light. There is considerable evidence to prove that the institution of *monogamy* is very generally recognized by the lowest races of man that are known to us. Among the East-Indian primitives this is especially the case. Furthermore, there is a very general absence, or at least a rarity, of gross crimes, whether as theft, murder, infanticide, cannibalism, or human sacrifice. On the contrary, the lessons of honesty, charity, kindliness and generosity are strongly inculcated from the tenderest years, and social and domestic relations reveal a simple, but attractive picture.

"*These statistics are sufficient to show that the supposed incapacity of primitive man to be the recipient or the bearer of*

a relatively high order of theological truth is ipso facto an untenable proposition. It is further contradicted by the reports from the missionary field, which show that the despised primitive is as receptive of supernatural doctrines and as retentive of them, as any of his more favored or 'civilized' brethren. . . . . .

"A preliminary analysis of three wide epochs of humanity has revealed the fact that the institution known as totemism is confined to a certain group of races, which are higher than any of the above primitives, and lower than any of the full neo-lithic and civilized races of antiquity.

"A further investigation has disclosed with some probability the existence of two intermediate layers, in which magic and spiritism respectively claim an important element in religious belief.

"If, therefore, magic and totemism, spiritism and animism, can be proved to be absent from the earliest belt, it will stand to reason that they are all later developments in religious history, and by a similar process of exclusion it may be proved that they follow one another in the order indicated, or at least are characteristic of their respective cultures.

"Such a proof has been outlined in the above analysis, but it presents the *results* of professional research, rather than the research itself. It is a broad summary of what has already been discovered.

"Detailed proof will be found in the following study, in which each of the above statements will be made good by a rigid examination of the cultural and mythological data for each successive or typical region." Pp. LXXI, LXXII.

"To sum up, then, the combined religious picture for the prehistoric era may be said to reveal a development which seems to be traceable in at least three broad stages of mental and social evolution. These stages may be described as follows:—

"For the primitive period. Here the divinity is supreme, personal and worshipful in the best sense by prayer and mild sacrifice,—without cruel rites. He is strictly *super*-natural, not involved or confused with nature. . . . . He creates directly, or by means of a demi-urge the whole universe and man. . . . . He is supreme Lawgiver of the race, and His character reveals itself in a relatively clean morality.

"*This is the Monotheistic age of humanity*, in which the idea of transcendence is apparently uppermost. He is the only One, but He is all in all,—*Amaka*,—the universal Father, — . . . . . ." P. 573.

"For the totemic or glacial period. This ancient divinity can still be traced in his main features. All the above qualities apply here with equal force, they can be sifted out. Nevertheless the idea of *genesis* begins to attract the attention of man. Where did he [man] come from? Is he not intimately related to nature? Is he not her direct offspring? By degrees the notion is formed that nature is nearer to man than the

Heavenly Father, later all thinkable things are of one substance. . . . . .

"*This is the age of Pantheistic Monism*, in which the notion of immanence becomes all-important, it is nature herself which is the All. And yet the idea of a unique being has not been entirely lost, the *Wakanda* is still 'The Great Mystery', 'the Creator of heaven and earth, the Fountain of Mystic Medicine.' Among the righteous the totem is a blessing, the growing Knowledge of nature has but deepened their love for the Creator." P. 573.

"While a supreme Personality still directs the destinies of man in the abstract, in practice his worship is less direct, more mysterious, more occult, more magical, more mixed up with lifeless and impersonal agencies. In this we discern a mental tendency which is never without danger, the desire to know too much of the origin of things, to trace the divine operations in every shining crystal, in every living cell. It was impossible to make this experiment without the risk of a one-sided development, of grading into a vague mystery-cult, which is frankly nature-worship. Yet side by side we find the definition of deity as 'The Great Mystery'; and the occasional glimpse of a 'Man beyond', of a 'Father' of all the totems, suggests at least that some of these practices may be interpreted in a higher and a better sense. . . . . .

"The combined evidence inclines me more and more to the opinion, that in this 'mediaeval' period of the race there is evidence of a mental and moral dualism, of a splitting of belief and practice into two opposite channels, the one conservative, monotheistic, and monogamous, the other associated more or less with a vague, pantheistic nature-cult, in which the primitive ideas of matrimonial chastity have been in great part lost. . . . . In fact it may yet be within the power of proof to affirm that at no period of humanity has the cult of the All-Father been entirely lost, though its greater or less corruptions are only too evident." P. 556.

"Now in re-examining the data that have so far been accumulated, we shall find that the ancient concept of a personal Creator, though in most cases faded, may be generally recognized in the background,—He is there in a vague outline." P. 545.

"For the neolithic and recent period. The second stone age marks in many respects a reform, a revival of the primitive notions. The *Wakanda* has been disentangled from nature, he is no longer connected with the lower creation, he has become an *Awonawilona*, a 'Father of All', once more emphatically a 'Supreme Person.' . . . . They [i.e., the totems] are no longer guardian-things or guardian-animals, they have become guardian-*spirits*, endowed with *mana*, great personalities, who act on the lower creation by their secret power, focussing their interest on certain objects, making them inviolable, or sacrosanct,—taboo. A neolithic *tabu* is therefore more than a totem. It is the abode of *a person*, and as there

are many *tabus*, so there are many persons operating the *tabu*, not excluding a supreme *Tabu*, who thus becomes the head of the pantheon.

"This is the age of Polytheistic Syncretism in which the 'great Spirit' is surrounded by a host of minor spirits of the same nature, who are frequently co-eternal and who contest his authority. But this is not the invariable rule. The great *Awona* is still behind the *tabu*, willing to make it the instrument of his power. . . . . It is not simply a case of *Amakalangi*, 'Our Father in Heaven', but of *A-ti-us-ta-ka-wa*,, 'Our Father in all places'." P. 574.

"If, therefore, the living survivors be compared with the buried civilizations as far as known to us, their combined testimony is surely of some value. They have revealed the fact that the worship of the supreme Being has never been entirely lost, the Father-above is still with his children." P. 570.

'If, then, we make one more appeal to the past records of the race by way of showing how essentially similar is the manifestation of the religious conscience in all ages of man, it should make us feel more secure in the foundations of our own faith, more especially, because, as I say, that consciousness cannot be entirely accounted for on purely naturalistic lines, but presupposes some form of divine illumination, and thus reflects on the office of the Messiah. . . . . .

"It should be strongly conducive to a robust form of religious belief of any kind to know and to feel that the common pulse of humanity beats as a single stroke on the all-essential matter of a supreme, personal, invisible cause of existence, however much that cause may have been mixed up in certain cases with its effect, and thus partially fused with its own creation. The argument from the universal consent of humanity appeals strongly to certain minds, and the fact that some kind of supreme power has always been recognized fills a void in the human heart which nothing else can replace—it is the first and fundamental dogma of all religion. . . . .

"Finally, we have undeniable relics of a great flood, coupled with a firm persuasion that the good shall in some way be rewarded in another world, while the wicked shall be punished or in some way purged for their moral perversities." P. 594.

Cf. also pp. 121 ff.; 501 ff.; 515 ff.; 541 ff.; 545 ff.; especially 547, 556; 557 ff.; 571 ff.; especially 573, 574.

DIFFICULTIES

1. If many races agree in asserting a plurality of gods, their testimony rather denies than affirms the existence of the true God.

   But many races so agree.

Therefore their testimony cannot prove the existence of the true God.

D. Maj. If they agree in asserting a plurality of gods, of whom one is acknowledged to be supreme, differing essentially from the others, and their master, their testimony denies, etc., *N.;* if one is not so acknowledged, *Subd.,* their testimony would disprove the existence of God, if their consent, with regard to the errors it affirms concerning the nature of the true God, enjoyed the universality and constancy required for a judgment of the common consent of mankind, *C.;* if it does not enjoy these qualities with regard to these errors, but does enjoy them in as much as it affirms *the existence* of a supreme being, *Subd.;* their consent, looked at objectively and considered *as a whole,* logically involves the denial of the true God, *C.;* their consent looked at *as their subjective persuasion,* and *only in as much as it asserts* the existence of the supreme being, since with regard to this point it has the marks of a judgment of the common consent of mankind, rather denies than proves the existence of the true God, *N.* *D. Con.*

2. If the persuasion of the human race concerning the existence of God has grown weaker as man has grown in knowledge, it cannot prove the existence of God.
But it has grown weaker.
Therefore from it the existence of God cannot be proved.
D. Maj. If it has grown weaker with mankind in general, it cannot, etc., *C.;* if it has grown weaker amongst *relatively* few, and that because of a perverted use of their intellect, it cannot, etc., *N.* *Cd. Min.*

3. If the Buddhists and other heathen peoples are Atheists, the consent of mankind in affirming the existence of God

is not morally universal, and, hence, not worthy of trust. But the Buddhists and other heathen peoples are Atheists. Therefore the consent of mankind in affirming the existence of God is not morally universal.

D. Maj. If some philosophers among the Buddhists and other heathens are Atheists, the consent, etc., is not universal, *N.;* if the common people are Atheists, the consent is not universal, *C.* *Cd. Min.*

There are about 130,000,000 Buddhists and countless other heathens in the world at present. Of these some of the philosophers are atheistic; the common class is not.

A similar difficulty might be urged in regard to the Brahmanists who number about 210,000,000. The Brahmanist philosophers profess Pantheism; the common people do not.

4. If there are many Pantheists in the world, man's consent in affirming the existence of God is not morally universal.
But there are many Pantheists in the world.
Therefore man's consent in affirming the existence of God is not morally universal.

D. Maj. If there are *absolutely* many, man's consent is not universal, *N.;* if there are *relatively* many, man's consent, etc., is not universal, *C.* *Cd. Min.*

5. If the human race erred with regard to the rotation of the sun, the common consent of mankind is not a source of certain knowledge.
But the human race so erred.
Therefore the common consent of mankind is not a source of certain knowledge.

D. Maj. If the human race so erred, and if this judgment was of the kind described in our prenotes, the common consent of mankind is not, etc.,*C.;* if it were not of that kind, *N.* *Cd. Min.*

ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS DEMONSTRATING THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

Besides the three arguments proving God's existence already given, modern Catholic philosophers offer nine others. They are not all of equal value. We shall consider briefly four of them. Of these four, three are given by Saint Thomas.

I. The argument from motion.

This argument is the first given by St. Thomas in the *Summa Theologica,* 1, q. 2, a. 3. His development of it, however, differs from the one given below.

The argument rests on the principle: Whatever is moved, is moved by another. The truth of this principle is established:—

1. **A priori.**

"Nothing can be at the same time in act and potentiality, with regard to the same thing. Whatever is in motion, however, as such, is in a state of potentiality, since motion is the act of a being which is in a state of potentiality, and in as much as it is in such a state. Now, whatever moves, in as much as it moves, is in act, since nothing can act unless it be in act. Therefore no being can be with regard to one and the same thing, actually mover and moved; and so nothing [unless it be also moved by another] moves itself." St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles,* Bk. I, c. 13.

2. **A posteriori.** Everything which we see in motion, whether it be a non-living or a living being, is in some way or other moved from without.

This principle being established, the argument is evolved as follows:

A is moved by B. B, the mover, is itself, in turn, either moved by another, or moves A and at the same time is unmoved. If B is moved by another, the same query must be repeated with regard to the being that moved him, and finally we must reach a mover who is unmoved

or admit the existence of an infinite series of moved and moving beings independent of an unmoved being. Such an independent series, however, is impossible, for nowhere in it can be found an adequately sufficient reason for the motion of A. Therefore we must admit the existence of some being who moves the others and who himself is unmoved. That being, then, must have *of himself* the perfection by which it communicated motion to the other beings. Since, however, no perfection of a being can exceed the perfection of the essence from which it flows, the unmoved mover must be a being whose *essence is from himself*. That being is God; the Prime Mover, who is unmoved and immovable.

II. **The argument from contingent being.**

This is the third argument given by **St. Thomas,** l. c. His development of it is somewhat different from the one we suggest.

A contingent being is one whose existence is not absolutely necessary. It could have not existed.

The argument is evolved in exactly the same way as the Cosmological argument.

From the fact, namely, that a contingent being exists, we deduce the existence of a being who is *absolutely necessary*. This being is God.

III. **The argument from the different degrees of perfection in creatures.**

St. Thomas, l. c., puts this argument in the fourth place. It is developed in different ways. We take the following: The creatures existing in the world possess many perfections, differing in kind and in degree. All of them are finite. No perfection, however, which is finite or limited, can exist of itself, for, if it could, the sufficient reason for its existence in that limited way would have to be found in itself. Now that is impossible, for since

perfection of itself does not say this degree rather than that, i.e., does not limit itself, in no limited perfection can be found the reason for its own existence. Nor can the adequately sufficient reason be found in another finite being, since that being in like manner, must have a sufficient reason, for its limited existence, in another. Therefore, that reason must be found in a being who possesses the perfection in question in an infinite way and of himself, and who, therefore exists of himself. There is, however, only one being who exists of himself. That being is God, who as is proved later in Natural Theology, possesses not only some perfections infinitely but all.

IV.—The argument derived from man's acknowledgment of moral obligation, i.e., of a law binding him in conscience.

It is a fact that all men admit that certain actions are morally good, and others morally bad; that they are obliged to do the good ones at times, and avoid the bad ones always; and this even in secret. This obligation binds us all; the great and the small alike. It binds at all cost, no matter what may draw us in the opposite direction—riches, pleasures, honors. And if the warning that is given us in concrete cases by the voice of conscience, "This action must be done", is not heeded, we realize that we have done wrong, that we are worthy of blame and punishment, and, if the transgression be judged serious, we are filled with the deepest remorse.

Now, whence comes this obligation? Certainly no inferior imposes it, for an inferior has not the right to command. Nor is it imposed by an equal, for an equal has no right to dominate me. Nor does it come from some human law, nor is it the outcome of social convention, for these things are changeable, and the morality of certain actions is absolutely changeless, and, conse-

quently, the mandate of the moral law with regard to them is also absolutely changeless. Of this kind are actions which are intrinsically good or bad; actions whose goodness or badness is independent of all legislation.

Nor can that obligation arise from the fact that my actions are or are not in conformity with my human nature looked at merely in itself and without ascending to some higher principle. For my nature looked at merely in itself is a finite good, and it is contrary to reason to say that I should be bound *absolutely* for the sake of a limited good.

Therefore the obligation must be imposed on me by some higher power, who has the right to command me, the right to punish me, and to whom I am responsible. That being is God.

Such is the persuasion of man. Now the question is: Is that persuasion founded on objective evidence, and if so, how can that be shown? All Catholic philosophers agree in admitting that this persuasion is founded on objective evidence, and, hence, that the acknowledgment of the existence of the law-giver, i.e., of God, which is implied in that persuasion, is also founded on objective evidence. They differ, however, in explaining how the evidence of God's existence is so implied.

a. Some hold that at least some of the fundamental principles of the moral law, e.g., "Good must be done; evil must be avoided", are immediately evident to us, and that in these judgments the existence of God is acknowledged on immediate evidence. They hold, however, that this immediate evidence is *a posteriori,* since it is bound up in, and derived from, a fact of experience. This opinion is held by Father S. Schiffini, S.J., and possibly by Cardinal Newman. Cf. Grammar of Assent, pp. 101-104, 106, 107. (Longmans. Ed. 1891)

This opinion is commonly rejected, and, most probably, rightly so, on the ground that it contradicts experience. We have no consciousness of an immediately evident knowledge of God's existence.

b. A second opinion holds that the acknowledgment of a moral obligation does not presuppose, nor does it formally imply, an acknowledgment of the existence of God. It so implies it, however, that, first, there can be no transgression of the moral law which is not an offence against God, and, secondly, from it that existence can be demonstrated.

Most probably this opinion is erroneous. An admission of the existence of an obligation contains *formally* an admission of the existence of the one who obliges. Hence one who would attempt to demonstrate the latter from the former commits the fallacy of *petitio principii*. On this ground, Father De San, S.J., and others reject this opinion.

c. A third opinion admits that the acknowledgment of any moral obligation, supposes the formal admission of the existence of the law-giver—God. Indirectly, however, the existence of God may be proved from such acknowledgment; from the fact, namely that the opposite hypothesis would make error the foundation of all honesty in man's life, and truth the foundation of all that is bad. In which case our nature would have been badly constituted.

This form of argument must also be rejected on the ground that it is a *petitio principii*. The only argument that we use to prove that our nature is not badly constituted, is to appeal to the wisdom of its maker—God. Yet the existence of God in the present case, is the point to be proved.

d. Another indirect proof of the existence of God from the acknowledgment of moral obligation, and a

proof which is certainly legitimate and used by many authors, appeals to the fact that the acknowledgment of moral obligation is a judgment of the common consent of mankind, of the kind described in the preceding thesis, and hence necessarily true.

CONCLUSION

To help man to reach God, the fundamental Truth of all truth, the author of his being, the Source of morality, the Object of his adoration, the End for whom he was made, is the highest service a sane, reason-grounded Philosophy can give. Natural Theology does this proximately, proving, as it does, God's existence, developing a true concept of Him and His attributes, showing the utter dependence of creatures and all their actions on Him, and His all-wise providence in governing them, defending these truths against attacks made on them by innumerable false philosophic systems, and, so, laying solidly the foundations of supernatural faith-knowledge without which salvation is impossible. Remotely, yet none the less necessarily, the other branches of Philosophy aid in this work, for without them there would be no science of Natural Theology.

One would rightly conclude, then, that the study of Philosophy is of the utmost importance, especially in these days, when, as we have seen, through an arbitrary setting aside of reason, the nature and personality, nay more, the very reality of God are called in question, not alone by professed unbelievers, but by many also who shamelessly call themselves followers of Christ. Nowhere, perhaps, is this importance more forcibly insisted on and the supreme worth of Philosophy as the strong ally of our Faith more clearly set forth, than in the Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII, *Aeterni Patris*, August 4, 1879, on The Study of Scholastic Philosophy according to the mind of St. Thomas Aquinas. This weighty appeal of the Holy Pontiff should be carefully read and deeply pondered by all serious students of Philosophy. We quote it in part.

"The Apostle warns us that the faithful of Christ are often deceived in mind 'by philosophy and vain deceit' (Col. ii, 8),

and that thus the sincerity of faith is corrupted in men. For this reason the Supreme Pastors of the Church have always held that it is a part of their office to advance, with all their power, knowledge truly so called; but at the same time to watch with the greatest care that all human learning shall be imparted according to the rule of the Catholic faith. Especially is this true of 'philosophy', on which the right treatment of other sciences depends in great measure. . . . .

"If anyone look carefully at the bitterness of our times, . . . he will discover with certainty the fruitful root of the evils which are now overwhelming us, and of the evils which we greatly fear. The cause he will find to consist in this—evil teaching about things, human and divine, has come forth from the school of philosophers. . . . . Now, it has been implanted in man by nature to follow reason as the guide of his actions, and therefore, if the understanding go wrong in anything, the will easily follows. Hence it comes about that wicked opinions in the understanding, flow into human actions and make them bad. On the other hand, if the mind of man be healthy, and strongly grounded in true principles, it will assuredly be the source of great blessings, both as regards the good of individuals and as regards the common weal.

"We do not, indeed, attribute to human philosophy such force and authority as to judge it sufficient for the utter shutting out and uprooting of all errors. . . . chiefly from the almighty power and help of God, we may hope that the darkness of error will be taken away from the minds of men, and that they will repent. But we must not despise or undervalue these natural helps which are given to man by the kindness and wisdom of God, Who strongly and sweetly orders all things; and it stands to reason that a right use of philosophy is the greatest of these helps. For God did not give the light of reason in vain to the soul of man, nor does the superadded light of Faith quench, or even lessen, the strength of the understanding. Its effect is far from this. It perfects the

understanding, gives it new strength and makes it fit for greater works. The very nature of the providence of God Himself, therefore, makes it needful for us to seek a safeguard in human knowledge when we strive to bring back the people to Faith and salvation. The records of antiquity bear witness that this method . . . . was used habitually by the most illustrious Fathers of the Church. They, in truth, were wont to give to reason offices neither few nor small; and these the great Augustine has summed up very shortly: 'Attributing to this science . . . that by which the life-giving Faith . . . . is begotten, nourished, guarded and strengthened.' . . . . . Hence it has not untruly been called by the ancients 'an education leading to the Christian Faith,' 'a prelude and help of Christianity,' 'a schoolmaster for the Gospel.' . . . . .

"In the first place, then, this great and glorious fruit is gathered from human reason—namely, that it demonstrates the existence of God: 'By the greatness of the beauty, and of the creature, the Creator of them may be seen, so to be known thereby.'

'In the next place, reason shows that God, in a way belonging only to Himself, excels by the sum of all perfections—that is, by an infinite wisdom from which nothing can be hidden; and also by a supreme justice which no affection of evil can touch. Hence reason proves that God is not only true, but the very Truth itself, which cannot deceive nor be deceived. Further, it is a clear consequence from this that the human reason obtains for the word of God full belief and authority.

"In like manner reason declares that the evangelical doctrine has shone as the light from its very beginning, by signs and miracles which are infallible proofs of infallible truth; and that therefore they who receive the Faith by the Gospel, do not act rashly, . . . but by an obedience that is altogether reasonable, submit their understanding and their judgment to the authority of God.

"Further, not less than these things in value is it that reason clearly shows us the truth about the Church instituted by Christ. That Church, as the Vatican Synod decreed—'because of the wonderful way in which it spreads; because of its great holiness and inexhaustible fruitfulness in all places; because of its Catholic unity and invincible stability—is in itself a great and perpetual motive of credibility, and an unanswerable argument for its own Divine legation.'

"The foundations, then, having been laid in the most solid way, there is needed, further, a use of philosophy, both perpetual and manifold, in order that Sacred Theology may assume and put on the nature, habit, and character of true science. . . . .

"Nor must we pass by in silence, or reckon of little account, that fuller knowledge of our belief, and, as far as may be, that clearer understanding of the mysteries of faith which Augustine and other Fathers praised, and labored to attain. . . . . Such knowledge and understanding are certainly acquired more fully and more easily by those who, to integrity of life and study of the faith, join a mind that has been disciplined by philosophical culture.

"Lastly, it pertains to philosophical discipline to guard with religious care all truths that come to us by Divine tradition, and to resist those who dare to attack them. Now, as regards this point, the praise of philosophy is great, in that it is reckoned a bulkwark of the faith, and as a strong defence of religion. 'The doctrine of our Saviour,' as Clement of Alexandria bears witness, 'is indeed perfect in itself, and has need of nothing, forasmuch as it is the power and wisdom of God. But Greek philosophy, though it does not by its approach make the truth more powerful, has been called a fit hedge and ditch for the vineyard, because it weakens the arguments of sophists against the truth, and wards off the crafty tricks of those by whom the truth is attacked.'

"In fact, as the enemies of the Catholic name borrow their warlike preparations from philosophic method, when they begin their attacks on religion, so the defenders of the science of God borrow many weapons from the stores of philosophy, by which to defend the dogmas of revelation. Again, we must count it no small victory for the Christian Faith, that human reason powerfully and promptly wards off those very weapons of the enemy which have been got together by the skill of the same human reason for purposes of harm. . . . .

"Nay, more; the Church herself not only advises Christian teachers, but commands them to draw this safeguard from philosophy. For the fifth Lateran Council decreed that 'every assertion contrary to a truth of enlightened faith is altogether false, because truth cannot possibly contradict the truth': and then it commands doctors of philosophy to apply themselves studiously to the refutation of fallacious arguments; . . . .

"But if philosophy has to be found equal to the work of bringing forth such precious fruits as we have mentioned, it must, above everything, take care never to wander from the path trodden by the venerable antiquity of the Fathers and approved in the Vatican Synod by the solemn suffrage of authority. It is plainly seen that we must accept many truths in the supernatural order which far surpass the power of any intellect. The human reason, therefore, conscious of its own weakness, must not dare to handle things greater than itself; nor to deny these truths. . . . .

"In those heads of doctrine, however, which the human intellect naturally can take in, it is clearly just that philosophy should use its own method, its own principles, and its own arguments: yet not so as to seem to draw itself away with audacity from the authority of God. . . . .

"We know indeed that there are to be found men who, exalting too highly the powers of human reason, contend that the understanding of man falls from its native dignity when it becomes subject to Divine Authority, and that being thus

bound, as it were, in a yoke of slavery, it is greatly retarded and hindered from reaching the heights of faith and excellence. Such teaching as that is full of error and falsehood. The end of it is that men, in the height of folly and sinful thanklessness, reject all higher faiths. . . . . Now, the mind of man is shut up and held in certain bounds, and narrow enough these boundaries are. The consequence is that it falls into many mistakes and is ignorant of many things. On the other hand, the Christian Faith, resting as it does on the authority of God, is the certain teacher of truth. He who follows this guidance is neither entangled in the nets of error nor tossed about on the waves of doubt. Hence the best philosophers are they who join philosophical study with the obedience of the Christian Faith. . . . .

"The doctors of the Middle Ages, whom we call Scholastics, set themselves to do a work of very great magnitude. There are rich and fruitful crops of doctrine scattered everywhere in the mighty volumes of the Holy Fathers. The aim of the Scholastics was to gather these together diligently, and to store them up, as it were, in one place, for the use and convenience of those that come after. . . . . .

"There were especially two glorious Doctors, teachers of the famous science—that is, the angelic St. Thomas, and the seraphic St. Bonaventure. . . . . Now far above all other Scholastic Doctors towers Thomas Aquinas, their master and prince. Cajetan says truly of him: 'So great was his veneration for the ancient and sacred Doctors that he may be said to have gained a perfect understanding of them all.' Thomas gathered together their doctrines like the scattered limbs of a body, and moulded them into a whole. . . . His intellect was docile and subtle; his memory was ready and tenacious; his life was most holy; and he loved the truth alone. Greatly enriched as he was with the science of God and the science of man, he is likened to the sun; for he warmed the whole

earth with the fire of his holiness, and filled the whole earth with the splendor of his teaching.

"There is no part of philosophy which he did not handle with acuteness and solidity. He wrote about the laws of reasoning; about God and incorporeal substances; about man and other things of sense; and about human acts and their principles. What is more, he wrote on these subjects in such a way that in him not one of the following perfections is wanting: a full selection of subjects, a beautiful arrangement of their divisions; the best method of treating them; certainty of principles; strength of argument; perspicuity and propriety in language; and the power of explaining deep mysteries. . . . . With his own hand he vanquished all errors of ancient times; and still he supplies an armory of weapons which brings us certain victory in the conflict with falsehoods ever springing up in the course of years." (Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Published as a Preface in Vol. I. of their translation of the *Summa Theologica.*)

APPENDIX

In the proofs of our theses and solutions of difficulties some few abbreviations occur. Those who are familiar with the use of the syllogism will have no difficulty in understanding and applying them; those who are not, will find the following explanation simple and yet sufficiently helpful. With very little practice the handling of syllogisms becomes quite easy.

The abbreviations used are those of the corresponding Latin words. This choice was made because the Latin verb, excluding as it does the separate use of the personal pronoun, is more easily abbreviated than its English equivalent. In the appended list we give the abbreviations, the corresponding Latin words, the corresponding English words, and whatever explanation is necessary.

Maj., *Major,* the Major, i.e., the first or principal proposition, from which, in a syllogism, the conclusion is derived. When this abbreviation is used in our proofs, it is followed either by the proof of the Major in question or any other reference to it thought necessary.

Min., *Minor,* the Minor, i.e., the second or subordinate proposition leading to the conclusion of a syllogism. In our proofs this abbreviation is used like the preceding one.

Ant., *Antecedens,* the Antecedent. The Antecedent, referred to by this abbreviation, is the *only expressed* proposition, from which, in an enthymeme, the conclusion is derived. An enthymeme is an abbreviated syllogism; a syllogism, namely, the Major or Minor of which is not expressed. In the few cases in which enthymemes take the place of syllogisms in our proofs, this abbreviation is used like the preceding ones.

Con., *Consequens,* the Consequent. The Consequent, referred to by this abbreviation, is the conclusion of a syllogism, an enthymeme, or any other form of argumentation.

C. Maj., *Concedo Majorem,* I concede, i.e., I admit the truth of the Major.

C. Min., *Concedo Minorem,* I concede the Minor.

N. Maj., *Nego Majorem,* I deny, i.e., I reject as false, the Major.

N. Min., *Nego Minorem,* I deny the Minor.

Tr. Maj., *Transmitto Majorem,* I transmit, i.e., I pass no judgment on, the Major. For one reason or another, it may be advisable, or even necessary, at times, to pass a Major by without comment. In such cases, the Major is said to be transmitted.

Tr. Min., *Transmitto Minorem,* I transmit the Minor.

Tr. Ant., *Transmitto Antecedens,* I transmit the Antecedent

D. Maj., *Distinguo Majorem,* I distinguish the Major. At times a Major may be understood in two different senses. When this happens, it is distinguished, or divided, according to these senses, into two propostions. If one of these is to be admitted as true, the abbreviation, *C., Concedo,* I concede, is placed after it. If one is to be denied, the abbreviation, *N., Nego,* I deny, is used. If one is to be transmitted, the abbreviation, *Tr., Transmitto,* I transmit, follows it. If, however, as not infrequently happens, one is still further to be distinguished, the abbreviation, *Subd., Subdistinguo,* I subdistinguish, is placed after it. The propositions resulting from this subdistinction, are treated in the same way as those resulting from the first distinction.

It is quite evident that a subdistinction is a distinction under (*sub*) a distinction.

D. Min., *Distinguo Minorem,* I distinguish the Minor. When the Major *is not distinguished,* and the Minor *requires distinction*, this abbreviation is used to denote that fact. The remarks just made concerning the distinction of the Major, are to be applied here also.

Cd. Min., *Contradistinguo Minorem,* I contradistinguish the Minor. When the Major *is distinguished,* and *the same distinction is also to be applied to the Minor,* the abbreviation *Cd.* is used to denote the fact that this application is to be made *contrariwise,* i.e., in a way contrary, to that made in the Major. To make clear just what this means it will be necessary to say a few words about the terms of a syllogism, and the application of distinctions to them.

In a categorical syllogism, i.e., one whose propositions are not conditional but absolute, two terms, called extremes, are compared with a third, called the middle term, and from this comparison, which is made in the Major and Minor, is derived the Conclusion, in which one of the extremes, which is the predicate of the Conclusion, is, according to the quality of the syllogism, affirmed or denied of the other, which is the subject of the Conclusion. As is evident, the middle term appears only in the Major and Minor; one of the extremes, in the Major, the other in the Minor, both in the Conclusion. When, therefore, a Major is distinguished, and the distinction falls on one of the extremes, as this extreme appears again only in the Conclusion, the same distinction is to be applied to it there, and in the same way. In this case, the Minor is not distinguished; it is conceded or, if advisable, transmitted. Similarly, when a Minor is distinguished, and the distinction falls on one of the extremes, as this extreme appears again only in the Conclusion, the same distinction is to be applied to it there, and in the same way. In this case the Major is not distinguished; it is conceded or, if advisable, transmitted. When, however, the Major is distinguished, and the distinction falls on the middle term, as that term appears again in the Minor, the same distinction is to be applied to it there, not, however, in the same way, but, as was

noted above, *contrariwise,* i.e., that term of the distinction which *was conceded* with regard to *one extreme* in the Major, is to be *denied* with regard to the *other extreme* in the Minor, and *vice versa.*

In a conditional syllogism the Major is a conditional proposition, and the Minor either affirms the antecedent *of this proposition,* in which case *its* consequent is affirmed in the Consequent, or Conclusion, *of the syllogism;* or it (the Minor) *denies* the consequent of the *conditional proposition,* in which case the antecedent *of this proposition* is denied in the Consequent *of the syllogism.* If the Major of a conditional syllogism requires distinction, the part there distinguished is to be contradistinguished in the Minor, if it appears there; if it does not appear there, it is to be distinguished in the Conclusion.

N. Con., *Nego Consequens,* I deny the Consequent. When a syllogism is distinguished, its conclusion is to be denied, according to the sense of the distinction used.

We make no use of this abbreviation, as the denial of the consequent in this case is taken for granted in our solutions of difficulties.

When the Major or Minor of a syllogism is denied, the syllogism falls. In this event nothing is said concerning the Consequent.

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